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 Abstract 
 
This study aims at assessing the level of efficiency of public R&D spending and public R&D support 
for private R&D and to compare efficiency scores among OECD countries, in particular EU Member 
states over the past two decades. The analysis rests on the concept of efficiency which is based on the 
relationship between public R&D spending and the additional R&D in the business sector induced by 
such measures. The differences observed in efficiency performance across countries is then explained 
in relation to control variables, e.g. exogenous framework conditions. 
Given the different specifications considered and the two methods implemented, i.e. Stochastic 
Frontier and non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis, results inevitably diverge and in some cases 
to a large extent. Some results are nevertheless robust and consistent through the different methods 
and model specifications.  
For the efficiency scores, three groups of countries emerge. The first group refers to the most efficient 
countries in terms of R&D public support, namely Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, and the USA. The second group is composed by 
France, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Norway, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom. The third group of 
the less efficient countries in terms of R&D public spending includes China, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Israel, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, and the Slovak Republic.  
In terms of the determinants explaining these performances, conditional efficiency scores are found to 
be higher in the most industrialized countries worldwide. In terms of GDP per capita, countries in an 
intermediate position are characterized by lower efficiency scores of their public R&D support 
funding. Unsurprisingly countries with the best performance in terms of innovative activities are also 
the ones that exhibit the highest efficiencies of their public R&D support, while higher government 
expenditures in percentage of total consumption are associated with lower performance in terms of 
efficiency. In terms of industrial structure, economies with a higher share of high-tech manufacturing 
sectors in the total manufacturing value added benefit from higher efficiency performance of their 
public R&D supporting policy instruments while economic growth does not seem to affect efficiency 
scores. 
In terms of regulatory and macroeconomic conditions, a positive and significant impact is observed on 
the efficiency scores of a more favourable tax regime to international trade, of more deregulation in 
the labour and business markets as well as of the strength of the Intellectual Property Right System. 
On the other hand, access to sound money does not appear to positively affect public R&D efficiency. 
The share of the general government consumption in percentage of total consumption negatively 
affects the efficiency scores and as expected countries with high inflation rates appear to be less 
efficient. 
Finally, there seems to be no unique public strategy that determines high efficiency levels and more 
general conclusions about “optimal” policy mixes with respect to public R&D would require to go 
beyond the pure macroeconomic level. 
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  6Executive Summary  
The objective of the study is to explore the possibility of using quantitative methods to assess 
efficiency of public R&D with respect to stimulating private R&D at the macroeconomic 
level. The study sought to make use of readily available indicators and statistics to measure 
the level of efficiency of public R&D spending and public R&D support for private R&D and 
to compare efficiency indices among OECD countries, in particular the EU member states. In 
order to do so, the study makes use of macroeconomic data from the recent two decades. The 
analysis rests on the concept of efficiency which is based on the relationship between public 
R&D spending (inputs) and the additional R&D in the business sector induced by such 
measures (output). As such the study can be considered as a first step of the analysis of the 
effects of R&D on the outcomes of such activities, e.g. output or TFP growth.  
 
The differences observed in efficiency performance across countries can then be explained in 
relation to control variables. Among those are exogenous framework conditions, e.g. the 
nature of competition, the quality of the business environment, the IPR regime, the access to 
market and to external financing conditions, etc. Based on the results obtained, it is assessed 
whether quantitative efficiency analysis at the country level is suitable to draw conclusions on 
recommendations for reinforcement or retargeting innovation policy to meet the national 
goals of the revised Lisbon agenda. 
 
This study uses two main methods that have been widely used in the literature, namely a 
parametric regression approach, the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), and a non-
parametric method called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Both methods relate the output, 
i.e. private R&D spending (BERD) and alternatively the R&D personnel employed in the 
business sector, to inputs. The study considers public R&D funding in the business sector 
including other direct payments towards R&D from government to industry (BERDBYGOV), 
expenditures on higher education research and development (HERD) and R&D conducted in 
public labs (GOVERD) as relevant input measures. Both methods estimate an efficiency term, 
that is, the extent of slack in government expenditures. In other words they allow the 
estimation of efficiency frontiers and efficiency losses. 
 
The obtained technical efficiency scores of public R&D spending across countries can then be 
explained by exogenous factors or framework conditions varying across countries in a second 
stage. While the SFA allows to simultaneously estimate the R&D equation and the efficiency 
terms, Tobit models are used after unconditional efficiency scores are calculated with DEA. 
By applying the DEA and the SFA method, this study uses two approaches which represent 
the most commonly used in the literature to assess the efficiency of public spending at the 
macroeconomic level. 
 
The Stochastic Frontier Analysis is conducted by estimating cross-sectional estimations, i.e. 
using only one-time period, as well as panel models, i.e. using all time periods at once. It 
turned out that the variables BERDBYGOV and HERD always have a positive impact on 
private R&D (BERD) and R&D personnel employed in the business sector, and that the 
  7estimated coefficients have a reasonable and meaningful magnitude. However, the sample of 
countries is too small to detect statistically significant inefficiencies in a single time period. In 
other words the small sample size of the cross-section does not allow to estimate inefficiencies 
with enough precision, so that we only find insignificant estimates of the efficiency index. 
Even in the panel data models, the SFA does not detect significant unconditional 
inefficiencies, that is, if the efficiency term is not related to certain country characteristics, 
the SFA does not report statistically significant inefficiencies. In a final step we apply panel 
regressions in which we assume that the conditional mean of the inefficiency term depends on 
covariates. Contrary to the former results we now find interesting differences across 
countries’ efficiencies based on the choice of the dependent variable (BERD or R&D 
personnel). Results indicate that the inefficiency is highest in EU15 countries when it comes 
to R&D employment in the business sector as reaction to public R&D spending either as 
subsidies or R&D performed in the public sector. 
 
The results improve further if we apply more structural variables rather than ad-hoc country 
groupings. It turns out that index variables, such as the access to sound money and the legal 
structure and security of property rights, point in the same direction for both dependent 
variables, BERD and R&D employment: the better the index, the higher is the efficiency in a 
country's R&D investment in the business sector as response to public R&D. 
 
The DEA analysis which is conducted by using an one-output three-input framework leads to 
the result that - averaged over five time periods - 3 countries out of 21, namely Japan, 
Switzerland and the United States are ranked in the first position and lie on the production 
possibility frontier. The other countries are inefficient in the sense that given their 
combination of inputs they achieve a lower amount of output as compared to the efficient 
countries which use similar combination of inputs. Regarding the evolution of efficiency 
scores over time it turns out that Japan, Switzerland and the United States are the three 
countries which are efficient for each of the five sub-periods. This is also the case for Ireland 
and Iceland, except for the last sub period. For the other countries, efficiency scores appear 
to decline over time. This drop is more pronounced for countries like Austria, Italy, Spain and 
Norway. On the contrary, France, Germany and Sweden are characterized by a relative small 
decline of their efficiency scores. Finally, Canada and Denmark are the only two countries 
which improve the efficiency of their public R&D over time. 
 
Applying the DEA over the more recent time period substantially increases the number of 
countries in the sample. Japan, Switzerland and the United States are still among the top 
efficient countries and some new Member States are listed among the most efficient countries 
(Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta) and other among the less efficient ones (The Slovak 
Republic, Latvia and Poland). The unique situation of some of these transition economies, the 
crowding in effect through the wages of the R&D personnel may explain their lower efficiency 
performance while the small size of some of these countries tends to overestimate their 
efficiency. 
 
  8In terms of the impact of different determinants to explain differences in DEA efficiency 
scores across countries, conditioning the scores on different country groupings partly confirm 
the crownding out/in effects. Conditional efficiency scores are also found to be higher for the 
most industrialized countries worldwide. In terms of GDP per capita, countries in an 
intermediate position are characterized by lower efficiency scores of their public R&D 
support funding. Unsurprisingly countries with the best performance in terms of innovative 
activities are also the ones that exhibit the highest efficiencies of their public R&D support, 
while higher government expenditures in percentage of total consumption are associated with 
lower performance in terms of efficiency. 
 
In terms of regulatory and macroeconomic conditions, we observe a positive and significant 
impact of a more favourable tax regime to international trade as well as more deregulation in 
the labour and business markets on the efficiency scores. Access to sound money does not 
appear to positively affect public R&D efficiency. The share of the general government 
consumption in percentage of total consumption negatively affects the efficiency scores and 
conversely for the legal structure and security of property rights. Then as expected countries 
with high inflation rates appear to be less efficient while economic growth does not seem to 
affect efficiency scores. 
 
In terms of administrative, institutional and business conditions that enhance R&D activities 
in the private sector and affect the efficiency of public R&D policies, results as regards the 
former were inconclusive. In terms of industrial structure, economies with a higher share of 
high-tech manufacturing sectors in the total manufacturing value added benefit from higher 
efficiency performance of their public R&D supporting policy instruments. The importance of 
public procurement advertised in the Official Journal as a percentage of GDP and as a 
percentage of total public procurements as well as the strength of the IPR system negatively 
affect the efficiency performance. Yet, as regards IPR, this result must be mitigated as a 
positive impact is found for the EU15 Member states and the most advanced countries in the 
world.  
 
To sum up, given all these different specifications it appears that the results inevitably diverge 
and in some cases to a large extent. Some results are nevertheless robust and consistent 
through the different methods and model specifications. For the efficiency scores it has been 
shown that three groups of countries emerge. The first group refers to the most efficient 
countries in terms of R&D public support. The countries that belong to this group are 
Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Switzerland, and the USA. The second group is composed by France, Hungary, Italy, Korea, 
Norway, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom. The third group of the less efficient 
countries in terms of R&D public spending includes China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Israel, 
Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic. On the one hand, one can attempt to 
explain the differences in efficiency performance by the possible presence of crowding-in or 
crowding-out effects of the public R&D support depending on certain country characteristics. 
For example, countries with low BERD may turn out to be inefficient when the efficiency of 
  9public spending is considered. However, a low level of wages of R&D personnel and the 
relatively abundant stock of researchers and scientists in these countries may result in a 
relatively large employment effect compared to e.g. EU15 member states (where wages are 
higher and unemployment among scientists may be relatively low) when public spending is 
extended. On the other hand, it is questionable if the results are suitable enough to draw these 
conclusions as, first, the DEA and SFA results are not always comparable due to different 
assumptions underlying the estimations (which cannot be tested), second, macroeconomic 
country data may not necessarily be sufficient to judge about inefficiencies without a detailed 
case-by-case study of the underlying policy mix, that is, a careful review of the different policy 
schemes at work and countries’ industry composition, the composition of the public science 
sector in terms of weaknesses and strengths of the research disciplines in comparison to other 
countries, and finally the match or mismatch between foci of business and public R&D in a 
country. 
  101. Introduction 
 
As a matter of fact, the scarcity of public expenditures is strengthened by the increased needs 
stemming from the ageing of the population and by a growing tax competition among 
industrialized countries. Moreover, the Stability and Growth Pact prevents EU Member States 
to run into ‘excessive’ deficits. Since public funds are scarce, available resources should be 
used as efficient as possible. Therefore, governments are drawing an increased attention on 
how to use public resources in the most efficient and effective ways and on analyzing the 
main factors affecting efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditures. Then, the role of 
Research and Development (R&D), and more generally of technological and innovative 
activities on economic growth, has been examined extensively in the economic literature for 
several decades. The ability to understand, exploit and adapt to a rapidly changing 
technological environment is seen to be a key factor to improve the standards of living and the 
prosperity of a nation. New and better products produced by firms allow them to gain market 
shares, while process R&D allows firms to make cheaper products, reduce their production 
costs and increase the overall performance of their total factor productivity (TFP). 
 
The objective of the study is to develop an analytical framework empirically implementable to 
assess the efficiency of public R&D instruments, i.e. direct subsidies, public procurement, tax 
incentives and R&D performed in the public sector, to support firms’ R&D and innovation 
related activities. The study, which can be defined within the broader context of the analysis 
of the efficiency of both public and private R&D spending in terms of stimulating 
productivity and growth, seeks to collect readily available indicators and statistics to measure 
the level of efficiency of these instruments and compare them in the EU-27 Member States, 
Japan, China and the US and over the last two decades. The study rests on the concept of 
efficiency which is based on the relationship between policy instruments to increase firms’ 
R&D activities (inputs) and the additional R&D induced by such measures (output). As such 
the study can be considered as a first step of the analysis of the effects of R&D on the 
outcomes of such activities, e.g. output or TFP growth.  
 
The differences observed in the levels (and changes) of efficiency performance across 
countries can then be explained in relation to control variables among which exogenous 
framework conditions, e.g. the nature of competition, the quality of the business environment, 
the IPR regime, the access to market and to external financing conditions, etc. Based on the 
results obtained, conclusions and recommendations are formulated to increase the efficiency 
of public spending for the Member states in the context of their national targets for R&D 
activities following the revised Lisbon strategy of 2005. 
 
The plan of the study is as follows. Section 2 proposes a survey of the literature assessing the 
performance and efficiency of public expenditure in general and R&D in particular. Section 3 
defines some concepts relating to inputs, output and outcomes and discusses some issues 
regarding the assessment of their efficiency. Section 4 discusses the empirical framework to 
  11assess the efficiency of public spending on R&D. Section 5 describes the data sources and 
indicators used in the study and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 6 presents the 
empirical findings based on the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and the Data Envelope 
Analysis (DEA) as regards the efficiency of public expenditures to support R&D activities in 
the private sector as well as the results as regards the impact of the framework determinants 
and business conditions affecting the efficiency of the public R&D policies. 
 
 
2. Survey of the empirical literature
3 
 
Several approaches for measuring the efficiency of governmental expenditures have been 
proposed in the literature. Studies dealing with efficiency of government spending use three 
main categories of methods, namely composite indicators, non-parametric methods and 
stochastic methods
4. 
 
2.1. Studies assessing the efficiency of public spending 
Non-parametric production frontier techniques, more precisely Free Disposable Hull (FDH) 
analysis and/or DEA methods estimate the extent of slack in government expenditures, in 
other words they allow the estimation of efficiency frontiers and efficiency losses. Both 
methods are linear programming based techniques that are able to convert multiple input and 
output measures into a single comprehensive measure of productive efficiency or productivity 
for the particular decision making units (DMUs), e.g. firms, non-profit or public 
organisations. In the FDH framework, it is possible to rank the efficiency of producers by 
comparing each individual performance with a production possibility frontier. Along this 
possibility frontier it is possible to observe the highest possible level of output for a given 
level of input and conversely it is also possible to determine the lowest level of input 
necessary to attain a given level of output. Likewise, the DEA method can be conducted for 
calculation of technical efficiency measures. Contrary to FDH, the DEA analysis assumes a 
convex production function which makes DEA more stringent than FDH. Thus, a country that 
is efficient under FDH is not always efficient under DEA whereas a country which is efficient 
under DEA will be always efficient under FDH
5. 
 
Afonso et al. (2006) mention different studies that investigated the performance and 
efficiency of the public sector and its functions using non parametric methods. These studies 
find significant inefficiencies in many countries
6. Most of them deal with the efficiency of 
                                                 
3 See Appendix 1 for a summary of the main findings of the studies presented in this section. 
4 See Section 4 for further details. 
5 Further details on these methods are provided in Section 4.1. 
6 Studies include Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) for education and health in Africa, Clements (2002) for education 
in Europe, St. Aubyn (2002) for education spending in the OECD, Afonso et al. (2006) for public sector 
performance expenditure in the OECD, Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005a, b) for efficiency in providing health and 
education in OECD countries. De Borger et al. (1994), De Borger and Kerstens (1996), and Afonso and 
Fernandes (2006) find evidence of spending inefficiencies for the local government sector. Afonso and St. 
  12public spending on education and health. For example, the FDH analysis to assess the 
efficiency of government expenditure on education and health is used by Gupta and Verhoven 
(2001), St. Aubyn (2002) and Clements (2002) where the latter one only deals with the 
efficiency of education spending. Clements (2002) discusses the efficiency of education 
spending in the European Union and compares their performance with a larger set of OECD 
countries. His dataset consists of data from 1996 onwards for 20 countries from the OECD 
where 12 are from the European Union. Using two input indicators (spending per student as a 
share of per capita GDP and the share of educational expenditure to GDP adjusted for cross-
country differences in the school age population) and two output indicators (percentage of 
people that completes secondary education at a normal graduation age and test scores on 
international examinations at the eight grade) shows that about 25 percent of education 
spending of countries belonging to the European Union are wasteful compared to the “best 
practices” observed in the OECD countries. 
 
The FDH method is also used by Afonso et al. (2003) who examine the performance and the 
efficiency of the public sectors of 23 industrialised OECD countries for 1990 and 2000. Since 
the measurement of public sector performance (PSP) and public sector efficiency (PSE), 
however, is still very limited, they provide a proxy for measuring PSP and PSE. The public 
sector performance (PSP) indicator consists of seven sub-indicators whereas the first four 
look at administrative, education, health and public infrastructure outcomes and the three 
other sub-indicators reflect the “Musgravian”
7 tasks for government, namely distribution, 
stability and allocation (See Appendix 2). The PSP indicator is then compiled by giving equal 
weight to each sub-indicator and in order to facilitate the compilation the values are 
normalised and the average for all indices is set equal to 1. Public sector efficiency (PSE) is 
calculated by weighting public sector performance by the amount of relevant public 
expenditure
8. Unlike the PSP indicators which show only moderate differences across 
industrialised countries, there are important differences across countries in the PSE indicators 
suggesting diminishing marginal products of higher public spending. The results indicate that 
the most efficient countries are the US, Japan and Luxembourg. Furthermore, small 
governments tend to show better results. To be more precise and regarding the 15 EU 
countries the average input efficiency is 0.73 which means that these countries are able to 
attain the same output level using only 73 percent of their currently used input. The output 
efficiency score is 0.82 which indicates that with given public expenditure, public sector 
performance is only 82 percent of what it could be if the EU was on the production possibility 
frontier.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
Aubyn (2005b) applied a two-step DEA/Tobit analysis to examine the efficiency of secondary education across 
countries. 
7 The ‘Musgrave Three-Function Framework’ which was developed by Richard Musgrave in his work ‘The 
Theory of Public Finance’ (1959) suggests that government activity should be separated into three functions 
macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution, and resource allocation. 
8 Additionally to total public spending, the average spending on goods and services, transfers, functional 
spending on education and health and public investment were also taken into account. In order to compute 
efficiency indicators, public spending was also normalised across countries with the average taking the value of 
one for each of the six categories. 
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and St. Aubyn (2005b) as well as Herrera and Pang (2005). Both studies deal with the 
efficiency in the education and health sector. Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005b) finally arrive at 
the conclusion that results using DEA were broadly comparable to results using FDH. Herrera 
and Pang (2005) additionally use a censored Tobit regression model to analyse the 
relationships between the efficiency scores and environmental variables. As the dependent 
variable, the input efficiency score already calculated with the DEA method is used. Several 
variables, such as the size of government expenditure, urbanization, income distribution 
inequality etc. are included as independent variables. This second stage analysis of the paper 
verifies statistical associations between the environmental variables and the efficiency scores. 
Afonso et al. (2006) also extend their analysis about public sector efficiency in the new EU 
member states. The computed DEA output efficiency scores are used to evaluate the 
importance of non-discretionary inputs via a Tobit regression where output efficiency scores 
are regressed on several non-discretionary factors. The results confirm the authors’ hypothesis 
that environmental factors, such as the security of property rights, per capita GDP, the 
competence of civil servants and the education level of people positively affect expenditure 
efficiency. 
 
Evans et al. (2000) as well as St. Aubyn (2002) also use parametric methods to examine 
efficiency on health and education. Evans et al. (2000) argue that since neither the maximum 
(frontier) nor the minimum levels of health are observable they have to be estimated. Thus, 
first of all a corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) procedure is then applied to estimate the 
minimum health level for 1997. Applying COLS a production function is first estimated using 
OLS and then shift up the OLS intercept parameter by the value of the largest positive 
residual to give the equation for the frontier. This ensures that all data points lie below the 
estimation frontier. In a next step a full translog model is estimated by using fixed effects. The 
fixed-effects model is a variable intercept model which means that there is a different 
intercept for each country. The country with the maximum intercept is taken as the reference 
country (frontier) and technical efficiency can be measured by the distance from this 
maximum. The results indicate that efficiency is positively related to health expenditure per 
capita, especially at low expenditure. 
 
2.2. Efficiency of R&D policies 
David et al. (2000) provide an extensive review of econometric studies over the 1965-2000 
period on the effects of publicly-financed R&D expenditure in the private sector at different 
levels of aggregation. Studies at the meso- and macro levels tend towards complementarity 
instead of substitution (crowding out) between publicly- and privately-financed R&D-
expenditure. Yet, these studies tend to overestimate the complementarity effect since they 
concentrate on R&D expenditures which include the upward effect (higher wages) due to the 
crowding out effect. Results based on studies at the micro or plant level are more mitigated. 
Studies focusing on US data find evidence of a substitution effect while for non US countries, 
a complementarity effect seems to predominate. 
 
  14The cross-country study by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2003) suggests a complementarity 
between public funds to support R&D in the private sector. Furthermore, R&D expenditure 
performed in the public sector, in particular in the defence sector, appears to crowd out private 
R&D. Building up on this model, Falk and Leo (2006) investigate the effects of different 
public support channels on the R&D spending in the business sector of 15 Western European 
countries, putting a focus on the case of Austria. Contrary to Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 
(2003), they use four-year averages instead of annual data and estimate their approach by 
using the fixed effects method and the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. 
They conclude that although direct government subsidies to R&D performing firms unfold 
great leverage effects, the dynamics of output growth as well as the R&D prone high tech 
structure seem to be more important drivers of the R&D intensity in the business sector.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, studies based on non parametric methods and examining the 
efficiency of R&D policies at the macro level in particular have not been performed yet. 
Though the studies of Lee and Park (2005) as well as those by Wang and Huang (2007) and 
Zabala-Iturriagagoitia et al. (2007) are not directly concerned with the assessment of public 
R&D efficiency, it is worth surveying them since they are three of the few studies at the 
macro level measuring R&D productivity at the national level by using the DEA method
9. 
Lee and Park (2005) investigate a two inputs (R&D expenditure, average number of 
researchers) and three outputs (technology balance of receipts, number of scientific and 
technical journal articles published and number of triadic patent families) framework and 
cover 27 countries whereas the focus lies on analysing the performance of the Asian states for 
the period 1994-1998 with their analysis. Lee and Park (2005) state that the objective of R&D 
lies in increasing outputs rather than decreasing inputs and therefore only apply the output-
oriented models. Furthermore, in a second phase the 27 countries are grouped into four 
clusters by output-specialized efficiency, namely inventors, merchandisers, academicians and 
duds. The results indicate a very low R&D efficiency level of China, Korea and Taiwan and a 
high efficiency of Singapore which seems to be due to the high technology balance of receipts 
–oriented efficiency. The authors also state that Japan will be able to obtain much more 
outputs even with a slight improvement in R&D efficiency since it possesses a large R&D 
cale.  
                                                
s
 
Wang and Huang (2007) address the relative efficiency of R&D activities across 30 countries 
(23 OECD members, 7 are non-OECD economies). They treat R&D capital stocks and 
manpower as inputs and use patents and academic publication as output measures. Like 
Herrera and Pang (2005) as well as Afonso et al. (2006) they use Tobit regressions to control 
for the external environment. The Tobit regressions include the enrolment rate of tertiary 
education, the PC density and the index of English proficiency as regressors to control for the 
effects of higher education, PC popularity etc. on R&D efficiency. The estimation results 
show that an increase in the enrolment rate of tertiary education as well as better English 
 
9 While our study is concerned with the assessment of the efficiency of R&D policies on R&D activities carried 
out in the private sector, the papers of Lee and Park (2005) and Wang and Huang (2007) investigate the 
relationship between firms’ R&D activities and their technological and economic outcomes, while Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia et al. (2007) assess the performance of regional innovation systems. 
  15skills of a country’s R&D personnel improve the efficiency of R&D. However, the PC density 
variable shows no significant result which implies that the popularity of PCs in a country does 
not contribute substantially to reducing R&D slack directly. Using the DEA approach leads 
Wang and Huang (2007) to the conclusion that less than one-half of the countries are fully 
efficient in R&D activities. Zabala-Iturriagagoitia et al. (2007) use the DEA analysis to 
evaluate the regional innovation performance based on information provided by the European 
Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) for the years 2002 and 2003. They use several input indicators, 
namely higher education, lifelong learning, medium/high-tech employment in manufacturing, 
public R&D expenditure, business R&D expenditure and high-tech patent applications to the 
European Patent Office (EPO) and as an output measure regional GDP per capita. The results 
show that the higher the technological level of a region, the greater is the need for system 
coordination. They are compared with those obtained by using the Revealed Regional 
Summary Innovation Index (RRSII) index which is recommended by EIS to measure the 
progress of the EU in innovation activities. The authors show that the use of these two 
different approaches yield to different results, however, they conclude that different 
approaches should be seen as complementarities for policy makers to obtain a comprehensive 
picture of regional innovation systems and to enrich the knowledge base for future policy 
ecision-making. 
ns) will influence the attempt and desire of a firm to 
vest in new ideas and technologies.  
 cash-flow in the United States, the United Kingdom and 
eland than in other economies. 
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2.3. Determinants of the efficiency of R&D activities and policies 
Jaumotte and Pain (2005a) use panel regressions for 20 OECD countries over the period 1982 
– 2001 to assess the effects of innovation policies and framework factors on business R&D 
intensity and patenting. Intuitively, the performance of the aggregate economy, the level of 
the real interest rates, the development of the financial markets, the degree of regulation and 
competition as well as the international openness of an economy (see Table 1 for an overview 
of the variables used in their regressio
in
 
First of all, macroeconomic factors seem to be clearly important for the understanding of the 
evolution of business R&D expenditure. R&D activities are sensitive to cyclical conditions as 
well as to a robust output growth and a low and stable inflation which have a positive 
influence on the growth rate of the R&D expenditure. To sum it up, investment in R&D is 
fostered by a stability oriented macroeconomic framework. Jaumotte and Pain (2005b) also 
highlight the potential sensitivity of R&D expenditures to the availability of external as well 
as internal finance. Many studies suggest that capital imperfections affect investment in 
R&D
10. Several studies also deal with the sensitivity of R&D expenditure to cash flow in the 
United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and a number of countries in the European Union 
(Hall and van Reenen 2000). However, the results are mixed. To be more precise, R&D 
appears to be more sensitive to
Ir
 
10 see Hall and van Reenen (2000) for an overview. 
  16Jaumotte and Pain (2005a) also include product and labour market regulations as well as 
restrictions on inward foreign direct investment in their regressions. They argue that enhanced 
product market competition can provide incentives to innovate and escape competition. 
However, this is only possible up to a certain point, after which the prospective rents from 
innovation begin to reduce. Labour market regulations could constrain the firms’ ability to 
undertake innovation-driven workplace re-organizations, but could also foster incremental 
process innovations since there is specialist knowledge in the workforce which has 
considerable company and occupation-specific experience. According to Jaumotte and Pain 
(2005c) many cross-country studies of economic growth emphasize the importance of the 
diffusion of both codified and tacit knowledge across national borders. Nevertheless, the 
effect of restrictions on inward foreign direct investments is also ambiguous. On the one hand 
they may slow the rate at which foreign knowledge is brought into national economies and on 
the other hand they can provide a more favourable environment for future innovators amongst 
national firms, especially in large economies. 
Table 1  Framework conditions on Business R&D 
GDP Growth 
Consumer price inflation 
Real interest rate 
B-index 
High level of financial development 
Ratio of bank credit plus stock market capitalization to GDP 
Corporate profits or Profit share of GDP 
Indicator of product market regulation 
Indicator of employment protection legislation 
Indicator of strength of FDI restrictions 
Trade openness adjusted for population size 
Real exchange rate 
Ratio of import to weighted domestic final expenditure 
Ratio of (trade-weighted) foreign R&D stock to GDP 
Share of hi-tech industries in GDP 
Share of scientists and engineers in total employment 
Index of strength of intellectual property rights 
R&D expenditures in the non-business sector (flows) 
Government funding of business sector R&D 
Business funding of non business R&D 
Public procurement as % of GDP 
Fundamental research as % of total R&D expenditures 
Defence R&D in % of total R&D expenditures 
Another set of important determinants which may influence business R&D are variables 
dealing with the influence of specific science policies and institutions, e.g. R&D in the non-
business sector, direct government subsidies for private sector R&D, support for intellectual 
property rights, industrial structure, human resources available for science and technology etc. 
Jaumotte and Pain (2005a) emphasize that there might be some important trade-offs between 
these factors, which means that some policies lead to the crowding out of the real resources 
available for R&D in the business sector. The authors also conclude in another paper (2005c) 
that fiscal incentives can be effective, especially when firms face financial constraints, but 
their overall impact on innovation appears comparatively small. On average, tax relieves for 
private R&D are found to provide a stronger stimulus than direct government subsidies. 
  17The strength of intellectual property rights is also an additional factor which could influence 
R&D and innovation. Jaumotte and Pain (2005b) have already argued that the relationship 
between the intellectual property rights system, patenting and innovative activity is a complex 
one. Firms can be encouraged to innovate by stronger intellectual property rights, but equally 
they can also hinder companies in accessing knowledge and thus deter cumulative innovation 
processes.  
 
The share of high-tech manufacturing industries (in GDP) as well as the share of scientists 
and engineers in total employment can also be expected to be positively related to the level of 
R&D. According to Jaumotte and Pain (2005a, 2005b), differences in the number of scientists 
may be an important explanation for cross-country differences in R&D. Furthermore, 
absorptive capacity of an economy could be also affected by the number of scientists. 
 
To briefly review, framework conditions as well as specific science policies and institutions 
help to support innovation independently and in interaction with each other. Furthermore, 
Jaumotte and Pain (2005a) conclude that there seems to be a clear evidence of policy trade-
offs, in other words policies that stimulate the demand for scientists and engineers will also 
lead to raising costs for R&D resources, especially in the period where labour supply can 
adjust. 
 
Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005b), Afonso et al. (2006) and Jaumotte and Pain (2005b) also 
identify several framework conditions (or environmental variables) for explaining the 
efficiency of public spending. Among these factors, we can mention the level of education of 
the population, the competence of the civil servants, the per capita GDP, the strength of the 
IPR systems, trade openness, and transparency in public policy, civil liberty or political rights. 
 
Another approach departs from comparing the estimated efficiency scores between countries 
relying on performance budgeting techniques and those ones not relying on such techniques. 
The former may experience better budgetary results (lower debt, deficit, better composition of 
government expenditures) compared to the other ones. With that respect, Joumard et al. 
(2004) based on a detailed survey for over two-thirds of OECD countries identify three main 
areas for action to enhance the effectiveness of public spending: budget process, management 
practices and the use of market mechanisms in the delivery of public services. 
 
Curristine et al. (2007) investigate the institutional drivers of efficiency in the public sector. 
By reviewing the literature they figure out that there is indeed evidence that some institutional 
variables help improving efficiency. Hence, efficiency gains can be obtained by increasing the 
scale of operations (evidence on this was collected mainly in the education and health sector). 
Furthermore, functional and political decentralization (i.e. spending responsibility) to sub 
national governments and human resource practices (e.g. soft aspects of human resource 
management like employee satisfaction and morale) seem to be beneficial for efficiency. 
Regarding the impact of ownership, competition and agencification findings were quite 
inconclusive. Curristine et al. (2007) conclude as well that e-government practices may 
  18reduce time demands which, however, come along with more technical requirements of staff 
members. Contradictory findings are also found for the impact of workforce diversity and 
representativeness on efficiency. Assessment of the role of unions in public sector efficiency 
is also really scarce. Although there is some empirical evidence from the United States which 
suggests that high levels of unionization constrain flexibility and productivity and that 
collective bargaining in local governments led to increased municipal expenditures, the 
impact of unions on efficiency and effectiveness remains unclear. Furthermore, studies 
conducted in Europe do not find either a positive or negative relationship (Curristine et al. 
2007). In terms of attractiveness the authors also point out that the image of the public sector 
plays an important role as well. To sum it up, except for the first three variables which were 
clearly identified as key institutional drivers that improve efficiency, there is a lack of 
empirical evidence of the impact of institutional factors on the aspect of efficiency. 
 
2.4. Conclusion of the literature section 
Several of the studies reviewed above used the FDH approach to assess efficiency, e.g. 
Afonso et al. (2003), Gupta and Verhoven (2001), Clements (2003) as well as Herrera and 
Pang (2005). However, as Afonso et al. (2003) emphasize this approach is likely to 
overestimate efficiencies since countries which lie on the production possibility frontier are 
efficient by definition. Furthermore, public sector policies may be also effected by economies 
of scale being able to deliver better outcomes. These constraints could be overcome by 
applying another non-parametric approach, namely DEA, e.g. Afonso et al (2006), Lee and 
Park (2005), Wang and Huang (2007). However, studies where both methods were conducted, 
e.g. Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005b) have also shown that results of the two analysis were 
broadly comparable.  
 
A drawback of using non-parametric approaches is that they do not statistically assess 
differences across countries. Non-parametric methods show a high sensitivity of the results to 
sampling variability, to the quality of the data and to the presence of outliers (Afonso et al. 
2003). Additionally, the dynamic structure is treated inadequately given the lag between input 
consumption (public expenditure) and output production, e.g. health and education outcomes 
or referring to our study business R&D expenditures (Herrera and Pang, 2005). Nevertheless, 
Data Envelopment Analysis is the preferred estimator for productivity levels if development 
is likely to vary across countries and scale economies are not constant (van Biesebroeck, 
2007). Afonso et al.(2006) as well as Herrera and Pang (2005) conduct Tobit analysis to 
control for non-discretionary inputs since this is not taken into account by the FDH and DEA 
method. This seems quite appropriate since such factors may play a relevant role in 
determining heterogeneity across countries and influence performance and efficiency. 
 
The strengths and the weaknesses of the different methods, namely composite performance 
indicators, data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis are shown in Figure 1. 
In a nutshell, methods based on composite indicators are not well suited to assess the 
efficiency of particular policies such as public R&D spending. The FDH method does not 
appear to be the most appropriate technique neither as this method tends to overestimate 
  19efficiencies of countries. The non parametric DEA must be complemented by a Tobit 
regression analysis to allow for heterogeneity across countries and for examining the role 
played by environmental non discretionary factors to explain differences in efficiency scores 
across and within countries. Given the dependency of DEA towards sample composition, 
outliers or data quality, a sensitiveness analysis should always be carried out in order to assess 
the robustness of results. SFA allows for hypothesis testing and to explain inefficiencies. Yet 
this method is quite data demanding since the convergence of the maximum likelihood 
iterative procedure to perform the efficiency terms requires a quite large number of 
observations which is not always likely when we use macro economic data over relative short 
time periods. Finally and more generally, whatever the strengths and weaknesses of these 
different approaches, any analysis aimed at examining the efficiency of public policies should 
consider different methods and compare the results obtained. 
Figure  1  Strengths and weaknesses of alternative methods for assessing the 
(in)efficiency of public spending on R&D  
Method Strengths  Weaknesses 
1. Composite performance indicators 
  •  Evaluation of public spending in its entirety  • Not suited to assess the efficiency of 
particular policies e.g. health, 
education, R&D policies 
2. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
  •  Allow one to directly compare the efficiency of 
countries (ranking) 
•  No need to define the relative importance of the various 
inputs employed and output produced (due to the 
absence of weights or prices attached to each outcome) 
•  No need to specify a functional relationship between 
inputs and outputs 
•  Not subject to simultaneous bias and/or specification 
errors 
•  Allow to deal with the simultaneous occurrence of 
multiple inputs and outputs 
•  Heavy reliance on the accuracy of 
the data 
•  Difficult to distinguish between 
output and outcomes 
•  Efficiency scores attributed to 
inputs while other factors may also 
contribute 
•  Frontier depends from the set of 
countries considered (Inefficiencies 
can be underestimated) 
3. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
  •  Error term with 2 components: conventional error term 
+ term representing deviation from frontier (relative 
inefficiency) 
•  Allow for hypothesis testing, confidence interval 
•  Allow to explain inefficiency 
•  Assume functional form for the 
production function 
•  Assume distributional form of the 
technical efficiency term 
•  Single output dimension 
•  Frontier depends from the set of 
countries considered (Inefficiencies 
can be underestimated) 
 
 
  203. Efficiency and R&D: Some concepts and issues 
 
The assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of government expenditures is inherently 
difficult. The studies in the economic literature dealing with these questions are limited and 
conceptual and measurement issues are important. To begin with, it seems useful to clearly 
define the concepts of economic efficiency and effectiveness. Conceptual issues in assessing 
efficiency in general and efficiency of public R&D in particular are then discussed. 
 
3.1. Input, output, outcome, efficiency and effectiveness 
Since the seminal work of Farrell (1957), the term ‘efficiency’ has been extensively used in 
economics and refers to the optimal use of resources in production, i.e. producing the 
maximum quantity of output from a given quantity of input (output-oriented measure), or 
alternatively producing a given output with minimum quantities of inputs (input-oriented 
measure). 
 
The concept of efficiency can be extended to the case where several inputs are used to 
generate multiple outputs. In this case, ‘technical efficiency’ is attained when the maximum 
amount of output is produced from a given amount of inputs or conversely a given amount of 
output (services) can be produced (delivered) from minimum quantities of inputs. In this case 
the entity producing the output is said to be technically efficient and operates on its 
production frontier. The optimal mix of inputs, given input prices, is obtained when the costs 
to produce a given amount of output are minimized. This situation refers to ‘allocative 
efficiency’. It is also common to use the term ‘overall efficiency’ which encompasses both 
technical and allocative efficiencies. 
 
Besides efficiency, it is also common in economics to assess the effectiveness of the 
production or provision of public services (See Figure 2). The difference between these two 
terms is not always clear and many authors use them in an interchangeable way. According to 
Hatry (1978: p. 28), “efficiency indicates the extent to which the government produces a 
given output with the least possible use of resources. Effectiveness indicates the amount of 
end product, the real service to the public that the government is providing. Effectiveness 
encompasses the concept of quality and level of service provided.” Note that as illustrated in 
Figure 1, both efficiency and effectiveness are affected by environment factors or framework 
conditions. In order to better grasp the differences between these concepts, it is helpful to 
introduce the concept of input, output and outcomes. Referring to the example of Afonso et al. 
(2006: p. 15), “the output of educational spending may be school enrolments, or number of 
students completing a grade. The outputs of health expenditure may be the number of 
operations performed or days spent in a hospital bed. However, the outcomes should be based 
on how much students learned and how many patients got well enough to return to a 
productive life”. 
  21Figure 2  Concepts of efficiency and effectiveness 
Technical efficiency
Input  Output  Outcome  Allocative efficiency  Effectiveness 
Monetary and 
Non-monetary 
Resources 
Environment factors 
e.g. Regulatory- competitive framework, socio-economic 
background, climate, economic development 
Source: Mandl and Ilzkovitz (2007). 
In the case of R&D activities, the inputs refer to the main policy instruments governments 
generally implement to stimulate investment in R&D in activities in both the public and 
private sectors. While there have been many attempts to classify the different policy 
instruments that affect R&D and innovation-related activities
11, governments in general rely 
heavily on a small group of instruments which can be classified into direct policy measures 
and indirect support to R&D activities
12. As regards the former, it is common to operate a 
distinction between three main categories of instruments, namely grants, subsidies and loans, 
public procurements as well as public funding of research performed in higher education 
institutions, in particular universities, and public research and technology organizations
13. 
Indirect fiscal measures to provide incentives to firms to invest more in R&D activities 
mainly consist in R&D tax credit. A main difference between tax incentives and direct 
subsidies is that the former reduces the marginal cost of R&D while the latter increases its 
private marginal rate of return (David et al., 2000). Another difference rests in the fact that 
R&D tax credits does not affect the choice of research projects by firms which is not the case 
                                                 
11 “The range of policy instruments that affect R&D activities is vast and policy design is complicated by their 
number, diversity and potential to interact both positively and negatively. Instruments range from highly targeted 
mechanisms that provide direct financial support to individual organizations to perform R&D, to broad changes 
in the legislative and regulatory environments of firms which can and do affect a multitude of business activities, 
including those related to R&D. Lying in between these R&D specific mechanisms and broader measures that 
affect the general business milieu are instruments that differ along many other dimensions. Some measures 
involve the direct transfer of funds from the public purse to private organizations, while measures such as R&D 
tax incentives are more indirect in that they involve the state forsaking income rather than increasing direct 
expenditure on R&D. Other measures are aimed at innovation-related activities other than R&D, though many 
seek to enhance the commercialization of R&D via improved links between R&D performing units and 
productive units, e.g. between universities and industry” (European Commission, 2003d: p. 31). 
12 See Appendix 3 for a more detailed picture. 
13 In practice, the distinction between direct subsidies and public procurement of R&D services is not easy to 
operate since it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish between the channels through which subsidies are 
transferred. 
  22for direct subsidies or grants since these funds are distributed by the government for specific 
projects in certain research areas.  
 
The new knowledge generated in the public sector, typically the research output of 
universities and or public research facilities, is also considered to affect R&D activities of 
firms in the private sector. Indeed the output of this kind of research of a more fundamental 
nature and which is basically publicly funded are at the source of important and positive 
spillover effects for the R&D activities carried out in the private sector. Indeed, the outcomes 
of publicly funded R&D performed in public research institutes or higher education 
institutions may in turn be used by private agents in their own applied research.  
 
In a nutshell, these different inputs affect R&D activities either by lowering the costs of doing 
R&D or by increasing the opportunity to engage in new research projects. Therefore, it is 
common to consider as the direct output of the policy intervention and the public funding of 
R&D in the public sector, the additional R&D activities induced by these inputs and 
performed by private companies. In terms of outcomes, the ultimate goal of R&D policy 
instruments is to help firms to improve profits and grow by creating new high value-added 
products, processes and services. In the literature of the economics of innovation and 
technology change, these outcomes are usually measured by different variables such as the 
number of patents, the number of innovations (product or process innovation), the share of 
sales due to innovations, the job creation, the growth of export or of output, changes in total 
factor productivity or profit increases (Cincera 1998). 
 
As regard the determinants affecting the efficiency (and effectiveness) of public R&D 
measures, as the review of the literature of the previous section indicates, various indicators 
can be considered among which framework conditions or environmental factors affecting the 
business milieu and the R&D conducted as well as institutional determinants including 
indicators of budgetary practices reflecting the quality of internal governance, public 
administration, e.g. composite indicators capturing corruption, red tape and shadow 
economy). To this end, a distinction can be made between two components of the overall 
efficiency. First, the business sector efficiency, i.e. the efficiency with which the private 
sector uses R&D public support and, second, the administrative or institutional efficiency, i.e. 
the efficient management practices in the public sector. In addition, public procurement can 
also be considered as an environment factor affecting the efficiency of public spending. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that in this study, the stress is put on a better understanding of the 
relations between R&D inputs and outputs (efficiency). Therefore the study has to be viewed 
as a first step of the analysis of the effects (or the impact) of R&D activities on firms 
economic performance, e.g. output or TFP growth (effectiveness). 
 
  233.2. Assessing efficiency 
As said before, economists are concerned about the efficient use of scarce resources, in 
particular those regarding the spending and taxing activities of governments. Following the 
idea that, at a given input, the greater the output, the more efficient an activity is, the 
efficiency of public expenditures to support R&D can be measured by comparing the amount 
spent (input or cost) with the benefits (output or outcomes) of the public expenditure or 
supporting scheme. Note that in this study, we will stick to the generally used concepts of 
input, output and efficiency. 
Figure 3  Efficiency frontier 
y
optimal output frontier
A
B
observed output
0x  
The difference between the output, i.e. the level of (additional) private R&D induced from 
public R&D, and the costs, i.e. the amount spent on the supporting measure (tax and subsidy 
measures for instance), can then be compared across countries. For instance if two countries 
A and B experience the same level of public expenditures, but for one country, A for instance, 
the gap between these expenses and the benefits is higher, than this country can be defined as 
more efficient than the other one (see Figure 3). This concept allows one to assess the level of 
efficiency (and changes in these levels) of the different Member States with regards to their 
R&D policy instruments and subsequent innovation performance. 
 
As emphasized by Wadhwa et al. (2005), one advantage of using DEA as compared to other 
methods is that it identifies peers for inefficient units. A peer is a Decision Making Unit 
(DMU), a country in our case, which lies on the efficiency frontier and with similar 
combination of inputs as that of an inefficient country
14. Hence the identification of country 
peer groups allows to better compare countries' performances and to formulate more specific 
country recommendations on how to improve the efficiency. Countries A and A’ in the 
example illustrated in Figure 4 lie on the efficiency frontier and represent the peer group for 
country B as they are closest to it in terms of the combination of inputs. 
                                                 
14 Quoting the authors, “Where two or more of these units act as peers for an efficient unit, they provide a peer 
group for the inefficient unit. The peer group is also known as the reference set of an inefficient unit. The 
characteristics of the units in the reference set provide the targets for the inefficient units to work towards”. 
  24Figure 4  Peer group and efficiency frontier 
 
 
3.3. Issues in assessing the efficiency of public policies in general and R&D in particular 
Note that the framework discussed in the previous section for measuring the efficiency of 
public spending raises a certain number of measurement issues. These issues can be general to 
the assessment of any public expenditure or specific to policies aimed at supporting R&D 
activities. 
 
As stressed by Afonso et al. (2006), higher public spending requires higher tax revenues 
which can be obtained only at progressively higher marginal costs given dead weight, 
administrative, compliance, opportunity and fixed costs of running a government. Then, 
opportunity costs
15 and fixed costs associated with the government taxing activities tend to 
underestimate the costs of public spending activities. 
 
Afonso et al. (2006) identify two other sources of inefficiencies of public expenditure. The 
first one, which they call ‘efficiency with wrong goals’ refers to the case where a government 
delivers efficiently in a technical sense certain services, e.g. public defence, but in a 
proportion which compared to other services, e.g. education, may be not efficient from a 
social point of view. The second source of inefficiency refers to a situation where public 
funds are used again in an efficient way but the budget is distorted towards the specific 
benefits of special pressure groups, higher wages which are not accompanied by higher 
productivity performance or corruption and X-inefficiency factors. 
 
Other measurement issues still need to be mentioned. The efficiency and outcomes of public 
spending also depend on different environmental factors or framework conditions shaped by 
the economy or other public policies. It is therefore important to control for such external 
factors in the assessment exercise. Different methods can be implemented to address this 
question. These methods are discussed in the Section 4. 
 
                                                 
15 For instance the rental value of government-owned assets such as buildings, land and forest (Afonso et al., 
2006). 
  25Some issues are specific to R&D public spending. As emphasized by Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe (2003), the effectiveness of public expenditures aimed at encouraging private 
R&D activities can be challenged on three main grounds: crowding out effect, substitution 
effect and allocative distortions. Indeed, public funds allocated to R&D projects increase the 
demand for researchers and depending on the elasticity of the supply of such a skilled 
workforce, the wages of researchers, and hence the price of R&D, will increase (Goolsbee, 
1998; David and Hall, 2000)
16. This ‘crowding-out’ effect between publicly financed R&D 
and privately financed R&D arises when firms, coping with higher R&D costs, reallocate 
their funds to other investment projects. Thus, in real terms, the total amount of R&D 
expenditures corrected for the higher wages of the researchers will be lower even if the total 
amount of R&D expenditure is higher due to the public funding. 
 
One way to address this issue is to take the approach proposed by Reinthaler and Wolff 
(2004) which consists in considering as the output variable R&D personnel in the private 
sector besides total private R&D expenditures. Comparing the results, i.e. the inefficiencies 
scores, between the two variables allows one to assess the degree of crowding-out effects 
through wages increases. 
 
Another issue concerns the ‘additionality’ of R&D policy. How much additional private R&D 
is stimulated by government support? Publicly-funded R&D may provide knowledge that is 
useful to firms and will invigorate private R&D. In this case, public R&D is complement to 
private R&D. However, if public funding supports research projects that would have been 
performed anyway, there is no additionality coming from public R&D. In this case, firms 
merely substitute public support for their own, while undertaking the same amount of R&D as 
initially intended. This question is in general investigated at the micro level by means of 
counterfactual analysis where a group of government-funded R&D firms is compared to a 
control sample of R&D firms receiving no support (Klette et al., 2000). 
 
Then, distortions in the allocation of resources between R&D projects may occur. This 
happens when governments allocate resources less efficiently than market forces due for 
instance to asymmetrical flows of information. Competition may also been distorted when 
(less efficient) firms get R&D funds at the expense of others. 
 
 
                                                 
16 On average, about two-thirds of R&D expenditures consist of the wages of the R&D personnel (Cincera, 
2005). 
  264. Empirical framework 
 
This section presents the methodological framework implemented to assess the efficiency of 
public R&D spending as well as its determinants. 
 
While several studies have used different methods for assessing efficiency of public 
expenditures, as emphasized before, studies specifically measuring the efficiency of public 
measures aimed at supporting R&D activities are relatively scarce
17. The measurement of 
efficiency at the macro level can be achieved through the use of three main categories of 
methods: composite indicators, non parametric methods and stochastic methods
18. 
 
The composite indicators based method consists in relating the level (or changes in the level) 
of total public spending to a composite public sector performance indicator based on various 
socio-economic indicators assumed to reflect the benefits from the public spending
19. The 
main drawback of this method rests in the difficulty to precisely identify the benefits, i.e. the 
effects of public spending on outcomes and separate them from other influences. 
 
Relative efficiency of public expenditures across countries can be achieved by means of non 
parametric methods, e.g. Free Disposal Hull (FDH) analysis
20, Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA)
21 and parametric ones, e.g. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), Thick Frontier 
Analysis (TFA)
22. Figure 1 in section 2.4 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of these 
different methods. To sum it up and as emphasized by Coelli et al. (2005), SFA is better than 
DEA as it accounts of measurement errors and other statistical noise and it allows for 
hypothesis testing and confidence interval. On the other hand it requires to assume a 
distributional form of the inefficiency term and a functional form for the frontier function. In 
what follows, we describe these two methods, i.e. DEA and SFA, which also represent the 
most commonly used in the literature to assess the efficiency of public spending to R&D at 
the macro level
23. Note that one objective of the study is to compare the results obtained 
through these two methods. 
 
                                                 
17 Afonso et al. (2006) distinguish between macro and micro assessment according to whether total public 
spending or particular categories of spending are considered. More generally, among the methods for the ex-post 
evaluation of RTD programmes and policies, Rojo and Polt (2002) distinguish between statistical data analysis, 
modelling methodologies and qualitative and semi-quantitative methodologies (see Appendix 4). 
18 We do not discuss the methodologies specific to micro level data such as for instance the counterfactual 
method. See David et al. (2000) for a review of these methods. 
19 See Appendix 2. 
20 See Tulkens (1993) for a discussion. 
21 See Sengupta (2000) for a number of applications. 
22 See Berger and Humphrey (1991). 
23 The direct impact of R&D public support on R&D and innovation activities can also be estimated through 
more traditional econometric models based on R&D investment functions. See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 
(2003) for an application. 
  274.1. Non parametric methods to measure efficiency 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) uses linear programming methods to construct a (non 
parametric) empirical based production frontier (or envelope) over the data
24. (In)efficiencies 
can then be calculated relatively to the frontier. Formally, the imputation of efficiencies can 
be obtained by solving the following linear program: 
 
i
u,v
i
i
i
u'y
maximise
v'x
u'y
subject to 1, j 1,...,N,
v'x
and u,v 0.
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠
≤=
≥
          ( 1 )  
 
Where xi are inputs, yi are outputs and u and v are scalar values chosen for each Decision 
Making Unit (DMU), countries in our case, such that the efficiencies of each DMU are 
maximised and no efficiencies are greater than one. 
 
When the DMU operates at an optimal scale, it is appropriate to assume Constant Return to 
Scale (CRS). Banker et al. (1984) propose a Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) model which 
introduces a Scale Efficiency (SE) measure for each DMU. SE is calculated as the ratio of 
CRS Technical efficiency (TE) to VRS TE. Scale efficiency can then be interpreted as 
follows: if SE=1, then a country is scale efficient that means its combination of inputs and 
outputs is efficient under both CRS as well as VRS. If SE>1 (resp. <1) in the output- (resp. 
input) oriented case, then the combination of inputs and outputs is not scale efficient. Scale 
efficiency can be measured in terms of production by referring to the concept of returns to 
scale. In the output oriented case for instance, increasing returns are observed when a 
proportional increase in inputs causes output to increase by a greater proportion, whereas 
decreasing returns refers to the case where an increase in inputs causes output to increase by a 
smaller proportion. The smaller this proportion, the higher the SE score is (and conversely for 
the input oriented case). The VRS TE scores can then be decomposed between two terms, one 
referring to scale efficiency and the second to pure technical efficiency (PE). 
 
As discussed in Section 3, technical efficiency can be achieved by producing a given output 
with minimum quantities of inputs (input-oriented measure) or by producing the maximum 
quantity of output from a given quantity of input (output-oriented measure)
25. In this study, 
we will focus on output-oriented measures of technical efficiency. In a revenue maximizing 
perspective, a reasonable justification to use the output oriented measure rests in the fact that 
the main objective of R&D policies is to maximize private R&D activities (output) and not to 
minimize the funds (inputs) used to achieve this goal. 
                                                 
24 As an alternative to DEA, the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) method is another non parametric approach. This 
methods performs a piecewise linear function (the frontier or envelope) such that all observed data points lie 
either on this frontier or below it. 
25 It should be noted that when CRS exist, the input and output-oriented measures are equivalent measures of 
technical efficiencies (Färe and Lovell, 1978). 
  28Once the technical efficiency scores of public R&D spending across countries have been 
calculated with the DEA method, the differences observed in the level (changes of levels) of 
efficiency scores can be explained by exogenous factors or framework conditions in a second 
stage. We shall come back to the discussion of these determinants in the next section. 
Following Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005a), the impact of framework conditions on efficiency 
scores across countries can be estimated through a Tobit econometric model with the 
following specification: 
 
it it it TE z =δ +ε             ( 2 )  
 
Where TEit is the technical efficiency score calculated from the DEA of country i at time t, zit 
is a vector of framework conditions or exogenous environmental variables and εit is the error 
term. 
 
As noted by Coelli et al. (2005, p. 194), a drawback of this two-stage method is that “if the 
variables used in the first stage are highly correlated with the second-stage variables then the 
results are likely to be biases”.
26 In practice, it is possible to determine the importance of this 
issue by examining the correlation matrix of variables. It should also be noted that the use of 
such a model is justified when the left hand-side variable (efficiency scores) is censored, i.e., 
it cannot take values below or above a certain threshold value (McDonald and Moffitt, 
1980)
27. 
 
4.2. Parametric methods to measure efficiency 
Following the framework developed by Battese and Coelli (1995), technical efficiency can be 
measured by estimating a stochastic frontier model that includes two equations
28. 
 
The first equation specifies the production frontier, in general of the Cobb-Douglas type: 
 
                                                 
26 Some authors (Wang and Schmidt, 2002) favour single-stage procedures where the inefficiency term and the 
impact of environmental variables on the efficiency scores are estimated simultaneously. 
27 Furthermore the estimated values of the Tobit regression can be used to separate the environmental variables 
from the net technical efficiency in R&D public instruments (see Wang and Huang, 2007 for a discussion and an 
application of this multi-stage approach for analyzing efficiency). Another potential issue is that the results may 
be biased due to the small size properties of the sample. This however is less likely to be the case in our study 
since we consider countries over a relatively long time period. According to Simar and Wilson (2004), εit may be 
serially correlated and/or correlated with some right hand-side variables. In the latter case, correlation occurs 
when the non discretionary variables and the outputs used to calculate the efficiency scores are correlated. As 
pointed out by Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005a) both sources of correlation are likely to disappear asymptotically 
but in small samples, inference is usually not valid. In order to address this issue, Simar and Wilson (2005) 
propose a semi-parametric approach based on bootstrap methods. In addition, when the number of bootstrap 
estimates is large, hypotheses testing and confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients becomes possible. 
28 Alternatively to the stochastic approach, a parametric deterministic approach is sometimes used. The 
Corrected Ordinary Last Square (COLS) is an example of such a method. It consists in estimating first a 
production function through OLS and than shifting up the intercept parameter by the value of the largest positive 
residuals which gives the equation for the frontier. Note that this approach is refereed as being deterministic 
(rather than stochastic) to the extent that it is not possible to separate true inefficiency from random shocks. In 
such a model, all deviations from the frontier are assumed to be the result of technical inefficiency. 
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Where i indexes countries and t years of observations. y and x are respectively the output and 
a vector of inputs. The variable t accounts for the drift of the common production function 
over time. vit is a random term accounting for measurement errors and other random shocks in 
the economy. It is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ²v. uit is 
assumed to reflect technical inefficiencies. It is a one-sided component with variance σ²u. As 
is common in the literature, we assume a half-normal distribution for the inefficiency term
29. 
The second equation specifies the inefficiency terms as: 
 
it it it uZ w =δ +             ( 4 )  
 
Where uit is the inefficiency term, zit is again a vector of exogenous environmental variables 
and wit is the disturbance term with mean zero and variance σ² = σu² + σv². 
 
The two-equations stochastic frontier model given by (3) and (4) can be estimated by 
maximum likelihood. It should be noted that the Stochastic Frontier Analysis can be extended 
in a panel data framework when both cross-sections of countries over time periods are 
available. 
 
5. Data 
5.1. Data sources 
The study covers the EU Member States as well as other OECD countries. Our main data 
sources are statistics on Science and Technology issued by EUROSTAT and the OECD 
database on “Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI)” which contains time series 
information on most EU27 and OECD countries since 1981. We investigate the impact on 
performance at the country level. We choose to analyze 5 different time periods in order to 
compare the evolution of efficiency parameters over time, i.e. we carry out analyzes with all 
country data available for the time periods 1981-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999 and 
2000-2004. The five years in each period are averaged in order to smooth out short term 
volatility in the indicators that are used in the empirical analysis.  
 
The composite indicators available from the Fraser Institute
30 based both on survey data and 
on data provided by different national and international sources refer to business regulations, 
ease of starting a new business and irregular payments connected with, among others, 
import/export permits, with business licences or with exchange controls. These indicators are 
designed to identify the extent to which regulatory restraints and bureaucratic procedures limit 
competition and the operation of markets. We will use them as well as indicators for 
                                                 
29 Note that more general distributional forms like the truncated normal and the two-parameter gamma can be 
used for the uit. 
30 See Gwartney and Lawson (2004). 
  30administrative, institutional and business R&D enhancing factors which are provided by the 
OECD Main Science and Technology database, EUROSTAT, European Innovation 
Scoreboard and by Park (2001) and Park and Wagh (2002) in a later step of the project to 
investigate possible reasons for inefficiencies occurring in some countries after our initial 
estimations
31.  
 
5.2. Descriptive statistics 
The dependent variable throughout this study is the Business Expenditure on R&D (BERD), 
to be more precise BERD is scaled by GDP to ensure better comparability between the 
different countries. This also accounts for the other variables, namely BERDBYGOV, HERD 
and GOVERD which will be also specified later in this chapter. Since scaling by GDP leads 
to rather small numbers of these variables we show them as intensities, which means as their 
percentage value of GDP. Our goal is to analyze how the most relevant determinants that 
influence R&D and, even more important in this study, what efficiency value each country 
achieves in combining its resources. As main determinants, we consider the amount of 
subsidies within BERD, that is, BERDBYGOV which reflects direct payments from 
governments to industry. Furthermore, R&D conducted in public research institutions may 
trigger private expenditure on R&D if industry makes use of publicly provided results in, e.g. 
fundamental research for privately conducted applied research which in turn may lead to new 
product inventions or the implementation of new processes in production. The two main 
indicators are R&D activities carried out in universities and other institution of higher 
education, and those activities conducted in other public research institutions. Both efforts are 
measured through the expenses, HERD and GOVERD.  
 
Table 2 shows the intensity of the dependent variable BERD (measured as the percentage of 
GDP) and the subsidies granted (BERDBYGOV; here in % of BERD) for all available 
countries in the database for three sub periods, 1980-1984, 1990-1994 and 2000-2004
32. The 
countries are sorted by size of BERD intensity in the period 2000-2004. Calculations are 
made on the basis of monetary numbers expressed as million US$ in constant prices of the 
year 1995. Note that BERD as we use it in this study measures the business R&D expenditure 
financed by the private sector. Thus, the data represent BERD net of subsidies. Furthermore, 
BERD refers to all R&D activities performed by businesses within a particular sector and 
territory, regardless of the location of the business’s headquarters, and regardless of the 
sources of finance. 
 
Japan, Sweden and Switzerland exhibit the highest intensity of R&D spending in the business 
sector in the first two sub periods (1980-1984 and 1990-1994). Sweden and Japan are also 
                                                 
31 We also experimented with the B-index proposed by Warda (1996). Due to missing values, however, and 
since values do not change over time, this variable was finally omitted in the subsequently  presented analysis. 
When i twas included in specifications of the models using only the sub sample where the B-index is available it 
always turned out to be insignificant. 
32 Data does not change much over time. For this reason only these three sub periods are shown in the descriptive 
statistics section. 
  31listed within the top three performs in the third sub period (2000-2004) with a BERD intensity 
of clearly over two percent, while Switzerland slightly increased from 1.72% during the 
1990ies to 1.84% in the early 2000s. The highest intensity of BERD in the third sub period is 
shown by Israel which almost tripled its R&D spending in the business sector measured as a 
percentage of GDP from 1.05% in the second to 2.99% in the third sub period. However, as 
one can see in the growth rates in the right column of the table, Finland which is the well-
known European example for the smaller economies was only in the middle field regarding 
BERD intensity at the beginning of the 1980ies. However, it was able to catch up and place 
itself into the field of the top five performs in the third sub period with one of the highest 
growth rates of 249%. Nevertheless, the highest growth rate of BERD/GDP is clearly shown 
by Iceland with outstanding 1815%. During the first sub period Iceland was almost bottom of 
the table with 0.06% and is now ranked within the middle field with 1.19% BERD intensity. 
High growth rates of BERD intensity were also realised by Greece which, however, still lies 
in the bottom third in 2000-2004. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the intensity of BERD and the growth rates for BERD intensity for a 
subsample of countries for which both variables are available. Sweden, Japan and Finland 
clearly show the highest BERD intensity in 2000-2004, however Japan’s growth rate of 
BERD intensity is rather low compared to the rest of the sample countries. The lowest growth 
rates are shown by the Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom where the latter two even 
have a decreasing evolution in their BERD intensity. These countries also have a BERD 
intensity in 2000-2004 below 1%. Furthermore, Figure 5 illustrates that more than half of the 
sample countries, to be more precise 11 out of 20 countries exhibit a BERD intensity of 
smaller than 1%, however, three of them, namely Greece, Australia and Ireland exhibit among 
the highest growth rates from BERD intensity between 1980-2004 in the sample. 
  32Figure  5  Scatterplot of BERD Intensity (2000-2004) vs. growth rates of BERD 
Intensity (both in %) 
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Note: For better illustration Iceland was excluded from the picture. Country codes follow the international standard ISO 3166.  
Among the top ten countries, the share of subsidies within BERD (BERDBYGOV) has been 
reduced since the 1980s. While share of subsidies amounted 43% in the United States in the 
period 1980-1984, on average, it reduced to 10% in the early 2000s. A reduction of the 
governmental share in BERD took place for most of the countries over the last decades (if 
data is observed for the early 1980s). Exceptions are Spain, Austria, Portugal and Switzerland 
where an increase has occurred. A high share of public budget in BERD is prevalent in the 
Eastern European countries such as Romania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Latvia and the 
Czech Republic. The Russian Federation can almost be considered as an “outlier” as the 
public share in private R&D reaches more than 125% in the early 2000s. Among the top ten 
countries, Italy, the United Kingdom and France exhibit the highest share of public support in 
BERD. It remains to be investigated whether the higher shares of subsidies in the business 
sector relate to relative inefficiency in combining R&D-resources in such countries. 
 
Table 3 shows the intensity of expenditures in higher education (HERD) and other public 
research institutions (GOVERD) as well as their growth rates. The data is sorted in 
descending order by HERD intensity in 2000-2004. In addition, the B-Index and the R&D 
personnel (BER) divided by GDP (see Table 4) are shown. Unfortunately the B-Index is only 
available for a subsample of countries. The countries are sorted in descending order by R&D 
personnel/GDP in 2000-2004. 
 
The only country which is ranked among the top five countries in both HERD and GOVERD 
intensity is Finland. Regarding the intensity of HERD the top five performers in 2000-2004 
are Sweden, Israel, Finland, Switzerland and Canada. For the intensity of GOVERD this 
accounts for Iceland, France, New Zealand, Finland and Germany. Furthermore the data 
shows that most countries have increased not only the private efforts for R&D in terms of 
GDP as expressed through BERD intensity over time, but also the intensity of expenditures in 
  33higher education as can be seen by the growth rates of HERD intensity. Interestingly, another 
component of public efforts on R&D, namely GOVERD intensity mostly shows a negative 
evolution from 1980s to the first half of 2000s. Figure 6 illustrates that 13 out of 21 countries 
show a negative development of GOVERD/GDP while they exhibit a positive evolution of 
their HERD intensity from 1980-1984 until 2000-2004. The highest growth rate of HERD 
intensity is clearly shown by Greece with almost 700%. Regarding GOVERD intensity the 
biggest increase from the early 1980ies until the beginning of the 2000s was conducted by 
Belgium and Iceland. 
 
We employ the public efforts devoted to R&D as further determinants of private R&D as 
scholars hypothesize that the government provides some amount of basic research findings 
through university research and other research. Results of such are typically be assumed to be 
in the public domain as they are usually disseminated through journal articles, where the 
public including industry has easy access. It is believed that public research results will 
constitute a basis for more applied research and development in the business sector, and thus 
one should control for different levels of public spending when the evaluation of a country’s 
efficiency is the goal (Salter and Martin 2001). 
 
Comparing HERD intensity with BERD intensity in 2000-2004 leads to the conclusion that 
countries, such as Israel and Sweden which clearly show the highest BERD intensity in this 
period also take the leading positions regarding the intensity of expenditures in higher 
education on R&D. The same accounts for the lower performing countries, e.g. Romania, 
Slovakia and Russia which have low intensities of HERD as well as of BERD. Luxembourg 
takes an outlying position in this case since it exhibits quite a high BERD intensity, but the 
lowest HERD intensity in the sample for the 2000-2004 period (see Figure 7). 
Figure 6  Scatterplot of growth rates of HERD Intensity vs. GOVERD Intensity (both 
in %) 
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Note: Country codes follow the international standard ISO 3166 
 
  34Figure 7  BERD intensity vs. HERD intensity for 2000-2004 
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Note: Country codes follow the international standard ISO 3166. 
Figure 8 shows the relationship of BERD intensity and GOVERD intensity where Iceland is 
not included in the picture due to its high intensity of GOVERD which was almost twice as 
high as the one of the country with the second highest GOVERD intensity (France in this 
case) in 2000-2004. It can be seen that Israel ands Sweden (the countries with the highest 
BERD intensity in 2000-2004) are only positioned in the middle field regarding GOVERD 
intensity. Furthermore, Switzerland which has among the highest BERD intensities in the 
sample shows the second lowest intensity of GOVERD in 2000-2004. This finding is only 
beaten by Malta which clearly offers the lowest intensities of both variables. 
Finally, Figure 9 illustrates BERD intensity vs. BERDBYGOV intensity in 2000-2004. This 
time Russia is excluded from the figure due to its high intensity of BERDBYGOV. Israel 
which exhibits the highest intensity of BERD also shows the (second) highest intensity of 
BERDBYGOV. Nevertheless, most of the countries lie within the third quadrant of Figure 
9
33. 
                                                 
33 A correlation table with significance level for the discussed variables is provided in the appendix (see 
) 
Table A 
2
  35Figure 8  BERD Intensity vs. GOVERD Intensity in 2000-2004 
AR
AUS
AT
BE
CA
CN
HR
CY
CZ
DK
EE
FI
FR
DE
GR
HU
IE
IL
IT
JP
KR
LV LT
LU
MT
MX
NL
NZ
NO
PL
PT RO
RU
SG
SK
ZA
ES
SE
CH
UK
US
0
.
0
1
.
0
2
.
0
3
B
E
R
D
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
0 .001 .002 .003 .004
GOVERD Intensity
 
Note: For better illustration Iceland was excluded from the picture. Country codes follow the international standard ISO 3166. 
 
Figure 9  BERD Intensity vs. BERDBYGOV Intensity in 2000-2004 
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Note: For better illustration Russia was excluded from the picture. Country codes follow the international standard ISO 3166. 
Regarding the R&D personnel/GDP Table 4 shows that Russia exhibit the highest value for 
2000-2004. Others countries which show quite high values in the same period as well are 
Romania and Bulgaria. However, one has to be aware of the fact that actually the number of 
R&D employees has decreased since the beginning of the 1990ies in all three countries (see 
Table A 1). Japan, the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom remain quite stable 
over all three sub period. 
 
  36The determinants on the quality of the regulatory framework are listed in Table 5. These 
indicators are classified into five categories: ease of starting a new business, trade tariffs and 
barriers, state involvement in the economy, and importance of administrative burdens and 
regulatory quality. These indicators are similar to the ones used by Cincera and Galgau (2005) 
and come from the Fraser Institute, which reports them on a five-year interval basis and 
annually from 2000 onwards. The latest period currently available is 2004.  
 
Table 6 shows that the highest value for the first indicator and the freedom to trade 
internationally indicator are clearly shown by Singapore in all three sub periods. Regarding 
the legal structure and security of property rights Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands are 
the leading countries in 1990-1994 and 2000-2004 as well as the United States and 
Switzerland which show the highest values for this component at the beginning of the early 
1980ies. Israel clearly underwent the biggest change for the access to sound money from 1.54 
in 1980-1984 to 9.08 in 2000-2004. It can also be seen that the United States exhibit the 
highest value for the regulation of credit, labour and business in all three sub periods. 
 
Finally descriptive statistics for the indicators dealing with the business conditions enhancing 
R&D activities of firms are provided in Table 7 and Table 8, again for the three periods, 
1980-1984, 1990-1994 and 2000-2004. Most of the indicators come from the OECD Main 
Science and Technology Indicators database as well as from EUROSTAT. Data for the PPP 
exchange rates and the GDP deflator came from the World Economic Outlook Database 2007 
of the International Monetary Fund and the World Development Indicators 2006. The source 
for the Strength of the IPR system is Park (2001) and Park and Wagh (2002). Data for this 
variable was linearly intrapolated. For the indicator “share of firms that received public funds 
for R&D” data from the European Innovation Scoreboard database was used as well as for the 
composite indicator “summary innovation index”, which, however, only was available for the 
year 2005. The indicator shows highest values for Finland, Sweden as well as Switzerland and 
is lowest for Romania and Turkey.  
 
It can be seen from Table 7 and Table 8 that data for most of the other indicators was not 
available in the first sub period (1980 - 1984). Although this has slightly improved for the 
second sub period (1990 – 1994), information is still only available for about half of the 
investigated countries. Table 8 (sub period 2000 – 2004) shows that regarding the share of 
basic R&D performed in the private sector in percent of total business R&D is highest in the 
Slovak Republic and Switzerland. Numbers on the industry university links indicate that 
about two third of the countries for which data is available are ranked over 90 percent. A 
notable improvement was made by Hungary which caught up by gaining 30 percent points 
from 56.84% in the second up to 85.94% in the third sub period. The share of public credit 
appropriation in the defence sector is clearly highest in the United States, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, Spain, France and Sweden. Table 8 (sub period 2000 – 2004) also demonstrates 
that the intellectual property rights (IPR) system has its biggest strength in the United States, 
Austria and Germany. However, the discussion of these indicators seems rather insufficient 
  37due to the huge data gaps, especially the unavailability of numbers for key countries like the 
United States, Germany etc. 
Table 2  Average BERD Intensity and subsidies by government (BERDBYGOV) in 
1980-1984, 1990-1994 and 2000-2004 
  1980 – 1984  1990 – 1994  2000 – 2004   
Country
#  BERD 
Intensity 
Subsidies in % 
(BERDBYGOV) 
BERD 
Intensity 
Subsidies in % 
(BERDBYGOV) 
BERD 
Intensity 
Subsidies in % 
(BERDBYGOV) 
Growth of 
BERD 
Intensity 
(1980/2004) 
in % 
Israel     1,05%  31,88%  2,99%  10,13%   
Sweden  1,28% 13,84%  1,72%  12,18%  2,72%  6,60%  111,75% 
Japan  1,54%  1,78% 1,96% 1,30% 2,28% 1,48% 48,12% 
Finland  0,65%  4,02% 1,09% 6,21% 2,28% 3,58%  248,70% 
Switzerland  1,58%  1,37% 1,72% 1,78% 1,86% 2,04% 18,23% 
Korea        1,84%  6,63%   
United States  1,25%  42,39% 1,45% 24,89% 1,75% 10,22% 40,72% 
Germany  1,38% 20,58%  1,42%  11,97%  1,58%  6,94%  14,88% 
Denmark  0,49%  13,93% 0,79% 8,75% 1,47% 3,16% 201,40% 
Luxembourg        1,38%  2,21%   
Iceland  0,06% 35,17%  0,26%  14,60%  1,19%  3,41% 1815,30% 
Belgium  0,94%  10,13% 1,02% 6,32% 1,13% 6,95% 20,03% 
France  0,82% 33,12%  1,03%  24,25%  1,10%  12,20%  34,64% 
Singapore      0,76% 2,45% 1,09% 8,74%   
Austria  0,55% 8,19%  0,69%  11,40% 0,98%  9,14%  77,59% 
Canada  0,48% 16,30%  0,61%  12,89%  0,93%  3,44%  94,32% 
Netherlands  0,82% 11,40%  0,84%  10,15%  0,82%  5,66%  -0,06% 
Australia  0,23%  11,09% 0,59% 2,89% 0,79% 4,57% 242,12% 
Norway  0,53% 28,86%  0,68%  20,80%  0,79%  12,78%  46,96% 
United 
Kingdom  0,89% 48,45%  0,98%  18,47%  0,76%  13,36%  -14,17% 
Ireland  0,25%  15,34% 0,61% 6,06% 0,69% 3,36% 182,54% 
China        0,64%  5,93%   
Czech 
Republic        0,61%  16,24%   
Croatia        0,46%  1,85%   
Spain  0,20% 5,25%  0,34%  14,04% 0,44% 12,07% 120,76% 
Italy  0,42% 17,26%  0,50%  17,93%  0,41%  17,05%  -2,01% 
South Africa        0,36%  9,64%   
New Zealand     0,24%  7,88%  0,35%  12,32%   
Russia        0,33%  124,49%   
Slovak 
Republic     0,39%  16,27%  0,27%  28,71%   
Hungary        0,26%  8,09%   
Portugal  0,10%  2,00% 0,10% 9,98% 0,22% 4,12%  120,79% 
Estonia        0,21%  7,30%   
Romania        0,15%  48,46%   
Greece  0,04%  4,82% 0,06% 7,11% 0,14% 3,38%  273,94% 
Poland        0,13%  31,10%   
Mexico      0,05% 1,62% 0,12% 5,77%   
Lithuania        0,12%  3,95%   
Argentina        0,10%  8,84%   
Latvia        0,08%  19,32%   
Cyprus        0,05%  6,89%   
Malta        0,05%  22,22%   
Note: BERD Intensity refers to BERD as the percentage of GDP. Calculations were made on the basis of monetary figures  expressed in 
millions of 1995 US $ (PPPs exchange rate and GDP deflator). 
BERD refers to privately financed R&D in the business sector, i.e. it excludes the business R&D subsidized by the government. 
Due to very high inflation rates it was not possible to characterize the economies of Bulgaria, Slovenia and Turkey. Therefore, they were 
excluded from the analysis. 
Source: Eurostat 2007, OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 2007. 
  38Table 3  R&D expenditure in Higher Education (HERD) and other governmental 
institutions (GOVERD) 
  1980 – 1984  1990 – 1994  2000 – 2004     
Country  HERD 
Intensity 
GOVERD 
Intensity 
HERD 
Intensity 
GOVERD 
Intensity 
HERD 
Intensity 
GOVERD 
Intensity 
Growth of 
HERD 
Intensity 
(1980/2004) 
Growth of 
GOVERD 
Intensity 
(1980/2004) 
Sweden  0.70 %  0.13 %  0.76 %  0.12 %  0.85 %  0.13 %  21.25%  -1.13% 
Israel      0.61 %  0.26 %  0.74 %  0.26 %     
Finland  0.29 %  0.27 %  0.42 %  0.41 %  0.64 %  0.34 %  120.87%  24.35% 
Switzerland  0.40 %  0.12 %  0.64 %  0.09 %  0.64 %  0.03 %  58.22%  -72.51% 
Canada  0.35 %  0.34 %  0.48 %  0.28 %  0.63 %  0.21 %  82.19%  -38.28% 
Austria  0.35 %  0.10 %  0.51 %  0.13 %  0.60 %  0.12 %  70.49%  24.53% 
Denmark  0.28 %  0.23 %  0.37 %  0.29 %  0.54 %  0.22 %  92.20%  -6.54% 
Singapore      0.33 %  0.16 %  0.53 %  0.27 %     
Iceland  0.20 %  0.43 %  0.33 %  0.53 %  0.51 %  0.67 %  161.58%  54.62% 
Netherlands  0.46 %  0.36 %  0.57 %  0.35 %  0.50 %  0.25 %  7.12%  -32.24% 
Norway  0.33 %  0.22 %  0.44 %  0.31 %  0.46 %  0.25 %  37.96%  15.18% 
Croatia          0.44 %  0.26 %     
Australia  0.29 %  0.43 %  0.37 %  0.42 %  0.44 %  0.31 %  54.05%  -26.22% 
Japan  0.57 %  0.25 %  0.55 %  0.24 %  0.44 %  0.30 %  -23.68%  20.57% 
France  0.32 %  0.51 %  0.36 %  0.51 %  0.41 %  0.37 %  30.43%  -27.92% 
Germany  0.39 %  0.32 %  0.40 %  0.34 %  0.41 %  0.34 %  5.93%  6.67% 
Belgium  0.29 %  0.08 %  0.38 %  0.09 %  0.41 %  0.13 %  40.45%  59.60% 
United 
Kingdom 
0.32 %  0.47 %  0.35 %  0.30 %  0.40 %  0.19 %  27.47%  -59.52% 
Estonia          0.36 %  0.12 %     
Italy  0.17 %  0.23 %  0.26 %  0.25 %  0.36 %  0.20 %  110.34%  -12.66% 
United States  0.23 %  0.45 %  0.31 %  0.39 %  0.35 %  0.32 %  49.20%  -30.33% 
New Zealand  0.00 %    0.28 %  0.42 %  0.34 %  0.35 %     
Lithuania          0.31 %  0.22 %     
Spain  0.10 %  0.13 %  0.22 %  0.17 %  0.30 %  0.15 %  194.33%  21.21% 
Portugal  0.08 %  0.15 %  0.22 %  0.13 %  0.29 %  0.15 %  265.69%  -1.27% 
Korea          0.27 %  0.33 %     
Ireland  0.11 %  0.24 %  0.23 %  0.12 %  0.27 %  0.09 %  142.58%  -62.10% 
Greece  0.03 %  0.11 %  0.12 %  0.11 %  0.24 %  0.10 %  695.56%  -2.00% 
Hungary          0.23 %  0.26 %     
Poland          0.19 %  0.22 %     
Czech 
Republic 
        0.19 %  0.28 %     
South Africa  0.16 %  0.25 %  0.16 %  0.21 %  0.18 %  0.17 %  9.15%  -33.91% 
Latvia          0.16 %  0.09 %     
Malta          0.16 %  0.03 %     
Mexico      0.12 %  0.11 %  0.14 %  0.14 %     
Argentina          0.13 %  0.17 %     
China      0.07 %  0.33 %  0.11 %  0.29 %     
Cyprus          0.09 %  0.12 %     
Slovak 
Republic 
    0.04 %  0.37 %  0.07 %  0.16 %     
Russia          0.06 %  0.29 %     
Romania          0.04 %  0.10 %     
Luxembourg          0.01 %  0.16 %     
Note: HERD/GOVERD Intensity refers to HERD/GOVERD as the percentage of GDP. Calculations were made on the basis of  monetary 
figures expressed in millions of 1995 US $ (PPPs exchange rate and GDP deflator). 
Source: Eurostat 2007, OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 2007. 
  39Table 4  R&D personnel/GDP  
Country  1980 - 1984  1990 - 1994  2000 – 2004 
Russia   0.0090  1.4087 
Romania   0.0098  1.2885 
Bulgaria   0.0093  0.6979 
Turkey   0.0007  0.2132 
Finland  0.0300 0.0539 0.1621 
Korea     0.1410 
Sweden  0.0489 0.0804 0.1209 
Iceland  0.0018 0.0336 0.1191 
Japan  0.1305 0.1338 0.1171 
United 
States  0.1102 0.1136 0.1131 
Denmark  0.0258 0.0463 0.0962 
Singapore   0.0780  0.0902 
Norway  0.0421 0.0661 0.0888 
Canada  0.0358 0.0592 0.0828 
China   0.0489  0.0785 
Slovenia   0.0676  0.0727 
Germany  0.0612 0.0778 0.0725 
Austria  0.0218 0.0389 0.0689 
Switzerland  0.0406 0.0545 0.0637 
United 
Kingdom  0.0673 0.0671 0.0635 
France  0.0369 0.0535 0.0617 
Hungary   0.0236  0.0616 
Luxembourg     0.0607 
Belgium  0.0303 0.0450 0.0602 
Ireland  0.0146 0.0390 0.0570 
Netherlands  0.0406 0.0372 0.0510 
Estonia     0.0509 
Czech 
Republic     0.0508 
Slovak 
Republic   0.0521  0.0441 
New 
Zealand   0.0258  0.0425 
Latvia   0.0269  0.0422 
Australia  0.0150 0.0410 0.0409 
Spain  0.0046 0.0167 0.0317 
Poland   0.0212  0.0316 
Croatia     0.0304 
Mexico   0.0013  0.0237 
Greece   0.0058  0.0234 
Italy  0.0133 0.0227 0.0206 
Portugal  0.0026 0.0061 0.0192 
Malta     0.0157 
Lithuania     0.0145 
Argentina     0.0083 
Cyprus     0.0068 
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 2007. 
  40Table 5  The Areas and Components of the Fraser Institute composite indicators 
Area 1: Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises 
A  General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption
B  Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 
C  Government enterprises and investment 
D  Top marginal tax rate 
 
Area 2: Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 
A Judicial  independence 
B Impartial  courts 
C  Protection of property rights 
D  Military interference in rule of law and the political process 
E   Integrity of the legal system 
F  Legal enforcement of contracts 
G   Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property 
 
Area 3: Access to Sound Money 
A Money  growth 
B  Standard deviation of inflation 
C  Inflation: most recent year   
D  Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts 
 
Area 4: Freedom to Trade Internationally 
A  Taxes on international trade 
B  Regulatory trade barriers 
C  Size of the trade sector relative to expected 
D  Black-market exchange rates 
E International  capital  market  controls 
 
Area 5: Regulation of Credit, Labour, and Business 
A Credit  market  regulations 
B  Labour market regulations   
C Business  regulations 
Source: Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom of the World 2007. 
 
  41Table 6  Descriptive Statistics for the five area indicators of the Fraser Institute 
1980-1984 1990-1994 2000-2004  Country 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Argentina  5.74 4.36 2.50 3.80 4.50 7.10 5.80 4.14 5.38 5.22 7.88 3.86 7.90 6.40 5.52 
Australia  5.02 7.54 9.06 6.84 6.54 5.52 8.34 9.16 7.50 6.88 6.16 9.12 9.30 7.52 7.38 
Austria  3.06 7.96 8.40 6.94 5.44 2.98 8.50 9.56 7.62 5.66 4.66 8.86 9.60 8.40 6.40 
Belgium  3.60 7.84 9.54 8.88 5.46 4.12 7.98 9.64 8.62 5.74 4.26 7.86 9.66 8.74 6.32 
Bulgaria  4.50       3.10  6.68  3.44  5.34 3.52 4.42 4.84 7.08 7.14 5.76 
Canada  4.82 7.48 9.12 7.76 6.76 5.30 8.54 9.60 7.42 7.10 6.46 8.74 9.50 8.02 7.46 
China  3.12    6.12 4.72 3.00 3.76 5.68 6.22 5.50 3.70 3.78 5.08 8.22 7.38 4.58 
Croatia          2.86     3.84  5.46  7.90  6.50  6.14 
Cyprus  5.92    6.10 5.90 5.36 5.72 6.54 7.12 5.48 5.22 6.54 6.98 8.04 6.18 5.74 
Czech 
Republic         6.92     4.08  4.32  6.60  8.84  8.28  5.96 
Denmark  3.10 7.48 6.58 7.18 5.66 2.98 8.62 9.56 7.30 6.60 3.96 9.34 9.68 8.08 6.98 
Estonia          3.62    3.98  6.32  6.58  9.28  8.66  6.94 
Finland  4.58 7.24 7.80 6.76 5.74 4.00 8.70 9.42 6.94 6.32 4.52 9.24 9.60 8.08 6.94 
France  3.46 6.96 6.42 6.64 5.70 3.38 7.62 9.68 7.22 5.82 3.14 7.58 9.60 7.94 6.44 
Germany  4.48 7.62 9.48 8.16 5.20 4.70 8.62 9.42 8.20 5.62 4.62 8.84 9.60 8.50 5.72 
Greece  4.66 5.60 6.86 5.88 4.40 5.16 6.76 6.94 6.30 4.84 6.08 5.78 9.54 7.48 5.42 
Hungary  3.44    6.62 4.38 3.64 3.62 7.36 5.84 5.78 5.16 5.18 6.68 8.76 8.22 6.78 
Iceland  5.18 7.24 2.24 5.60 5.50 5.88 8.30 7.84 6.14 6.28 5.86 9.00 9.18 6.68 7.86 
Ireland  4.54 6.94 6.12 7.50 6.12 5.68 8.26 7.92 7.88 6.90 6.10 8.48 9.58 8.84 6.80 
Israel  2.18 5.18 1.54 6.66 3.42 3.10 5.44 4.76 6.54 4.58 3.60 7.30 9.08 7.94 5.66 
Italy  3.36 6.14 5.66 7.46 4.84 3.46 7.22 9.36 7.34 5.10 5.02 6.78 9.58 7.86 5.48 
Japan  5.88 7.62 8.32 6.86 6.50 5.66 7.86 9.70 6.56 6.38 5.94 7.56 9.56 6.68 6.46 
Korea  6.20 5.58 5.56 6.24 5.34 6.28 5.48 7.10 7.04 5.16 6.56 6.26 9.14 7.18 5.38 
Latvia          5.04     5.82  5.88  9.04  7.44  6.22 
Lithuania          5.22    3.30  5.80  5.32  8.58  7.60  5.82 
Luxembourg  7.04 8.00 9.14 8.68 6.90 4.58 8.62 9.46 8.46 6.68 4.52 8.64 9.64 8.86 7.12 
Malta  4.28    6.62 6.00 5.66 4.98 5.74 7.22 6.50 5.18 5.80 7.08 7.36 6.64 6.52 
Mexico  5.70 5.94 5.76 3.86 4.72 7.20 6.20 4.36 7.50 5.50 7.84 4.08 7.44 7.34 5.38 
Netherlands  3.80 7.82 9.44 8.38 5.48 4.86 8.62 9.64 8.30 6.06 4.62 9.18 9.54 8.64 6.98 
New 
Zealand  3.68 7.96 6.18 7.32 5.74 6.30 8.66 8.26 7.98 7.48 6.72 8.96 9.50 8.24 7.72 
Norway  3.02 7.44 6.42 7.18 5.32 3.22 8.66 9.02 7.94 6.06 4.42 8.66 8.96 7.28 6.48 
Poland  3.86  6.20  3.10  2.24  6.44  3.90  5.82 3.90 5.38 5.84 8.10 6.78 5.60 
Portugal  3.72 7.24 5.50 6.78 4.66 4.90 7.82 7.10 7.48 5.10 5.60 7.56 9.52 7.86 6.16 
Romania  5.48  6.72  2.56  3.76  6.02  4.54  4.92 2.86 4.44 4.94 5.24 6.70 5.46 
Russia  1.20  6.02  2.50  2.64  4.12   3.44 5.48 4.32 4.36 6.82 4.66 
Singapore  7.04 7.74 7.20 9.36 6.20 8.28 7.64 9.46 9.60 6.94 8.04 8.38 9.56 9.32 7.18 
Slovak 
Republic          7.96     4.00  5.88  8.06  8.26  6.06 
Slovenia             2.60  6.56  8.46  7.20  5.62 
South Africa  4.78 5.52 5.30 7.00 5.54 5.68 4.18 6.04 6.42 6.14 5.52 6.66 7.96 7.18 6.56 
Spain  4.50 6.34 6.14 6.98 5.28 4.50 7.32 7.50 7.56 5.66 4.98 6.64 9.54 8.06 6.54 
Sweden  2.30 6.92 7.76 7.06 5.44 2.48 8.54 8.48 8.38 5.92 3.40 8.78 9.72 8.14 6.56 
Switzerland  7.06 8.18 9.58 8.40 5.52 6.80 8.62 9.66 7.94 6.38 7.32 8.78 9.68 8.16 7.36 
Turkey  4.60 5.68 1.22 4.46 4.72 6.24 4.62 3.26 5.88 5.50 7.02 4.90 4.24 7.02 5.20 
United 
Kingdom  3.80 6.88 7.04 8.50 6.24 5.52 8.14 8.70 8.20 7.40 6.44 9.12 9.42 8.22 7.64 
United 
States  5.52 8.30 9.24 7.98 6.80 6.78 8.50 9.68 7.84 7.36 7.64 8.36 9.76 7.78 7.86 
Note: (1) Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes and Enterprises, (2) Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, (3) Access to Sound 
Money, (4) Freedom of Trade Internationally, (5) Regulation of Credit, Labour and Business 
  42Table 7  Descriptive Statistics for Business R&D enhancing factors (1980 -1984 and 
1990-1994) 
  1980 – 1984  1990 – 1994 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9) 
A r g e n t i n a                                
A u s t r a l i a                                 
Austria     98.30            0.19  1.02  98.06  4.40          
Belgium     97.31       1.18     0.84  5.70  94.69        0.24    
Bulgaria                     76.68           
Canada                                
C h i n a                                 
C r o a t i a                                 
Cyprus                                
Czech 
Republic 
         
 
  
     1.19      
  
Denmark     98.63       0.47     2.16  14.60  97.96    0.38  48.72  0.60    
E s t o n i a                                 
Finland     94.92       1.80     0.48  2.81  94.85        1.95    
France      98.65 2.98      35.78      0.77  4.28  96.01 4.31 0.30 41.56 29.50     
Germany     98.59       12.85     0.65  3.59  97.23        9.14    
Greece            2.23     4.35  34.15 89.41    0.04 36.36  1.62     
Hungary                     56.84           
Iceland     89.51  0.39     0.00        77.06        0.00    
Ireland      91.75 3.38            1.49 10.39 93.65 4.04           
I s r a e l                                 
Italy     98.10       7.04     0.95  7.22  96.92        7.42    
Japan     95.41       6.00        95.51        5.07    
K o r e a                                 
Latvia                                
Lithuania                                
Luxembourg                 0.86  5.74             
M a l t a                                 
M e x i c o                                 
Netherlands     95.14       2.98     0.89  4.22  92.49    0.24  35.29  3.04    
New 
Zealand 
         
 
  
           
  
Norway     96.13       10.72        93.40        5.72    
Poland                     67.94  5.24          
Portugal     93.36            1.60  11.26  85.58    0.03  42.86  1.16    
Romania                     97.49  4.82      4.10     
R u s s i a                                 
Singapore                               
Slovak 
Republic 
         
 
  
   83.72  5.07      
  
Slovenia                     93.69           
South  Africa                                
Spain     98.79       6.45     1.03  93.48    0.09  38.21  11.78    
Sweden     97.79       24.44     0.99  4.35  97.50    0.39  42.86  21.10    
Switzerland    96.03       11.25        99.18        4.73    
Turkey                     71.97           
United 
Kingdom 
   91.51      
46.70 
  
2.60 12.34 94.04        41.82 
  
United 
States 
   98.53  3.46    
57.15 
  
   98.03  4.27     53.65 
  
Note: (1) Public procurement advertised in the Official Journal as a % of GDP; (2) Public procurement advertised in the 
Official Journal as a % of total public procurements; (3) Industry university links (business funded R&D performed in other 
sector than the business one); (4) Basic R&D performed in the private sector in % of total business R&D; (5) Share in % of 
researchers, scientists & engineers in the private sector as a % of total active population; (6) Share in % of researchers, 
scientists & engineers in the total business R&D personnel; (7) Share of Public Credit Appropriation in the defence sector; 
(8) Strength of the intellectual property rights (IPR) system; (9) Value added in hi-tech manufacturing sector as % of total 
manufacturing value added. 
  43Table  8  Descriptive Statistics for administrative, institutional and business R&D 
enhancing factors (2000 -2004)* 
Countries (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
Argentina             3.33         
Australia             4.19         
Austria  2.60 16.31 96.55    0.51 54.94    4.71 10.57 0.48    0.51 54.94 10.57 
Belgium  2.49  16.76  94.62 7.16 0.45  51.64 0.30 4.05 13.27 0.49  7.16  0.45 51.63 13.27 
Bulgaria      75.97 0.08 0.04  52.86    3.24 7.65 0.21 0.08 0.04  52.86 7.65 
Canada             3.90         
China             2.48         
Croatia      89.71 1.34 0.06  42.45       0.26  1.34  0.06  42.45  
Cyprus      95.92 5.59 0.08  50.33 0.00    3.93 0.30 5.59 0.08  50.33 3.93 
Czech 
Republic      95.71 3.35 0.20  43.40 3.00 3.52 6.94 0.33 3.35 0.20  43.40 6.94 
Denmark  2.86  16.03  98.20 5.24 0.64  49.25 0.93 4.19 15.16 0.63  5.24  0.64 49.24 15.16 
Estonia      84.99 1.27 0.12  60.67 1.25     0.34  1.27  0.12  60.67  
Finland  2.39 14.90 96.29    1.05 66.88  2.34    24.02 0.68    1.05 66.88 24.02 
France  2.93  17.71  96.51 4.33 0.38  50.61  23.30  4.05 16.97 0.48  4.33  0.38 50.61 16.97 
Germany  1.23 7.41 96.41    0.45  52.07 6.15 4.52 11.17 0.60    0.45 52.07 11.17 
Greece  4.68  34.10  87.80 4.89 0.09  34.20 0.70 3.19    0.22 4.89 0.09  34.20   
Hungary      85.94 6.26 0.13  58.42    3.71  16.59 0.25  6.26  0.13 58.42 16.59 
Iceland     91.79  0.79  57.66  0.00    0.50  0.79  57.66  
Ireland  2.63  20.68  97.87 5.58 0.36  55.42    4.00 22.57 0.48  5.58  0.36 55.42 22.57 
Israel             4.05         
Italy  2.24 18.05    4.97  0.13 37.91  3.70  4.33 9.48 0.34 4.97 0.13  37.91 9.48 
Japan     97.96  5.74     4.53  4.19  0.62  5.74      
Korea             4.19         
Latvia      65.95 2.53 0.08  55.43 0.80     0.22  2.53  0.08  55.43  
Lithuania      68.26 0.02 0.03  58.67 0.27    8.05 0.24 0.02 0.03  58.67 8.05 
Luxembourg  2.04 13.59 99.20    0.83 45.60       0.53  0.83  45.60  
Malta         0.07  59.51  0.00    0.29  0.07  59.51  
Mexico             2.86         
Netherlands  1.97 9.35 90.79    0.33  44.03 1.74  4.38  0.49  0.33  44.03  
New 
Zealand             4.00         
Norway      94.12 4.07 0.64  67.69 6.94 3.90  0.38  4.07  0.64  67.69  
Poland      81.43 4.81 0.06  52.45 5.00 3.24 5.76 0.21 4.81 0.06  52.45 5.76 
Portugal  2.32  17.62  93.98 2.85 0.10  65.92 1.48    6.17 0.23 2.85 0.10  65.92 6.17 
Romania      86.52 8.87 0.10  56.46 1.36 2.71 4.85 0.18 8.87 0.10  56.46 4.85 
Russia     85.98  3.00    44.65  3.52    3.00      
Singapore             4.05         
Slovak 
Republic      92.89 9.56 0.10  46.47 7.17    4.84 0.22 9.56 0.10  46.50 4.84 
Slovenia     92.37  2.33  .18  36.18  0.80    14.11 0.34  2.33  0.18 36.18 14.11 
South Africa             4.05         
Spain  3.06 24.72 93.06    0.17 41.84 26.68 4.05 6.12 0.31    0.17  41.84 6.12 
Sweden  3.81 19.81 98.18    0.67 58.77 16.12 4.38 16.38 0.73    0.67 58.77 16.38 
Switzerland     96.94  11.10     0.45  4.05    0.69  11.10      
Turkey     69.90  0.02  46.67  2.86  0.08  0.02  46.67  
United 
Kingdom  4.69  26.27  94.03  6.46    32.70  4.19  16.91  0.54  6.46    16.91 
United 
States     98.21      54.90  5.00  0.55        
*Administrative and institutional R&D enhancing factors were only available for the last sub period, namely 2000 – 2004, data for the 
Summary innovation index was only available for 2005. 
Note: Business R&D enhancing factors: (1) Public procurement advertised in the Official Journal as a % of GDP (2) Public procurement 
advertised in the Official Journal as a % of total public procurements; (3) Industry university links (business funded R&D performed in other 
sector than the business one); (4) Basic R&D performed in the private sector in % of total business R&D; (5) Share in % of researchers, 
scientists & engineers in the private sector as a % of total active population; (6) Share in % of researchers, scientists & engineers in the 
total business R&D personnel; (7) Share of Public Credit Appropriation in the defence sector; (8) Strength of the intellectual property rights 
(IPR) system; (9) Value added in hi-tech manufacturing sector as % of total manufacturing value added,, (10) Summary innovation index; 
Administrative and institutional R&D enhancing factors; (11) More effective control of public spending growth; (12) Anchoring the budget 
process in a medium-term perspective; (13) Reduced budget fragmentation and increased transparency; (14) Share of enterprises receiving 
public funding for innovation. 
  446. Results 
 
This section presents our results regarding the efficiency of R&D public spending of countries 
over different time periods. We begin by presenting the estimates based on the Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA) and continue with the ones obtained through the DEA non 
parametric method. 
 
6.1. Guide through the empirical study 
Before the results are presented in detail, we briefly describe how this section is organized in 
more detail. Section 6.2 starts with the application of the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). 
While this model has the advantage over the DEA analysis that the structural R&D equation 
and the inefficiency term are simultaneously estimated, it – unlike the DEA – relies on 
functional form assumptions for the R&D equation and on distributional form assumptions for 
its error term.  
 
We first consider cross-sectional regressions for each period, and explore the performance of 
different specifications of the R&D equation. When doing this, we evaluate the unconditional 
inefficiency, that is, the inefficiency in the models does not depend on observable factors. As 
it turns out, the cross-sectional regressions do not point to significant inefficiencies. To 
explore this further, we subsequently estimate panel models instead of separate cross-sections, 
as the sample in the cross-sectional regressions may have been too small to uncover 
statistically significant inefficiencies. It turns out, however, that there are no significant 
inefficiencies in the panel models either. Since we first used only R&D expenses as dependent 
variable in the analysis, we extend the panel models also to R&D personnel. R&D expenses 
may go up due to subsidies as wages for R&D employees may increase. As this, however, 
may have no real effect on the economy unless the wage increase coincides with a 
productivity increase of the R&D workers, it is desirable to test whether private R&D 
employment is also positively related to public R&D in form of subsidies or higher education 
spending and government R&D. We find that the results on the R&D employment are very 
similar to the models on R&D spending. Again, no significant inefficiencies are detected. 
 
As the unconditional inefficiency term did not report unobserved differences across countries, 
we proceed by putting more structure on the inefficiency term. While the inefficiency may not 
vary significantly across countries and years, it may vary across groups of countries or vary 
systematically due to certain characteristics of the country. 
 
First, we investigate the efficiencies of different groups of countries and then proceed to other 
determinants of possible inefficiencies. It turns out that indeed some sources of inefficiencies 
can be identified by putting more structure onto the model.  
 
The specifications of the SFA are then carried over to the DEA analysis in Section 6.3. We 
start by presenting our benchmark results obtained by applying DEA with variable returns to 
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available for all sub periods of five years from 1980 to 2004. We continue by exploring the 
evolution of these efficiency scores over time. In a second step, the results of the most recent 
period are discussed. This allows us to increase substantially the number of countries and to 
examine the performance of the EU New Member States. In the next subsection, we carry out 
a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the benchmark results by changing certain 
parameters of the DEA method, by comparing this method with other non parametric ones, by 
considering alternative specifications (inputs and outputs) and by testing the stability of the 
efficiency scores on different samples of countries.  
 
The results of the two stage Tobit regressions are also discussed in this section. This method 
allows us to investigate the impact of different sets of determinants on the efficiency scores. 
In a first step, the DEA efficiency scores are regressed on alternative groupings, for example 
based on different geographic areas, GDP per capita, or the Summary Innovation Index 
developed for the European Innovation Scoreboard. In a second step, we investigate the 
effects of different regulatory and macroeconomic stability conditions on the efficiency of 
public R&D spending. In addition, we analyze the role played by administrative and 
institutional factors as well as business conditions enhancing R&D activities in the private 
sector and affecting the efficiency of public R&D policies. 
 
Finally, Section 6.4 summarizes the empirical findings of the study by comparing the 
favourite results obtained with the two main parametric and non parametric methods 
implemented in the study. 
 
6.2. Stochastic Frontier Approach 
 
6.2.1 Cross-sections estimates 
In this subsection we present the results of the regressions applying the stochastic frontier 
models as outlined in subsection 4.2. The stochastic frontier analysis was carried out using the 
software package STATA in particular the cross-sectional frontier command and the 
xtfrontier command for the panel regressions. We experimented with different specifications 
and came to the conclusion that the most sensible choice for the baseline regressions is to use 
a log-transformation of business sector R&D and the covariates, where all variables that are 
related to the size of a country are re-scaled by GDP.  
 
The log-transformation is favoured as the stochastic frontier approach was originally 
developed to estimate production or cost functions of the Cobb-Douglas type which are based 
on a multiplicative relationship of the covariates. Furthermore, the estimation method only 
produces consistent estimates if the random error follows a normal distribution. As the 
distributions of the variables are skewed - as typical for economic data – we use their natural 
logarithm (except for the B-Index) to approximate the model assumptions empirically. The 
vector v denotes a “conventional” random error which is assumed to be normally distributed. 
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distributed error term (normal distribution truncated at zero). Thus our preferred specification 
is: 
 
ln(BERD/GDP) it =   b0 + b1 * ln(BERDBYGOV/GDP)it + b2 * ln(HERD/GDP) it +  
b3 * ln(GOVERD/GDP) it + b4 * B-Index it + v it – u it.     (5) 
 
As the B-Index is only available for a limited number of countries, such regressions were only 
considered with subsample. Table 7 presents the estimation results for the time periods 1990-
1994 and 2000-2004 without the B-index. The estimations for the first period 1980-1984 did 
not converge. 
 
As one can see, the subsidies (BERDBYGOV) and the R&D conducted in Higher Education 
(HERD) turn out to be positively significant in both time periods. The term μ in the tables 
displays the mean of the truncated normal distribution (the efficiency term), and the reported 
Coelli-Test (Coelli, 1995) in the hypothesis of no inefficiency is reported at the bottom of the 
tables. If the null hypothesis of no inefficiency is not rejected the model the frontier 
regression basically reduces to an OLS regression with normally distributed errors. As 
indicated by the test statistics, we do not find statistically significant inefficiencies. This may 
have several reasons:  
a) Our cross-sectional samples are too small to achieve the necessary precision in the 
estimations,  
b) the model assumptions are not satisfied,  
c) there are no inefficiencies.  
 
In order to investigate whether there are outliers in the data that may result in the fact that the 
error term departs from the normal distribution, we inspected the residuals of OLS regressions 
instead of using the SFA technique. Indeed, we found that 2 observations, one in the 1980-
1984 sample (Iceland) and one in the 2000-2004 sample (Luxembourg), had very high 
residuals, and took them out of the sample and re-run the regressions form above. Now, the 
model also converges for the 1980-84 period. However, the results still do not suggest any 
significant inefficiencies. This is due to the fact that even our simple model fits the data points 
very well. The estimation results are shown in the following table, and we find that 
BERDBYGOV and HERD remain positively significant as before. 
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denominator
# 
 Time  Period 
Variable 1990-1994  2000-2004 
ln(BERDBYGOV/GDP)  0.427*** 0.553  *** 
  (0.093) (0.104)   
ln(HERD/GDP)  0.619*** 0.424  *** 
  (0.188) (0.129)   
ln(GOVERD/GDP)  -0.102 0.267   
  (0.196) (0.192)   
Intercept  1.028 3.254  ** 
  (1.640) (1.372)   
-1.395* -0.721  **  ()
2 ln v σ  
(0.736) (0.305)   
-0.135 -0.136    μ 
(40.097) (28.815)   
# of obs.  26 42 
Log-Likelihood  -18.737 -43.438 
χ
2 Test  68.48*** 63.37*** 
Coelli-Test: No inefficiency 
[p-value] 
0.948 
[0.828] 
3.087 
[0.999] 
Note:  μ denotes the mean of the truncated normal distribution (inefficiency term). Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
# The model for the period 1980-1984 does not converge. 
 
Table  10  Stochastic Frontier Estimation – Specification using GDP as size 
denominator – Outlier corrected 
 Specification 
Variable 1980-1984  1990-1994  2000-2004 
ln(BERDBYGOV/GDP)  0.230***  0.427***  0.514 *** 
  (0.082)  (0.093)  (0.072)  
ln(HERD/GDP)  0.893***  0.619***  0.894 *** 
  (0.150)  (0.188)  (0.112)  
ln(GOVERD/GDP)  -0.214  -0.102  0.215  
  (0.170)  (0.196)  (0.133)  
Intercept  0.527  1.028  5.309 *** 
  (1.252)  (1.638)  (1.175)  
-2.075** -1.395*  -1.467  ***  ()
2 ln v σ  
(0.942) (0.736) (0.485)   
-0.118 -0.135 -0.098    μ 
(31.161) (40.098) (29.883)   
# of obs.  20 26 41 
Log-Likelihood  -7.600 -18.737  -28.074 
χ
2 Test  124.34 68.48 177.15 
Coelli-Test: No inefficiency 
[p-value] 
0.433 
[0.668] 
0.948 
[0.828] 
1.090 
[0.862] 
Note:  μ denotes the mean of the truncated normal distribution (inefficiency term). Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
  48In the specifications presented above, we did not present results concerning the B-Index, as 
this is only available for a subset of the countries in the sample. We ran all regressions 
including this index describing the generosity of the governmental policies towards R&D, but 
it never turned out to have a coefficient significantly different from zero in any specification. 
Therefore, we decided to omit the presentation of detailed regression tables
34. 
 
6.2.2 Panel data estimates on BERD and R&D personnel 
As mentioned above, the sample size of the single cross-sections may be too small for 
obtaining precise enough estimations for the inefficiency term. Therefore, we now pool all 
years and estimate panel data regressions including observations from 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 
1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004. We directly show the outlier corrected regressions (the 
outlier correction does improve the overall fit of the model, but not the results on the 
inefficiency term, though). The estimations are shown in Table 5. We also experimented with 
other specifications of the model, but since they did not improve the findings, they are 
relegated to the appendix of the study (see Table A 3 - Table A 6). 
 
As Table 11 shows, we find meaningful coefficient estimates for the variables measuring 
public R&D in the regression on BERD. Both subsidies and higher education spending lead to 
higher investment in R&D in the business sector. On part of the subsidy variable, we can also 
reject a crowding out effect. Since the dependent variable excludes the amount of subsidies, 
but comprises only private expenditure, the estimated coefficient and its t-statistic provide a 
direct test on crowding-out. Since the estimated coefficient is positive and significantly 
different from zero, we can reject crowding-out effects.  
 
Again, however, we do not find significant inefficiencies in the pooled sample (see Coelli 
Tests). The hypothesis of no inefficiency is not rejected in the regression model. Furthermore, 
the time dummies are not jointly significant which indicates that there is no time trend in 
BERD which is not already captured by the other explanatory variables. 
As also shown in Table 11 R&D personnel is significantly positively related to government 
subsidies and higher education expenditure. We, thus, can also reject clearly that subsidies 
crowd-out private investment completely. The estimated elasticity is 47%, i.e. if subsidies are 
increased by 100%, R&D employment in the business sector will grow by 47%. Interestingly, 
GOVERD is also positively related to R&D employment while it does not show any effect on 
BERD. As in the case of BERD, though, there is no significant inefficiency. 
                                                 
34 As a further test, we consider R&D personnel in the business sector as dependent variable. According to a 
paper by Goolsbee (1998), crowding-out effects may occur even if R&D expenditure in the business sector 
increases with higher public R&D spending. He argues that it may happen that one observes higher private R&D 
spending, but that it may be due to wages of R&D personnel. He shows this by correlations of wages and 
government spending in a large sample of high-skilled employees in the United States. If the wage increase does 
not coincide with a corresponding productivity increase of the scientists, one may still argue in favor of 
crowding-out effects as the higher government subsidies only result in higher wages rather than higher 
employment. The specifications are analogous to the previous subsection but using log of R&D personnel over 
GDP as dependent variable. As results obtained were very similar – even with respect to the outlier analysis, we 
only present the regressions using panel data below. 
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One interesting difference between the models on BERD and R&D personnel is that the time 
dummies are jointly significant in the latter regression models (see Table 11), while they were 
not in the BERD regressions. Furthermore the coefficients of the time dummies are increasing 
over time, that is, there is a positive trend in R&D employment in the business sector that is 
not captured yet by the other variables in the models. 
Table  11  Stochastic Frontier Panel Data Estimation on R&D Personnel in the 
business sector 
 Dependent  Variable 
Variable ln(BERD/GDP)  ln(R&D personnel
/GDP) 
ln(BERDBYGOV/GDP)  0.404*** 0.465  *** 
  (0.042) (0.043)   
ln(HERD/GDP)  0.826*** 0.376  *** 
  (0.074) (0.073)   
ln(GOVERD/GDP)  0.040 0.172  ** 
  (0.082) (0.082)   
Intercept  2.992*** 9.949  *** 
  (0.686) (0.668)   
Joint significance of 4 time dummies  0.37 53.21  *** 
[p-value]  (0.985) (0.000)   
-1.357*** -1.377  ***  ()
2 ln v σ  
(0.247) (0.297)   
-0.089 -0.129    μ 
(10.131) (15.974)   
# of obs.  141 137 
Log-Likelihood  -104.310 -99.887 
χ
2 Test  446.14 328.07 
Coelli-Test: No inefficiency 
[p-value] 
1.346 
[0.911] 
2.105 
[0.982] 
Note:  μ denotes the mean of the truncated normal distribution (inefficiency term). Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
6.2.3 Panel data estimations: conditional mean of  inefficiency term depending on 
covariates 
In the former regressions we considered unconditional inefficiency terms. This implicitly 
assumed that the inefficiency term is identically distributed (following a truncated normal 
distribution) across all observations. Now we put more structure on the models by making the 
conditional mean of the truncated normal distribution depend on covariates, such that the 
inefficiency is a linear combination of some additional regressors w: 
 
 ' it it w μ δ = ,  
 
where δ denote the additional coefficients in the inefficiency term to be estimated. This allows 
the mean of the inefficiency term to vary across observations depending on the covariates. 
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additional covariates.  
 
As a start, we model the conditional mean as groupwise heterogeneous, i.e. we group the 
countries in the sample by including dummy variables indicating to which “group of 
countries” an observation belongs to. The groups are defined as follows
35: 
 
1.  The New EU Member States since 2004 (this serves as base category in the models) 
2.  The former EU15 Member States 
3.  European countries, but not EU members (yet) 
4.  “High-tech” or highly industrialized countries in the rest of the world. Those are 
Canada, Japan, Korea, and the United States. 
5.  Other countries in the rest of the world. 
 
Using the New EU Member States as reference category is just a choice. The estimated 
coefficients in the efficiency term then represent the relative difference of a certain group, e.g. 
the former EU15 members, to the base category. Any other choice of reference category 
would result in the same results concerning the interpretations of findings. 
 
Table 12 shows the regression results for our 5-period panel. There are interesting differences 
across the regressions. While the former results on the coefficients in the structural equation 
(BERD or personnel) show basically the same results as in the previous models, we now find 
interesting differences across countries’ efficiencies. In the regression using BERD as 
dependent variable, we see that basically all country groups – expect “other countries” – 
perform better than the reference, the (New EU Member States) as the estimated coefficients 
of the group indicators are significantly negative, i.e. their inefficiency is smaller.  
 
In the regression on R&D personnel, however, we find a positive coefficient of the former 
EU15 Member States while the other dummy variables are not significant. Only the 
coefficient of the non-European highly industrialized countries is weakly significant at the 
10% level indicating that those countries are more efficient than the new Member States. 
Thus, the model finds here that the inefficiency is highest in EU15 countries when it comes to 
R&D employment in the business sector as reaction to public R&D spending either as 
subsidies or R&D performed in the public sector. One explanation for this result, could be the 
fact that the former EU15 Member States have a relatively higher stock of researchers than 
the New Member States. Thus, additional incentives may not increase employment as much 
as in countries where the stock of researchers is low. In addition, it may be more difficult to 
find additional highly qualified personnel in countries with a high stock of researchers. If 
these arguments would apply, it would not be surprising that the former EU15 countries 
would exhibit less efficiency in hiring new R&D employees due to government spending than 
the New Member States. It has to be pointed out though that the R&D personnel regression in 
log-levels without rescaling by GDP delivers other findings on the efficiency term. While the 
                                                 
35 See Appendix 7 for the lists of countries for the different groupings. 
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that the EU15 countries are not different from the New Member States, and that the other 
high-tech countries are more efficient than the reference countries. As the results seem to 
depend on the specification, one should be careful with final interpretations. 
Table 12  Stochastic Frontier Estimation (1) 
 Dependent  Variable 
Variable ln(BERD/GDP)  ln(RDPERS/GDP*1000) 
ln(BERDBYGOV/GDP)  0.407 *** 0.480  *** 
  (0.041)  (0.042)   
ln(HERD/GDP)  0.705 *** 0.377  *** 
  (0.083)  (0.074)   
ln(GOVERD/GDP)  -0.009  0.076   
  (0.082)  (0.079)   
Intercept  2.785  10.201   
  (84.135)  (75.527)   
Time dummies  YES YES 
  Inefficiency term μi (Reference class: NEW-EU) 
-0.320 * 0.364  **  Former EU15 members  (0.164)  (0.144)   
Rest of Europe  -0.428 ** 0.025   
  (0.209)  (0.186)   
Other High-Tech  -0.757 *** -0.306  * 
  (0.200)  (0.180)   
Other countries  -0.216  0.147   
  (0.174)  (0.164)   
Intercept  1.192  0.484   
  (84.133)  (75.526)   
# of obs.  141 137 
Log-Likelihood  -96.197 -85.497 
χ
2 Test  347.05 343.95 
Note:  μ denotes the mean of the truncated normal distribution (inefficiency term). Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
As further grouping of countries, we consider the membership of the European domestic 
market (Internal Market) and the membership in the Euro area. These results are presented in 
the following table. Again, we find very robust results concerning the positive impact of 
subsidies and HERD. While both indicators do not point to heterogeneous inefficiencies 
across countries in the BERD regression, the R&D personnel equation indicates less 
efficiency if countries participate in the internal market. This finding is similar to the 
inefficiency found for the EU15 members. However, we should not over-interpret this results 
as the IM dummy may capture several other structural characteristics of countries that go 
beyond the pure internal market membership. 
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 Dependent  Variable 
Variable ln(BERD/GDP)  ln(RDPERS/GDP*1000) 
ln(BERDBYGOV/GDP)  0.417 *** 0.516  *** 
  (0.042)  (0.042)   
ln(HERD/GDP)  0.818 *** 0.353  *** 
  (0.074)  (0.068)   
ln(GOVERD/GDP)  0.020  0.109   
  (0.082)  (0.077)   
Intercept  3.136  10.111   
  (25.727)  (57.651)   
Time dummies  YES YES   
Internal Market  0.159  0.431  *** 
  (0.100)  (0.094)   
Euro Area  -0.262  -0.351   
  (0.330)  (0.298)   
Intercept  0.153  0.131   
  (25.720)  (57.648)   
# of obs.  141 137 
Log-Likelihood  -103.039 -89.840 
χ
2 Test  454.18 393.28 
Note:  μ denotes the mean of the truncated normal distribution (inefficiency term). Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
As these results are not robust across the models using different dependent variables, we split 
the countries according to their GDP into high income countries (the top 25% of the income 
per capita distribution), medium income, and low income (the 25% with least income) (see 
Appendix 7). The high income countries are more efficient in the BERD equations, but not 
with respect to R&D personnel. Note that we could only estimate a reduced specification for 
the R&D personnel equation as the model did not converge with the full specification. We 
had to drop the medium income dummy variable.  
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 Dependent  Variable 
Variable ln(BERD/GDP)  ln(RDPERS/GDP*1000) 
ln(BERDBYGOV/GDP)  0.399 *** 0.461  *** 
  (0.040)  (0.044)   
ln(HERD/GDP)  0.787 *** 0.365  *** 
  (0.078)  (0.076)   
ln(GOVERD/GDP)  0.048  0.173  ** 
  (0.078)  (0.082)   
Intercept  3.226  10.063   
  (28.908)  (35.531)   
Time dummies  YES YES 
Medium GDP per capita  0.315  -   
  (0.198)  -   
High GDP per capita  -0.144  -0.077   
  (0.251)  (0.141)   
Intercept   0.215   
   (35.526)   
# of obs.  141 137 
Log-Likelihood  -97.534 -99.737 
χ
2 Test  330.97 258.73 
Note:  μ denotes the mean of the truncated normal distribution (inefficiency term). Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
For the final specification of the SFA models, we turn our attention to indicators of country 
characteristics as published by the Fraser institute. Due to missing data problems for most 
subcomponent indicators, we rely on the 5 broad summary indicators: “Size of government: 
Expenditures, taxes and enterprises”; “Legal structure and security of property rights”; 
“Access to sound money”; “Freedom to trade internationally”; “Regulation of credit, labor, 
and business”.  
 
Unfortunately, the indicators are highly correlated so that the model could not be estimated 
with the full set of variables. The model using BERD as dependent variable shows that quality 
of a country’s “Legal structure and security of property rights” as well as the “Access to 
sound money” reduce inefficiencies the better these indicators are. The R&D personnel 
models do not show the same effects: the legal structure variable is insignificant, and the 
access to sound money is only weakly significant at the 10% level. However, both variables 
have the same sign as in the BERD regression and, thus, point into the same direction.  
 
As an interim conclusion on the SFA models, we can conclude that the model performance is 
very sensitive to the specification of the model. In the cases, where we tried to estimate more 
sophisticated models with respect to the inefficiency term, the regressions did not converge. 
Furthermore, the regressions using country groupings rather than variables that are based on 
more structural characteristics of the countries point into different directions when one 
compares R&D spending and personnel. Thus it seems that the dummy variables pick-up 
something more than just the pure group structures. When we use the structural determinants, 
though, the models on BERD and personnel point to similar conclusions. This evidence seems 
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other, as most R&D cost is based on wages of personnel.  
Table 15  Stochastic Frontier Estimation (4) 
 Dependent  Variable 
Variable ln(BERD/GDP)  ln(RDPERS/GDP*1000) 
ln(BERDBYGOV/GDP)  0.356 ***  0.454 *** 
  (0.039)   (0.054)  
ln(HERD/GDP)  0.686 ***  0.280 *** 
  (0.097)   (0.088)  
ln(GOVERD/GDP)  0.076 ***  -0.030  
  (0.025)   (0.031)  
Intercept  1.270   8.796 *** 
  (13.828)   (0.644)   
Time dummies  YES YES 
-0.058  -0.078    Legal structure and security of property rights  (0.046)  (0.107)   
Access to sound money  -0.085 **  -0.154 * 
  (0.040)   (0.080)  
Intercept  1.400   2.071 * 
  (13.826)   (3.327)  
# of obs.  140 136 
Log-Likelihood  -91.959 -93.561 
χ
2 Test  273.39 123.42 
Note:  μ denotes the mean of the truncated normal distribution (inefficiency term). Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
6.2.4. Robustness tests 
We performed several robustness checks on the results presented above. We also tried to use 
other regressors in the SFA inefficiency term, e.g. as described in Table 5, Table 7 and Table 
8. Such data, however, is only available for a small subset of countries and time periods. Due 
to the small sample size the SFA models failed to converge in too many cases, so that we do 
not show any result here. We only analyze these determinants with the DEA method. The 
latter has the advantage that the structural equation and the inefficiency term are not estimated 
simultaneously. Thus the efficiency scores can always be calculated from the full sample, and 
the analysis of determinants can be done for the subset where data is available. For that we 
will use a Tobit regression in the second step. As the Tobit model’s optimization function is 
not as complicated as the SFA likelihood function, it will be possible to obtain estimates 
through the combination of DEA and Tobit analysis, whereas the SFA models did not 
converge as the model has to rely on the subset of available data for both the structural 
equation and the efficiency term simultaneously. 
 
Using annual data (in total 512 observations) rather than the 5-year average time periods as 
observations for the regression models does not change the interpretation of results. However, 
sometimes we encountered problems with respect to the convergence of the maximum 
likelihood routine. These are possibly related to the fact that the variables do only change very 
slowly over time, and are thus basically time constant over several years. Furthermore, an 
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problems. 
 
We also tried to use lagged values rather contemporaneous values of the regressors in the 
model, but that causes large problems in the Maximum Likelihood optimization as there 
appear may gaps in the time series once we want to include lags. Therefore we do not present 
the results in more detail. 
 
Finally, we had the idea not to estimate frontier production functions, but use a concept that 
we label “dynamic efficiency”. In this we were interested how R&D expenditure or R&D 
personnel in the business sector respond to a change in public expenditure on R&D. Thus, we 
estimated linear regression models in first differences over time, such that a difference in e.g. 
subsidies should trigger also a positive difference in BERD over time. However, a often the 
case with macroeconomic data, the values change slowly over time. This caused that the first 
differences estimations still found positive coefficients of the regressors used in the model, 
but since the one-period change in the level of subsidies is typically small, the coefficients 
were not precisely determined, i.e. most are insignificant. We also experimented with two-
year differences so that there is more variation in the regressors. While results became 
marginally better, we face the trade-off between more variation in the differenced regressors 
and the reduction in sample size. Therefore, we decided not to present these results in more 
detail in this report. 
 
Due to the poor performance of the SFA models, especially with respect to the convergence 
of more complicated models, it does not seem to be promising for conclusions towards policy 
recommendations. It remains to be checked if the DEA method delivers more robust results. 
 
6.3. Non Parametric approach 
6.3.1. DEA benchmark results and evolution over time 
We implemented a DEA approach as described in Section 4.1 to perform efficiency scores in 
a one-output three-input framework, where GOVERD, HERD and BERDBYGOV represent 
the input indicators and BERD is used as output. Due to limited data availability, the B-index 
is excluded from the analysis and to allow for a better comparability of results with the ones 
reported in the previous section, variables are, except otherwise notified, taken in natural 
logarithms and averaged over five sub-periods, i.e. 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-
1999 and 2000-2004. 
 
Table 16 presents our benchmark results, i.e. efficiency scores for the output-oriented DEA 
with variable returns to scale. Note that efficiency scores are only reported for countries with 
data available over the whole period investigated to avoid differences due to time variations 
from one sub-period to the other. It follows that 3 countries out of 21, namely Japan, 
Switzerland and the United States are ranked in the first position and lie on the production 
possibility frontier. The other countries are inefficient in the sense that given their 
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countries which use similar combination of inputs. Among the most inefficient countries, we 
observe Greece (ranked in the 19
th position), Norway (18), Portugal (17) and Spain (16). 
Iceland (2), Ireland (3), Sweden (4) and Germany (5) come close to the efficiency frontier, 
while Belgium (6), Finland (7), United Kingdom (8), France (9), Denmark (10), Austria (11), 
The Netherlands (12), Australia (13), Italy (14) and Canada (15) appear to be in an 
intermediary position.  
Table 16  DEA output efficiency scores - 3 inputs (lnHERD, lnGOVERD, 
lnBERDBYGOV), 1 output (lnBERD), variable returns to scale,  
Average over 5 sub periods, 1980-1984 until 2000-2004 
Country  Efficiency 
Score  Rank Country  Efficiency 
Score  Rank 
Australia  1.119 13  Italy  1.120 14 
Austria  1.090 11  Japan  1.000 1 
Belgium  1.032 6  The Netherlands  1.116 12 
Canada  1.122 15  Norway  1.146 18 
Denmark  1.082 10  Portugal  1.131 17 
Finland  1.048 7  Spain  1.127 16 
France  1.071 9  Sweden  1.020 4 
Germany  1.027 5  Switzerland  1.000 1 
Greece  1.165 19  United Kingdom  1.069 8 
Iceland  1.010 2  United States  1.000 1 
Ireland  1.016 3    
Before performing a sensitivity analysis of these benchmark results in order to check their 
robustness, it is worth investigating their evolution over time and across countries. Here also, 
due to limited information at the beginning of the period investigated, it is not possible to 
consider all countries for all sub-periods. This is in particular the case for the new EU 
Member States. Figure 10 shows the evolution of efficiency scores of all countries for which 
information on inputs and outputs is available over the whole period
36. Japan, Switzerland 
and the United States are the three countries which are efficient for each of the five sub-
periods. This is also the case for Ireland and Iceland, except for the last sub period. For the 
other countries, efficiency scores appear to decline over time. This drop is more pronounced 
for countries like Austria, Italy, Spain and Norway. On the contrary, France, Germany and 
Sweden are characterized by a relative small decline of their efficiency scores. Finally, 
Canada and Denmark are the only two countries which improve the efficiency of their public 
R&D over time. 
                                                 
36  in the Appendix reports the results for all countries.  Table A 7
  57Figure 10  Efficiency scores DEA output efficiency scores 3 inputs (lnHERD, 
lnGOVERD, lnBERDBYGOV), 1 output (lnBERD) variable returns to 
scale, 5 sub-periods (1980-2004) 
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Greece and Portugal are special cases as these countries exhibit relatively higher efficiency 
scores at the end of the period investigated and perform worse in the middle of the period. In 
particular Portugal shows a high inefficiency score during the 1990’s. Another special case is 
Australia which shows relatively good efficiency scores in the middle of the period and yet is 
embedded by high inefficiencies in the first and the last period. Australia even has the largest 
inefficiency score among all countries considered during 1980-1984. 
 
6.3.2. DEA results for the most recent period, New Member states and crowding out effects 
Table 17 reports DEA efficiency scores based on the output-oriented method with variable 
returns to scale for the 2000-2004 period. This more recent period covers a larger number of 
countries among which the New Member States. It follows that 11 countries out of 42, 
namely Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, 
Switzerland and the United States are ranked in the first position and lie on the efficiency 
frontier. Note that with respect to the benchmark results and despite the higher number of 
countries on the frontier, Japan, Switzerland and the United States are still among the top 
efficient countries. Among the most inefficient ones, we observe Russia (ranked in the 29
th 
position), New Zealand (30), The Slovak Republic (31), Latvia (32) and Poland (33) while 
France (12), Belgium (13), The United Kingdom (14), Greece (15), Australia (16), Portugal 
(17) and The Netherlands (18) appear to be in an intermediary position. The right hand-side 
part of Table 18 presents the group of country peers for each inefficient country. For Austria 
for instance, the closest efficient countries in terms of input combination are Japan, 
Luxembourg and Switzerland. These three countries represent in fact the peers of several 
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Korea, Norway, The Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and The United Kingdom. 
 
Interestingly, some new Member States are listed among the most efficient countries (Cyprus, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Malta) but also among the less efficient ones (The Slovak Republic, 
Latvia and Poland). The most likely explanation rests in the size of these countries in terms of 
R&D activities both in the public and private sectors and in terms of the R&D public 
intervention. Indeed all ‘small’ countries appear to be efficient. Not only do these countries 
represent a unique combination on inputs and output as compared to larger countries (and as a 
result are located on the efficiency frontier) but they are also located near the origin of both 
vertical and horizontal axes of the frontier. In this region, the frontier function is close to zero 
(and therefore the distance to the horizontal axis is small) and very downward sloping which 
explains why DMUs are more likely to be efficient. Note however that Latvia represents the 
only exception to this rule. Yet, if we look at the peers for these country, we see that Latvia is 
dominated by three other ‘small’ countries (in terms of R&D efficiency), namely Estonia, 
Luxembourg, Malta which are able reach a higher output given a similar mix of inputs.  
 
Crowding out (or crowding in) effects and the unique transition situation characterizing some 
of these countries are two other factors may also explain their relative good (or respectively 
bad) performance
37. As discussed in Section 3.3., another issue when using R&D 
expenditures as a measure for output is the crowding out effect through prices which can arise 
if the supply of the R&D personnel is inelastic at least in the short term. In order to control for 
this effect, it is possible to use a volume based indicator as an alternative output such as the 
R&D personnel in the private sector. The results based on the two output measures, i.e. 
business R&D expenditures and R&D personnel are reported in Figure A 4 (for the whole 
period) and Table A 8 (for the sub period 2000-2004) in the Appendix. Over the whole 
period, some differences can be observed for some countries. Noticeable differences are 
Croatia, The Czech Republic, Latvia, Portugal, Russia and Switzerland for different sub 
periods. Switzerland (for the period 2000-2004) for instance, is only ranked in the 14
th 
position when output is measured by the R&D personnel in the private sector. This result can 
be explained by the crowding in effect through the wages of the researchers in this country. 
Given the shortage of researchers, an increase of public R&D shows up in higher wages of 
researchers but not necessarily in an increase of the number of R&D people hired. This effect 
also appears to be present in Sweden (2000-2004) and more surprisingly in Croatia (2000-
2004) and in The Czech Republic (1995-1999). Conversely, given the low wages of the R&D 
personnel and the high supply of researchers in some countries like Russia (2000-2004), an 
increase of the public support to R&D will manifest in an increased demand and hiring of the 
R&D personnel. Therefore, when the number of researchers, scientists and engineers is 
considered for measuring output, Russia appears to be on the efficiency frontier. Latvia 
                                                 
37 For Paasi (1998) for instance, the low level of R&D activities in the private sector and of interactions 
mechanisms and diffusion within transition economies and with other countries are two factors explaining the 
low efficiency of these countries to transform R&D inputs into economic performance. See also Cincera (2001) 
for a discussion. 
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similar situation.  
Table  17  DEA output efficiency scores - 3 inputs (lnHERD, lnGOVERD, 
lnBERDBYGOV), 1 output (lnBERD), variable returns to scale, 2000-2004 
Country  Efficiency 
Score  Rank Peers 
Argentina  1.272  27  Croatia, Japan, Luxembourg 
Australia 1.123  16  Croatia,  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Austria  1.151  19  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Belgium  1.112  13  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Canada 1.082  10  Croatia, Japan, Switzerland 
China  1.033  2  Japan, Luxembourg, United States 
Croatia 1.000  1  Croatia 
Cyprus 1.000  1  Cyprus 
Czech Republic  1.263  26  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Denmark  1.071  7  Croatia, Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Estonia 1.000  1  Estonia 
Finland 1.085  11  Croatia,  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
France  1.102  12  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Germany  1.049  5  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Greece  1.117  15  Croatia, Japan, Switzerland 
Hungary 1.283  28  Croatia,  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Iceland  1.050  6  Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg 
Ireland 1.081  9  Croatia,  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Israel  1.075  8  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Italy  1.197  22  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Japan 1.000  1  Japan 
Korea  1.048  4  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Latvia  1.476  32  Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta 
Lithuania 1.000  1  Lithuania 
Luxembourg 1.000  1  Luxembourg 
Malta 1.000  1  Malta 
Mexico  1.196  21  Croatia, Japan, Luxembourg 
Netherlands 1.147  18  Croatia,  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
New Zealand  1.339  30  Croatia, Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Norway  1.255  25  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Poland 1.492  33  Croatia,  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Portugal 1.142  17  Croatia,  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Romania 1.000  1  Romania 
Russia  1.294  29  Japan, Luxembourg, United States 
Singapore 1.216  23  Croatia,  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Slovak Republic  1.448  31  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
South Africa  1.241  24  Croatia, Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Spain  1.191  20  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Sweden  1.035  3  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Switzerland 1.000  1  Switzerland 
United Kingdom  1.115  14  Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
United States  1.000  1  United States 
For the former Eastern countries, for instance Croatia, The Czech Republic and Romania, it is 
also important to account for the unique situation of the economies of transition characterizing 
most of these countries and which may explain why some of them lie on the efficiency 
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particular in the private sector and their research base (physical capital, research 
infrastructure) was wrecked. However, these countries had a relatively well-educated and 
highly-skilled labour force (human capital), which contributed to attracting R&D investment 
from abroad and ultimately to increasing the level of R&D activities. 
 
6.3.3. Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis has been conducted to check for the robustness of the benchmark 
results. Additional efficiency scores have been performed by changing some parameters of the 
DEA method, by using alternative methods, e.g. the FDH one. Different specifications have 
been tested by considering alternative inputs. The sensitivity of results towards different 
sample compositions in terms of countries has also been investigated. The full results reported 
in the Appendix are discussed in what follows.  
 
As discussed in sections 3.1 and 4.1, technical efficiency can be measured by considering that 
a given output is produced by minimizing the use of inputs (input-oriented method). Table A 
9 in the Appendix shows the input-oriented variable returns to scale based efficiency scores 
which rather confirm our findings from the output-oriented approach since they identify the 
same set of efficient and inefficient countries. 
 
In terms of return to scales, a country which is efficient under constant returns to scale will 
also be efficient under variable returns to scale but the converse does not necessarily holds. 
This will be the case when a country is scale efficient. Interestingly, the scale efficiency terms 
reported in Table A 9 in the Appendix indicate that countries like Japan, the United States and 
Romania and to a lesser extent Croatia and Lithuania are not operating at the most productive 
scale size. The scale inefficiency terms of these countries are above one suggesting that they 
operate at decreasing returns to scale, i.e. a proportional increase of all inputs producing a less 
than proportional increase in output. 
 
Table A 9 in the Appendix also illustrates the output-oriented FDH results for the 2000-2004 
period. The FDH efficiency scores are not really conclusive since almost every country lies on 
the production possibility frontier. Therefore it is quite reasonable to focus on the DEA 
approach as it seems like more stringent assumptions are needed to identify efficient and 
inefficient producers. In fact, a country that is efficient under FDH is not always efficient 
under DEA, but a country efficient under DEA will be always efficient under FDH. 
 
Finally, Table A 9 in the Appendix also reports efficiency scores performed by mean of a 
Simple Composite Index (SCI) method
38. A lower value of this index is associated with a 
higher efficiency performance. The three most efficient countries under the DEA method are 
still the most efficient under the SCI one. Yet, this appears not to be the case for smaller 
                                                 
38 The SCI is defined as an unweighted sum of the three inputs, i.e. HERD, GOVERD and BERDBYGOV 
divided by the output, i.e. BERD. 
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not (fully) efficient under DEA are now among the ones with the highest efficiency 
performances. This is in particular the case for Finland, Germany, Israel and Korea. In a 
nutshell, except for some small New member States, we can conclude that results based on the 
two methods are globally the same. 
 
Table A 10 in the Appendix compares the efficiency results when the three inputs and the 
output are taken in levels rather than in natural logarithm. Here also, except for Croatia, 
Estonia and Lithuania, the group of the most efficient countries is globally the same in both 
cases. As said before, the B-index was not included in the DEA analysis since this indicator of 
the fiscal generosity of governments towards R&D is only available for a sub sample of 
countries and sub-periods. As a result, when we include this input measure, the number of 
country-observations is much lower as expected. Yet, except for Argentina, the group of the 
most efficient countries is again globally the same when the B-index is included as an 
additional input as can be seen from Table A 11 in the Appendix. 
 
As a last test for assessing the robustness of the benchmark efficiency scores, we applied the 
DEA on different samples of countries (from the full sample of 42 countries to the smallest 
one composed of the EU15 Member States only). As it can be seen from Table A6 in the 
Appendix, countries that exhibit the highest efficiency scores remain on the frontier when 
smaller samples are considered. On the same time, countries that were almost efficient 
become fully efficient. 
 
6.3.4. Determinants of efficiency scores: Tobit regressions 
The objective of this section is to assess the impact of different determinants discussed in 
Section 2.2 on the efficiency scores. Among these determinants, we can make a distinction 
between the B-index, the quality of the regulatory framework
39, administrative, institutional 
as well as business factors enhancing R&D activities and affecting the efficiency of public 
spending in support of R&D. Thus, we continue the study by discussing the results as regards 
the determinants of efficiency scores obtained through the DEA analysis
40. In order to 
maximize the number of observations, all country’s efficiency scores available on the five 
sub-periods have been taken into account. This leads to an unbalanced panel of 142 
observations for 42 countries. The efficiency scores represent the dependent variable which is 
                                                 
39  Note that the dependent variable, i.e. the efficiency scores, takes values between one and above, one 
representing the best score. The determinants related to the regulatory framework and which come from the 
Fraser Institute take values ranging from 1 to 10 according to the level of economic freedom or regulation. A 
value of 10 indicates the highest level of economic freedom and the lowest level of economic regulation. Hence, 
a negative estimated coefficient associated with these determinants must be interpreted as having a positive 
impact on efficiency scores. 
40 All findings unless otherwise notified refer to the DEA scores based on the natural logarithm of R&D 
expenditures. 
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Tobit regression method in the context of panel data
41.  
 
Country groupings 
In a similar vein as for the SFA analysis, we also investigate the impact on efficiency of a set 
of dummy variables representing different ‘groupings’ of countries. The first grouping is 
defined as in Section 6.2.3. As alternatives, four other grouping of countries have been 
considered as well
42. The first one operates a distinction between the level of GDP per capita 
(low, medium and high GDP per capita
43), the second one divides countries according to 
whether they are part of the Internal market
44 or the Euro area
45. The third and fourth ones 
split the countries into three groups based on the Summary Innovation Index developed for 
the European Scoreboard and the size of government. For the SSI, the group of countries with 
the highest values of this index refers to the most efficient countries in terms of transforming 
innovation inputs, i.e. education and investment in innovation, into innovation outputs, i.e. 
turnover coming from new products, employment in high-tech sectors and patents
46. For the 
size of government, the grouping is based on general government consumption spending as a 
percentage of total consumption released by the Fraser Institute. 
 
Note that due to collinearity of data, it was not possible to include all the determinants in the 
specification. The same issue has been encountered for the B-index whose results are 
inconclusive. For each regression, log-likelihood ratio tests to discriminate between random 
effects and no fixed effects have been performed systematically
47. Except in a few cases, the 
performed statistics associated with these tests reject the null hypothesis of no fixed effects, 
i.e. pooled model, hence justifying the use of random effect panel data Tobit models
48. 
 
Table 18 reports the result of the panel data Tobit regression of the impact of the five different 
groupings of countries, i.e. the EU15 Member states, the new 10 Member States, the rest of 
Europe, highly industrialized countries and other countries in the rest of the world (column 1); 
countries belonging to the internal market and the Euroland (column 2); low vs. medium and 
high GDP per capita countries (column 3); low vs. medium and high values of the SSI 
(column 4) and size of government (column 5). 
 
                                                 
41 Remember that if the determinants are highly correlated with the inputs and outputs used in the first stage then 
the estimates are likely to be biased. The correlation matrix reported in Table A 13 in the Appendix indicates that 
this is indeed the case for some determinants. 
42 See Appendix 7 for the lists of countries for the different groupings. 
43 The threshold for low (respectively high-) GDP per capita has been defined by considering the first 
(respectively the third) quartile of the GDP per capita series. 
44 A dummy variable has been constructed which takes values zero before the year of a country’s adhesion to the 
EU and one after. 
45 Currently, there are 12 countries in the Euro area, the last Member being Slovenia which joined in 2007. 
46 See http://www.proinno-europe.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=275&parentID=51. 
47 Note, that that for mixed continuous and discrete likelihoods like the Tobit one, log-likelihoods can be 
positive. 
48 Note that due to practical estimation problems, fixed effect Tobit models (Honoré, 1992) have not been 
considered here. 
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countries, i.e. Canada, Japan, Korea and the US, are more efficient as compared to the 
reference group composed of the new EU10 Members states. The coefficient associated with 
the dummy variable representing the rest of Europe has also a negative sign but is not 
statistically significant at the 10 % level. For the DEA scores performed on the basis of the 
natural logarithm of the R&D personnel as an output, the results of the Tobit regression are 
the same as the ones performed with SFA method, i.e. the former EU15 Member states are 
less efficient than the New EU10 ones. This result can be partly explained by the crowding 
out effect which is more severe in the EU15 countries compared to the new Member states
49. 
The countries that belong to the EU and to the Euro zone do not appear to be more or less 
efficient than the other ones. In terms of GDP per capita, countries in an intermediate position 
with respect to this indicator are characterized by lower efficiency scores of their public R&D 
support funding. Unsurprisingly countries that exhibit intermediate and higher values of their 
SSI are more efficient while higher government expenditures in percentage of total 
consumption are associated with lower performance in terms of efficiency. 
                                                 
49 It follows from Table A.8 in the Appendix that the average DEA efficiency score over the 2000-2004 period 
for the EU15 is higher for the DEA results based on the R&D personnel as an output as compared to the 
efficiency scores based on R&D expenditures (1.159 against 1.106) and conversely for the new Member states 
(1.139 against 1.218). 
  64Table 18  Impact of different groupings of countries on DEA efficiency scores 
Panel data TOBIT regression 
Dependent Variable: DEA unpredicted efficiency scores based on ln(BERD) 
  (1)   (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)  
Former EU15 Member states  0.016               
  (0.051)             
Rest of Europe  -0.082              
  (0.054)             
Other High-Tech  -0.105 *              
  (0.054)             
Other countries  0.091               
  (0.076)             
Internal market     0.004            
     (0.024)           
Euro area     - 0 . 0 0 1             
     (0.051)           
Medium GDP per capita        0.205  **        
        (0.094)       
High GDP per capita        0.141         
        (0.100)       
Medium SII            -0.152  ***  
           (0.054)      
High SII            -0.211  ***  
           (0.055)      
Medium size of government               0.105***
spending in % of total consumption             ( 0 . 0 2 7 )
Large size               0.094***
spending in % of total consumption             ( 0 . 0 3 3 )  
# of obs. [left censored]  143 [44]  26 [26]  102 [34] 
Log-Likelihood  52.1   47.9  53.0   7.28   48.4   
LR-test for random effects  41.9 ***50.8  ***48.7 ***0    44.5 ***
Notes: 
Annual dummies included; standard errors in parentheses; reference groups: new EU10 Member 
States, low GDP per capita countries; *** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
Regulatory and macroeconomic conditions  
Table 19 shows the results of the random effects panel data Tobit regression of five general 
regulatory framework factors enhancing R&D activities of firms in the private sector and 
which may explain differences in the observed levels of the efficiency of R&D public support. 
The composite indicators refereeing to the freedom to trade internationally and the regulation 
of credit, labour and business are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, if we have a closer 
look at the main components of these composite indicators
50, we observe a positive and 
significant impact of a more favourable tax regime to international trade as well as more 
deregulation in the labour and business markets on the efficiency scores. Access to sound 
money does not appear to positively affect public R&D efficiency. Yet, none of the 
                                                 
50 These results are reported in   in the Appendix.  Table A 14
  65components of this factor is significant. The overall impact of the size of governments in 
terms of expenditures, taxes and enterprises on efficiency appears to be positive. This is 
particularly the case for transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP and the importance of 
government enterprise and investment in the economy. On the contrary, the share of the 
general government consumption in percentage of total consumption negatively affects the 
efficiency scores which confirm the findings of column (5) in Table 18. The last set of 
regulatory framework conditions concern the legal structure and security of property rights. 
As regards the former, i.e. judicial independence and impartial courts, a positive impact is 
found, while an opposite finding holds for the military interference in rule of law and the 
political process. Interestingly, a higher protection for property rights is associated with a 
negative impact of R&D efficiency. 
 
The bottom part of Table 19 displays the effects of macro economic conditions, i.e. inflation 
and average GDP growth on public R&D efficiency. As expected countries with high 
inflation rates appear to be less efficient while economic growth does not seem to affect 
efficiency scores. 
Table 19  Impact of regulatory and macroeconomic conditions on DEA efficiency 
scores Panel data TOBIT regression 
Dependent Variable: DEA unpredicted efficiency scores based on ln(BERD) 
Size of government: Expenditures, taxes and enterprises 0.022(0.009)**      
Legal structure and security of property rights  -0.025(0.012)**      
Access to sound money  0.027(0.009)***      
Freedom to trade internationally  0.007(0.013)      
Regulation of credit, labor, and business  -0.020(0.016)      
Inflation   0.002(0.001)***
GDP growth   0.117(0.260) 
# of obs. [left censored]  142 [43]    102  [34]  
log-likelihood  56.1        46.1     
LR-test for random effects  54.5     ***  40.2    ***
Notes: 
Annual dummies included; standard errors in parentheses; 
*** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
Administrative, institutional and business conditions 
Table 20 displays the estimates as regards the impact of administrative, institutional factors as 
well as business conditions that may enhance the R&D activities in the private sector and 
affect the efficiency of public R&D policies. Note that here also, given collinearity issues it 
has not been possible to include all these determinants in the same specification. Therefore 
their impacts on efficiency are discussed separately. Furthermore, the results should be 
cautiously interpretated as the number of observations available is limited and sample sizes 
change from one set of determinants to the other. Among the administrative and institutional 
determinants, we consider the share of enterprises that benefited from public funds for their 
innovative activities. Independently from the amounts received, the higher this share, the 
larger the number of firms supported and the more the administration in charge of the 
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different strategies that have been recently implemented by countries to limit the growth of 
their public spending and establish priorities across their programmes expenditures. Among 
these measures, we can mention a more effective control of spending growth, to anchor the 
budget process in a medium-term perspective or less fragmentation in budgets and more 
transparency. Unfortunately, the information on such budget practices is quite recent and 
rather coarse which may explain why the results shown in Table 4 appear to be not 
significant
51. 
 
Among the factors affecting the efficiency of R&D activities, two factors have a positive 
impact on the public R&D policy efficiency scores. The first indicator is the SII which 
evaluates and compares the innovation performance of the EU Member states and other 
industrialized countries in the world. As in the previous table, countries with the best 
performance in terms of innovative activities are also the ones that exhibit the highest 
efficiencies of their public R&D support. Second, in terms of industrial structure, economies 
with a higher share of high-tech manufacturing sectors in the total manufacturing value added 
benefit from higher efficiency performance of their public R&D supporting policy 
instruments. Among the factors with a negative and significant impact on public R&D 
efficiency, we find the importance of public procurement advertised in the Official Journal as 
a percentage of GDP and as a percentage of total public procurements as well as the strength 
of the IPR system. Jaumotte and Pain (2005a) obtain a similar result for this last determinant. 
As emphasized by these authors, a stronger IPR system can encourage firms to carry out more 
R&D
52 and at the same time can make it more difficult for R&D firms to access knowledge. 
However for this last determinant, the conclusion must be mitigated as a positive and 
significant impact on efficiency is detected when the regression is restricted to the EU15 
Member states and the most industrialized countries worldwide while a negative effect is 
observed for the New Member States and countries of the Rest of the world taken alone. 
 
Among the other determinants of efficiency which are not significant, we find the intensity of 
industry-university linkages, the share of fundamental or basic R&D in total business R&D 
activities, the importance of public credit appropriation outlays in the defense sector as well as 
the share of researchers, scientists and engineers in the total population or in the total R&D 
personnel. These results confirm the idea that the synergies in terms of S&T production, 
diffusion and absorption between the public and the private sector could be certainly 
strengthened and their effectiveness could also be improved. Then the risks and uncertainties 
inherent to more basic R&D limit the efficiency of the public funds for this type of research. 
                                                 
51 For this variable, we constructed a dummy variable taking values one if a given measure has been introduced. 
52 Given the amount of public support to R&D, firms will have more incentive to do R&D when the IPR system 
is stronger. Yet, if the access to the knowledge base is difficult, it will hamper the R&D activities of firms even 
in the presence of R&D public incentives. 
  67Table 20  Impact of administrative, institutional and business determinants 
on DEA efficiency scores - Panel data TOBIT regression 
Dependent Variable: DEA unpredicted efficiency scores based on ln(BERD) # obs. 
Log-Like- 
lihood. LR  test  
Administrative and institutional R&D enhancing factors 
More effective control of public spending growth  -0.005 (0.045)  21 4.8  T     
Anchoring the budget process in a medium-term perspective  0.016 (0.035)      T     
Reduced budget fragmentation and increased transparency  -0.013 (0.018)         T    
Share of enterprises receiving public funding for innovation   -0.002 (0.004)  46 6.4  3.1 ** 
Business R&D enhancing factors 
Summary Innovation Index (SII)  -0.404 (0.199) ** 31 -1.98  T   
Public procurement advertised  
in the Official Journal as a % of GDP  0.024 (0.008) *** 43 58.3  22.6 ***
Public procurement advertised  
in the Official Journal as a % of total public procurements  0.005 (0.001) *** 42 57.8  21.5 ***
Industry university links (business funded R&D 
performed in other sector than the business one)  -0.001 (0.001)  113 38.4  48 ***
Basic R&D performed in the private sector  
in % of total business R&D  0.016 (0.013)  46  -4.2  11.1 ***
Share in % of researchers, scientists & engineers 
In the private sector as a % of total active population  -0.126 (0.117)  50  13.8  7.1 ***
Share in % of researchers, scientists & engineers 
In the total business R&D personnel  -0.001 (0.003)  50  13.2  8.5 ***
Share of Public Credit Appropriation in the defence sector  0.001 (0.001)  84  49.5  43.7 ***
Strength of the IPR system       
Full sample  0.030 (0.006) *** 65 34.4  19.2 ***
EU15 Member States and most industrialized countries  -0.037 (0.003) *** 41 47.2  24.8 ***
New EU Member States and rest of the World  0.132 (0.013) *** 23 8.71  3.62 ** 
Share in % of high-tech sectors 
in total manufacturing value added  -0.008 (0.004) * 35 15.3  T    
Notes: 
Annual dummies included; standard errors in parentheses for generalized Tobit pooled regression; 
*** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
The last set of determinants concerns the supply or the stock of researchers available in the 
economy which can be measured by the share of researchers as a percentage of the population 
as well as the quality of the research environment which can be proxied by the share of 
researchers, scientists and engineers in the total R&D personnel
53. Here also these two factors 
do not seem to affect in a particular way the efficiency of the public funds to support the R&D 
in the private sector. 
 
6.3.5. Predicted efficiency scores 
The estimated coefficient from the Tobit regression models obtained for the different sets of 
determinants are used to predict the DEA efficiency scores of countries. In comparison to the 
unpredicted (or unconditional) scores, the predicted ones are useful to determine whether 
countries are performing better (or worse) than it would be expected given the environmental 
                                                 
53 The higher this share, the less researchers will be assisted for other tasks than pure research. 
  68variables, i.e. given the fact that we control for the role played by the different sets of 
determinants on the economy.  
 
Figure A 5 compares the unpredicted DEA efficiency scores and the corresponding ones 
predicted by regulatory framework conditions of the Fraser Institute. We also compare the 
unpredicted and predicted scores performed by taking the natural logarithm of R&D 
expenditures and personnel as outputs. Finally, for the predicted scores, we also compare the 
results based on the pooled and the random effect Tobit models
54.  
 
In all cases, the conditional scores differ quite a lot with respect to the unpredicted ones 
suggesting that regulatory conditions matter in explaining countries’ performance in terms of 
the efficiency of their public R&D spending. Conversely, predicted scores based on both 
pooled and random effect Tobit models and on R&D expenditures and personnel do not differ 
to a great extent. For the later, the main differences are again observed for some new Member 
States for which, as already discussed, crowding-in effects of their R&D expenditures are 
likely to be more pronounced. 
 
6.4. Comparison of efficiency scores and determinants: SFA and DEA 
In this section, we compare the efficiency scores obtained from the SFA and the DEA 
methods as well as their determinants. 
 
6.4.1. Efficiency scores 
In order to assess the consistency of the results between the two methods, we show the 
estimated efficiency scores in a scatterplot. Note that these scores should not be interpreted as 
percentages or related terms of inefficiencies. In order to illustrate the consistency of the 
results, we standardized the scores of both methods by subtracting the mean value and 
dividing by the standard deviation of the estimated scores. The overall levels of the scores are 
not comparable, we are only interested in the correlation of the scores that is, do the efficiency 
ranks of the countries obtained from the two methods broadly coincide? 
 
Figure 11 shows the correlations of the predicted efficiency scores from the regression of 
ln(BERD) where the Fraser institute variables are included in the efficiency term (cf. Table 15 
for the SFA and Table 19 for the DEA results). Note that this comparison has not been done 
for the raw or unpredicted efficiency scores as there is basically no variation across countries 
for these indexes for the SFA method. The predicted or conditional efficiency index reflects 
the average efficiency observed over the whole time period. The closer a country is located to 
the origin of the coordinate system, the higher is its efficiency. The graph shows that there is 
congruence of ranks to a large extent. The vertical and horizontal lines split the countries into 
a high, medium and low efficiency group according to each method based on the rule that 
                                                 
54 Note that the likelihood ratio tests of the Tobit panel regression vindicate the use of random effect models 
rather than pooled cross-sectional models (no countries specific effects). Yet, it may be worth comparing the 
predicted efficiency scores we get from these two models. 
  69each group contains one third of the countries. As can be seen, the majority of countries is in 
the same group (high, medium, low) for both methods. 
 
Iceland may be seen as an outlier, as it is highly efficient in the DEA but ranks much lower in 
the SFA results. Thus it is located far away from the main diagonal “boxes”. Similarly, the 
results of DEA and SFA differ considerably for Belgium, Luxembourg, and Mexico. 
 
The results for most of the other specifications are different and are not presented in detail 
here. Besides the technical differences between the SFA and the DEA (number of 
observations, assumptions as regards the form of the specification and the distribution of the 
error term for the SFA, the collinearity between the determinants and the variables used in the 
first stage for the DEA method and so on), another source of divergence among the results 
rests in the significance of the determinants which differs across methods
55. 
 
Similar issues arise when we are interested in comparing the SFA and DEA predicted 
efficiency scores performed by means of the R&D personnel. The scores conditional to the 
regulatory conditions for instance are different and lead to a different ranking of countries’ 
efficiencies. Therefore these results are not reported here. Rather, Figure 12 shows the 
rankings of countries based on the DEA predicted efficiency index obtained for the R&D 
expenditures and the R&D personnel. We can observe a certain consistency between the two 
models, the main differences, once again, mainly concern the countries likely to be affected 
by crowding out and crowding in effects. 
 
In a nutshell, the comparison of the predicted efficiency scores in Figure 11(SFA vs. DEA) 
leads to a ranking of countries (in alphabetical order) into three groups. Those groups 
represent the list of countries where efficiency scores obtained from the both models lead to 
very similar conclusions: 
•  Top performers: Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, and the USA. 
•  Average countries: France, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Norway, Sweden, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. 
•  Less efficient countries: China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Israel, Latvia, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic. 
 
For other countries, the results indicate that they score differently in the both models. For 
instance, Austria, Belgium and Denmark are among the top performers in the SFA, but only 
in the medium category when DEA is used, whereas Iceland and Ireland are top in the DEA, 
but only medium in the SFA. A large outlier is Mexico that is among the worst three countries 
                                                 
55 For instance the results from the regressions where the internal market and the Euro area enter the conditional 
mean function of the efficiency term lead to a large discrepancy among the models. This is due to the fact that 
the two models do not deliver coherent results. While the SFA detects variation in the efficiency levels, the Tobit 
regression based on the DEA does not report systematic variations across countries. 
  70in the SFA but in the medium category in the DEA. Thus, for some countries the model 
outcome when compared across methods remains inconclusive. 
 
Regarding the comparison in (R&D expenditures vs. personnel) the following countries 
belong to the three comparable groups for both models: 
•  Top performers: Australia, Canada, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, 
Portugal, Singapore, Switzerland and the United States. 
•  Average countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Korea, Norway, Spain, Sweden, France.  
•  Less efficient countries: China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Russia and the Slovak Republic. 
 
The results of the comparison of BERD and R&D personnel when both scores are obtained 
from the DEA method shows that the results are more harmonized than in the case when 
results are compared across models. Even the countries that score differently on BERD and 
personnel are closer to the “borders” of the comparable efficiency scores of the two models. 
For example, Finland, Germany and the Netherland score “only” medium on personnel but 
are in the top third of the BERD results. However, in the BERD’s medium group they are just 
a little above the top performers threshold values. The only larger outliers are Argentina, 
Mexico and Malta which score somewhat more different on personnel and BERD.  
Figure 11  Comparison of efficiency scores obtained from SFA vs. DEA 
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  71If one compares a more similar set of countries, such as the old EU Member States, however, 
we find that they score very similar in both the comparison across methods and across 
personnel vs. BERD. Even when some of them are mentioned above as having different 
results in the sense that they end up in the medium group in one case and in the top group in 
another case, it should be noted (see the two figures summarized above) that they are quite 
close to border of the top or medium performers, respectively, in all cases. The largest 
exception is Belgium that scores high in the SFA on BERD but only medium – while being 
somewhat further away from the threshold to the top – in the DEA on BERD. Otherwise, we 
do not find larger differences in the efficiencies in the older EU Member States which point to 
the conclusion that the highly industrialized countries in Europe have somewhat more 
harmonized policy mixes in comparison to other countries. 
Figure 12  Comparison of DEA efficiency scores: R&D expenditures vs. personnel 
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If we take a closer look at the countries in the top performers with respect to the estimated 
efficiency scores, it turns out that there is no single policy mix that may ensure that countries 
score high on the efficiency levels. For instance, the United States turn out as highly efficient 
in the analysis. Given the fact, however, that many of the top universities in the U.S. are 
private but not public schools, the HERD is ranging only in the average of the countries 
considered (taken relative to GDP and averaged across the whole time period for 
simplicity)
56. However, the U.S. scores high on government-funded BERD and R&D 
conducted in the public sector (GOVERD). Compared to, for example, Switzerland, the U.S. 
has implemented a very different policy mix. Switzerland ranges among the top countries 
                                                 
56 Compare with   in the descriptive statistics section.  Table 3
  72with respect to HERD, but only below average in government-sponsored BERD and even 
among lowest countries with respect to GOVERD. Japan, in contrast, is similar to Switzerland 
in government-sponsored BERD and HERD, but is clearly above average in terms of 
GOVERD, too. Thus, one cannot identify a single strategy, e.g. high or low public spending 
on all types of expenditure that leads to high efficiency. It should be noted, however, that the 
older EU Member States typically range in the upper third of the distribution of countries with 
respect to all types of public R&D spending (HERD, GOVERD, BERDBYGOV). In terms of 
efficiency scores with respect to BERD or R&D personnel they also score mainly among the 
upper third of countries. Again, their policy mix is different from Switzerland, Japan and the 
US, but it also yields high efficiencies in the models applied. 
 
6.4.2. Determinants 
The results as regards the determinants explaining the efficiency scores obtained from the two 
methods and for the R&D expenditures and personnel are reported in Table 21. On the whole, 
it appears that for R&D expenditures and SFA results, countries from the former EU15, the 
rest of Europe, the most industrialized countries and other parts of the world are more 
efficient as compared to the new Member states. These results are partially confirmed by the 
DEA method and for the R&D personnel. When this output is considered to perform the 
efficiency index, former EU Member states are found to be less efficient which can be 
explained by a crowding out effect of their public R&D support. This result is also observed 
when the DEA method is performed. When we consider the membership to the European 
internal market and the Euro area, only the SFA based results are significant. The findings are 
in line with previous ones, i.e. belonging to the Euro area leads to less inefficiencies for the 
R&D expenditures and being part to the Internal market to more inefficiencies for the R&D 
personnel. These results are again consistent with the crowding out effect of public R&D. 
  73Table 21  Determinants of efficiency scores: Comparison of SFA and DEA methods 
Method SFA/panel DEA/panel 
Output R P  R  P 
Determinants        
Country groupings         
World regions         
EU15  - +    + 
Rest of Europe  - -     
High  - -  -   
Other  - -     
Internal market and Euroland 
IM   +     
Euro  -     
GDP per capita         
Medium     +  + 
High  - -     
Regulatory conditions         
Size of government  - -  +  
Legal structure  -  -   
Access to sound money     +  + 
Freedom to trade        
Regulation       + 
Notes:  
R = R&D expenditures; P = R&D personnel; The sign ‘-’ refers to a negative impact of the determinant on 
inefficiency, i.e. a positive impact on efficiency, and conversely for the sign ‘+’; Only the signs of the 
variables that were significant (at the 10% at least) are reported. 
The results obtained when we group the countries according to their GDP per capita levels are 
consistent across outputs (R&D expenditures vs. personnel) and within methods (SFA vs. 
DEA). With respect to the reference group, countries with the highest GDP per capita are the 
less inefficient and countries in an intermediary position appear to be more inefficient. 
 
The last set of determinants reported in Table 21 concerns the framework conditions of the 
Fraser institute. It follows that the results between the SFA and DEA methods are less 
comparable except for the legal structure which has a positive impact on the level of 
efficiency. For the size of the government determinant, an opposite effect on efficiency is 
found between the two methods. However, when this variable is further decomposed a 
negative sign is also observed for the DEA model. A negative impact on efficiency of a better 
access to sound money and a higher level of deregulation are also observed for the DEA 
model. Yet, here also, the findings are not confirmed by the specifications based on the sub-
components of these determinants. 
 
Note that the comparison of results for the administrative, institutional and business 
conditions that may directly enhance R&D activities in the private sector and indirectly affect 
the efficiency of public R&D spending is not reported here since no results as regards the 
  74impact of these determinants were found for the SFA. This is a main limitation of the SFA 
method stemming from the poor availability of data for this kind of indicators
57. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this study was to develop a methodological framework to assess the 
efficiency of the main public R&D instruments implemented by countries to support R&D 
activities in the private sector. Among these policy measures, we made a distinction between 
four main categories of instruments, i.e. direct subsidies, tax incentives and R&D performed 
in the public sector (higher education and government sectors). 
 
The study rests on the concept of efficiency which is based on the relationship between policy 
instruments to increase firms’ R&D activities (inputs) and the additional R&D induced by 
such measures (output). As such the study can be considered as a first step of the analysis of 
the effects of R&D on the outcomes of such activities, e.g. GDP or TFP growth. Various 
indicators and statistics mainly from EUROSTAT and the OECD have been collected to 
measure the level of efficiency of these instruments and compare them across countries for 
the last two decades. The analysis is not restricted to EU Member States, but also takes other 
OECD countries into account. Especially, the comparison to Japan and the United States is 
interesting as a benchmark. 
 
The differences observed in the efficiency performance across countries have been 
investigated and explained by control variables (exogenous framework conditions), e.g. the 
nature of competition, the quality of the business environment, the IPR regime, the access to 
markets and to external financing conditions, and administrative and institutional factors 
possibly influencing the effectiveness of public R&D with respect to stimulating R&D 
activities in the business sector.  
 
At the macro economic level, the assessment of the efficiency of public policies and of their 
determinants are generally achieved by means of parametric and non- parametric econometric 
methods. Among these, the Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) and the Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) have been the most widely used in the literature. Each method has its own 
advantages and drawbacks. SFA is sometimes preferred as it accounts for measurement errors 
and other statistical noise. Unlike the DEA approach, it also delivers the possibility to test for 
statistically significant inference on the estimated inefficiencies. However, it requires – 
compared to DEA – quite restrictive assumptions on functional forms and the distribution of 
error terms, in particular the distribution of the inefficiency term. This method, in order to be 
fully operational, also requires a quite large number of observations.  
 
                                                 
57 Data are in general only available over a short and recent time period. 
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not only the two methods (SFA vs. DEA), but other methods as well (FDH, Simple 
Composite Method), dependent variables (BERD and R&D personnel in the business sector), 
and different data samples (cross-sectional versus panel data; sub-periods vs. averaged data). 
With respect to the estimated inefficiencies, unconditional and conditional mean estimates 
have been applied. The latter allow to explain possible inefficiencies of countries by a set of 
determinants, e.g. country groupings (EU vs. non-EU; high, medium, low income) or more 
structural variables, such as regulatory framework, administrative, institutional and business 
conditions and other indices. Several different sets of these determinants have been tested in 
the study.  
 
A first result that can be concluded from the exploration of the SFA versus the DEA method 
is that the SFA technique is very sensitive to the model specification. Given our data, it 
frequently happened that the estimation did not converge at all. Thus, the suitability of the 
SFA for efficiency analysis turned out to be quite limited. Although several results are 
comparable to the DEA analysis, the SFA could only be applied to a limited set of 
determinants explaining potential inefficiencies of countries. On the one hand, a large number 
of interesting indicators was only available for a few countries so that the small sample size 
explains the undesirable property of not converging estimations in SFA applications. On the 
other hand, even if determinants were available for the full set of observations, it frequently 
happened that the SFA did not converge. Therefore, the DEA seems to be a more suitable 
method in practice, as it always converges and does not suffer from as restrictive assumptions 
as the SFA that may make its application fail.  
 
Turning to the economic results, it turned out that the comparability of the DEA and the SFA 
is not fully satisfactory. While several results are robust and consistent across the different 
methods and model specifications, some efficiency determinants are found to have opposite 
signs in the SFA and DEA (although they may not be significant in one of the methods). 
Nevertheless, for a large set of countries similar efficiency indices can be found when 
comparing SFA and DEA. In the case of the models on BERD, it turns out that following 
countries are ranked as most efficient by both methods: Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United States. The 
investigation of R&D personnel in comparison to BERD using the DEA method led to the 
result that following countries are among the most efficient for both outcome variables: 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Switzerland 
and the United States. In a nutshell, the different models and specifications find the coherent 
results that the Finland, Germany and the Netherlands for the EU Member States and the 
United States, Japan and Switzerland can be seen as highly efficient countries, irrespectively 
of model specification or method used. Also Austria, Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom for the EU and Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore score high in each of 
the models. 
 
  76In terms of the determinants that influence the efficiency of a country, the possibility of 
comparisons across methods are limited as the SFA does not work in many cases. However, 
when looking at the whole set of results, two factors emerge as positively affecting efficiency 
levels: the strength of the IPR system, and, the alternative measure from the Fraser institute’s 
data, the composite indicator of legal structure and security of property rights. When looking 
at the values of these factors for the highly efficient countries mentioned above, it turns out 
that they all score high on these. While many country characteristics certainly play a role for 
the incentives to invest in R&D, the results of this study clearly refer to the importance of a 
well functioning system for securing intellectual property. For Europe, the results obtained 
give clue that while the strength of the IPR system in Europe still varies considerably even 
among European member states in recent time periods (at least in the indicators we used), an 
improvement and harmonization of such a system will possibly support efficiency 
improvements of public R&D spending. Especially the less developed economies of the old 
Member States and even more the New Member States show lower scores on the quality of 
the IPR system. 
 
Keeping in mind that R&D investment of a firm is possibly one of the riskiest investment 
decisions managers have to make, it is highly plausible that well-established appropriation 
mechanisms help to facilitate positive investment decision. Arguments for this are deeply 
rooted in economic theory since decades: R&D by its nature has an inherent uncertainty of 
outcome. On top of uncertain returns, R&D is typically seen as a knowledge generating 
process, and as Arrow (1962) pointed out already, knowledge is basically information, and 
something intangible as information can never be kept secret. Knowledge as result of an 
investment in R&D will always spill-over to third parties, in the worst case rivals that can 
free-ride on an inventor’s investment to generate own returns.  
 
Therefore it is well-known and established in both economic theory and empirical research 
that firms seek for solutions to improve the appropriation possibilities of R&D. Of course, 
most industrialized countries have patent systems in place to increase the appropriability of 
R&D results, but it is also known that institutional differences in the patent systems lead to 
varying appropriability conditions, and that none of the patent systems is guaranteeing a 
100% allocation of returns of R&D to the inventor. Third parties can invent around the patent, 
or possible infringement has to be detected, and can appropriately be sued and proven so that 
inventors will be compensated for potential losses. Thus, a strong legal system offers much 
beyond the pure patent systems that determines appropriation conditions in an economy, and 
in the end will result more R&D investment in the economy.  
 
Finally, more general conclusions about “optimal” policy mixes with respect to public R&D 
can not be drawn easily from this study relying on macroeconomic indices. It turns out that 
the top performing countries, Japan, Switzerland and the united States actually rely on very 
different public R&D strategies. While the United States spends relatively less on higher 
education expenditure (in relation to GDP) than the other top performers, Switzerland 
conducts very little government R&D, and the United States employ more government-
  77sponsored business R&D than both Switzerland and Japan. The latter is to a large extent 
driven by defense-related investments, though. Yet, there seems to be no unique public 
strategy that determines high efficiency levels.  
 
In order to derive conclusions on the success of a policy mix, it would be necessary to go 
beyond the pure macroeconomic level. For instance, investigate how well matched the focus 
of public and private research is in an economy. For example, is there a special interest in 
certain technology developments in the public sector? Several countries maintain public 
research institutions for specialized technologies which are important for their national 
industry. It would be interesting to investigate if such public engagements in the end lead to a 
better link between science and industry in the country? If so, will this ensure higher 
efficiencies in translating public research results into private R&D investment?  
 
Another question concerns the interactions between the different innovation policy measures. 
Are they complement or substitute, what is the optimal mix of R&D instruments associated 
with allocative efficiency of inputs? Given the increasing power of decision devolved to 
regions in the field of S&T policy, what are the interactions between different spatial levels of 
public intervention, i.e. national, regional vs. supranational ? To what degree are, for instance, 
the S&T collaborative agreements funded through the successive Framework programmes 
complementary to national initiatives? 
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 Appendix 1 Review of the empirical literature assessing the efficiency of public spending 
     Indicators   
Authors Period  Countries  Input  Output  Methods 
Afonso et al. (2003)  1990 and 2000  23 industrialized 
OECD countries 
Public spending as a percentage of GDP  PSP indicator  FDH 
Afonso et al. (2006)  2001  24 countries  PSP composite indicator  Total government spending as a ratio of GDP  DEA (output-oriented), Tobit 
regression (evaluation of the 
importance of non-discretionary 
inputs) 
Gupta and Verhoven 
(2001) 
1984 – 1995  37 countries  Per capita education, health spending by the 
government 
life expectancy, infant mortality; adult illiteracy, 
primary/secondary school enrolment 
FDH 
Clements (2002)  1996  20 OECD countries  Spending per student as a share of per capita GDP, 
the share of educational expenditure to GDP 
Percentage of people that completes secondary 
education at a normal graduation age,  test scores on 
international examinations at the eight grade 
FDH 
Afonso and St. Aubyn 
(2005b) 
2000  OECD countries  Teachers per student, hours per year in school; 
number of doctors, of nurses and of in-patient beds 
per thousand inhabitants 
Performance of 15-year-olds on the PISA reading, 
mathematics and science literacy scales; infant survival 
and life expectancy 
FDH, DEA 
Herrera and Pang 
(2005) 
1996 – 2002  140 countries  Nine Public spending per capita on education and 
health 
Nine education and four health output indicators  FDH, DEA 
Evans et al. (2000)  1993 – 1997  191 WHO countries  Total health expenditures per capita, average 
education attainment in the adult population 
Indicator of healthy life expectancy (DALE)  COLS 
St. Aubyn (2002)  1997  OECD countries  Total health expenditure per head; cumulative 
expenditure per student, expenditure in primary and 
secondary education per habitant aged between 5 and 
19 
DALE, infant mortality; PISA results, graduation rates 
in upper secondary 
FDH, COLS 
Wang and Huang 
(2007) 
1997 – 1999  30 countries (23 
OECD and 7 non-
OECD) 
R&D capital stocks and manpower  Patents and academic publications  DEA, Tobit regression 
Lee and Park (2005)  1999  27 countries  R&D expenditure, average number of researchers Technology  balance of receipts, number of scientific 
and technical journal articles published and number of 
triadic patent families 
DEA (output-oriented), cluster 
analysis 
Zabala-Iturriagagoitia et 
al. (2007) 
2002 and 2003  European regions  Higher education, lifelong learning, medium/high-
tech employment in manufacturing, public R&D 
expenditure, business R&D expenditure and high-
tech patent applications to the European Patent Office 
(EPO) 
Regional GDP per capita  DEA 
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Source: Afonso et al. (2006). 
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Direct measures 
 
Source: CEC (2003a) 
 
Indirect measures 
 
Source: EC (2003b) 
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Source: CEC (2003b) 
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Appendix 4 Methods for ex-post evaluation of RTD programmes and policies 
Statistical data analysis: 
•  Innovation Surveys: provides basic data to describe the innovation process, summarised using descriptive 
statistics. 
•  Benchmarking/Ranking: allows performing comparisons based on a relevant set of indicators across 
entities providing a reasoned explanation their values. 
Modelling methodologies: 
•  Macroeconomic modelling and simulation approaches: allows estimating the broader socio-economic 
impact of policy interventions. 
•  Microeconometric modelling: permits to study the effect of policy intervention at the level of individuals 
or firms. There are mechanisms to control for the counterfactual by specifying a model which allows 
estimating the effects on the outcome of the participant had the programme not taken place. 
•  Productivity analysis: permits to assess the impact of R&D on productivity growth at different levels data 
aggregation. This is particularly relevant to analyze the broader effects of R&D on the economy. 
•  Control group approaches: allows capturing the effect of the programme on participants using statistical 
sophisticated techniques. 
Qualitative and semi-quantitative methodologies: 
•  Interviews and case studies: uses direct observation of naturally occurring events to investigate 
behaviours in their indigenous social setting. 
•  Cost-benefit analysis: allows establishing whether a programme or project is economically efficient by 
appraising all its economic and social effects. 
•  Expert Panels/Peer Review: measures scientific output relying on the perception scientists have of the 
scientific contributions made by other peers. Peer review is the most widely used method for the 
evaluation of the output of scientific research. 
•  Network Analysis: allows analyzing the structure of cooperation relationships and the consequences for 
individuals’ decisions’ on actions providing explanations for the observed behaviors by analyzing their 
social connections into networks. 
•  Foresight/ Technology Assessment: used to identify potential mismatches in the strategic efficiency of 
projects and programmes. 
Source: Rojo and Polt (2002). 
 Appendix 5 Description of the different variables used in this study 
NAME DESCRIPTION  SOURCE 
BERD   Business expenditures on R&D All R&D expenditures in the business sector, according to 
the Frascati Manual definitions. BERD refers to all R&D activities performed by businesses 
within a particular sector and territory, regardless of the location of the business’s 
headquarters, and regardless of the sources of finance. Note that BERD as we use it in this 
study measures the business R&D expenditure financed by the private sector. Thus, the data 
represent BERD net of subsidies. 
Eurostat, 
OECD 
HERD   Expenditure on R&D in the higher education sector  Eurostat, 
OECD 
GOVERD   Government Intramural Expenditure on R&D  Eurostat, 
OECD 
BERDBYGOV   Expenditure on R&D in the Business Enterprise Sector by the Government  Eurostat, 
OECD 
R&D  personnel  R&D personnel, according to the Frascati Manual definitions are expressed in full-time 
equivalent (FTE), i.e. a person working half-time on R&D is counted as 0.5 person years, 
and headcount. 
OECD 
B-Index  The B index is defined as the present value of before tax income necessary to cover the initial 
cost of R&D investment and to pay corporate income tax, so that it becomes profitable to 
perform research activities (see Warda 2001 for further details). 
OECD 
Strength of the IPR 
system 
The index is based on five categories: (1) coverage (the subject matter that can be patented); 
(2) duration (the length of protection); (3) enforcement (the mechanisms for enforcing patent 
rights); (4) membership in international patent treaties; and (5) restrictions or limitations on 
the use of patent rights. For each of these categories, a country is given a score (ranging from 
0 to 1) indicating the extent to which a country is strong in that aspect. The overall score for 
patent rights is the unweighted sum of the scores of the five individual categories. 
Park (2001), 
Park and 
Wagh (2002) 
Share of firms that 
received public funds 
for R&D 
Number of innovative enterprises that have received public funding. Public funding includes 
financial support in terms of grants and loans, including a subsidy element, and loan 
guarantees. Ordinary payments for orders of public customers are not included. This number 
is divided by total number of enterprises, thus both innovating and non-innovating 
enterprises (Community Innovation Survey). 
European 
Innovation 
Scoreboard 
(EIS) 
Summary Innovation 
Index 
The Summary Innovation Index (SII) gives an “at a glance” overview of aggregate national 
innovation performance. The SII is calculated using the most recent statistics from Eurostat 
and other internationally recognised sources as available at the time of analysis, e.g. 
population with tertiary education, innovation expenditures, employment in high-tech 
services (% of total workforce), Triad patents per million population etc. 
European 
Innovation 
Scoreboard 
(EIS) 
Public procurement 
advertised in the 
Official Journal as a % 
of GDP 
The numerator is the value of public procurement, which is openly advertised. For each of 
the sectors works, supplies and services, the number of calls for competition published is 
multiplied by an average based, in general, on all the prices provided in the contract award 
notices published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, Supplement S during 
the relevant year. The denominator is the GDP (gross domestic product). 
Eurostat 
Public procurement 
advertised in the 
Official Journal as a % 
of total public 
procurements 
The numerator is the same as for the previous indicator. The denominator is the total value of 
public procurement. 
Eurostat 
The Fraser 
Institute, 
Economic 
Freedom of 
the World, 
2007. 
Composite Indicators 
of the Fraser Institute 
For a detailed description of the different areas and components of the Fraser Institute 
composite indicators see: 
http://www.freetheworld.com/2007/4EFW2007app1.pdf  
More effective control 
of public spending 
growth 
Based on Joumard et al (2004), table 2, p.14.  Joumard et al 
(2004) 
Anchoring the budget 
process in a medium-
term perspective 
Based on Joumard et al (2004), table 2, p.14.  Joumard et al 
(2004) 
Reduced budget 
fragmentation and 
increased transparency 
Based on Joumard et al (2004), table 2, p.14.  Joumard et al 
(2004) 
Basic R&D performed 
in the private sector in 
% of total business 
R&D 
Basic R&D as defined in the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002)  Eurostat 
Share in % of 
researchers, scientists 
& engineers in the 
private sector as a % of 
total active population 
Researchers, scientists and engineers as defined in the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002)  Eurostat 
Share in % of 
researchers, scientists 
& engineers in the total 
Total business R&D personnel as defined in the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002)  Eurostat 
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business R&D 
personnel 
Share of Public Credit 
Appropriation in the 
defence sector 
Total business R&D personnel as defined in the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002) 
Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays on R&D (GBAORD) broken down in 
accordance to the nomenclature for the analysis and comparison of scientific programmes 
and budgets (NABS) at chapter level (Chapter 13 – Defence) as defined in the Frascati 
Manual (OECD, 2002). 
Eurostat 
Share in % of high-tech 
sectors in total 
manufacturing value 
added 
Based on the EU R&D Scoreboard (Company data) following the ICB and NACE sector 
classifications. Note that the Scoreboard refers to all R&D financed by a particular company 
from its own funds, regardless of where that R&D activity is performed while BERD refers 
to all R&D activities performed by businesses within a particular sector and territory, 
regardless of the location of the business’s headquarters, and regardless of the sources of 
finance (Eurostat website). 
Eurostat 
Industry university 
links (business funded 
R&D performed in 
other sector than the 
business one) 
100-(R&D expenditures funded and performed in the private sector in % of R&D 
expenditures funded in the private sector and performed in all sectors). 
Eurostat 
 Appendix 6: Additional results 
Figure A 1  BERD intensity vs. HERD intensity (both in logs) for all sub periods 
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  91Figure A 2  BERD vs. BERDBYGOV (both in logs) for all sub periods 
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  93Figure A 3  BERD vs. GOVERD (both in logs) for all sub periods 
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  95Table A 1  R&D personnel for three sub periods 1980-1984, 1990-1994 and 2000-2004 
R&D personnel  Country 
1980 – 1984 1990 - 1994 2000 - 2004 
Argentina     3200 
Australia 4681  13742  19936 
Austria 3120  6995  16255 
Belgium 5659  10106  16778 
Bulgaria   3527  1128 
Canada 17228  35240  70034 
China   151225  439779 
Croatia     1060 
Cyprus   27  98 
Czech Republic      6266 
Denmark 2719  5336  14002 
Estonia     463 
Finland 3033  5312  21663 
France 38061  62896  94374 
Germany 79442  134880  158143 
Greece   1181  3836 
Hungary 12574  4705  4221 
Iceland 47  208  856 
Ireland 714  2354  5961 
Israel      
Italy 20724  29149  27026 
Japan 212265  354426  439591 
Korea     100698 
Latvia   755  653 
Lithuania     379 
Luxembourg     1513 
Malta     99 
Mexico   1311  8726 
Netherlands 8819  12243  21082 
New Zealand    1420  3256 
Norway 3590  6933  11279 
Poland 49450  14870  7863 
Portugal 667  1002  3217 
Romania   25608  10733 
Russia   366982  274878 
Singapore   4059  9879 
Slovak Republic    2648  2115 
Slovenia   1211  1537 
South Africa       
Spain 3545  11310  24819 
Sweden 9957  14410  28144 
Switzerland 6048  9800  14458 
Turkey   1510  4190 
United Kingdom  77500  80000  93738 
United States  547500  766160  1054500 
Note: Data sorted in alphabetical order. 
  96Table A 2  Correlation matrix 
 BERD 
intensity 
Growth of 
BERD 
intensity 
HERD 
intensity 
Growth of 
HERD 
intensity 
GOVERD 
intensity 
Growth of 
GOVERD 
intensity 
BERDBYGOV 
intensity 
BERD intensity  1.0000            
Growth of 
BERD intensity  -0.0056 1.0000           
HERD intensity  0.7249* 0.0669  1.0000         
Growth of 
HERD intensity  -0.4529* 0.2158  -0.3587  1.0000       
GOVERD 
intensity  0.1372 0.7026* 0.0781 -0.1825 1.0000     
Growth of 
GOVERD 
intensity 
0.1363 0.4064 0.0979 0.1140 0.3885  1.0000   
BERDBYGOV 
intensity  0.4215* -0.2243 0.2415*  -0.4412* 0.3686*  0.0531  1.0000 
Note: * indicates significance on the 5% level. 
  97Supplemental Stochastic frontier regressions 
Cross-sectional estimations using different model specifications 
 
In the main text body, we show regressions, where all regressors are divided by GDP to take 
out pure country size effects in the regressions. However, we also estimated the models with 
other specifications. Specification A uses the log of the levels of the variables, and B just 
rescales the regressors HERD and GOVERD by BERDBYGOV to reduce multicollinearity 
among them. Model C is the specification as shown in the main text. 
 
A)  is the regression of ln(BERD) on ln(BERDBYGOV), ln(HERD) and ln(GOVERD). 
Similarly, 
B)  refers to ln(BERD) on ln(BERDBYGOV), ln(HERD/BERDBYGOV) and 
ln(GOVERD/BERDBYGOV), and 
C)  is the regression of ln(BERD/GDP) on ln(BERDBYGOV/GDP), ln(HERD/GDP) and 
ln(GOVERD/GDP). 
Table A 3  Stochastic Frontier Estimation – Basic specification A 
 Time  Period 
Variable 1980-1984  1990-1994  2000-2004 
ln(BERDBYGOV)  0.142* 0.402***  0.512  *** 
  (0.076) (0.089) (0.103)   
ln(HERD)  1.144*** 0.675*** 0.381  *** 
  (0.131) (0.134) (0.114)   
ln(GOVERD)  -0.175 -0.029  0.199   
  (0.128) (0.135) (0.145)   
Intercept  0.486 1.008 1.137  * 
  (0.593) (0.839) (0.675)   
2.045 -1.415***  -0.760  ***  ()
2 ln v σ  
(6.055) (0.553) (0.271)   
-20.219 -0.104 -0.086    μ 
(130.211) (23.345) (18.327)   
# of obs.  21 26 42 
Log-Likelihood  -10.887 -18.476 -43.616 
χ
2 Test  506.78*** 380.18*** 519.41*** 
Coelli-Test: No inefficiency 
[p-value] 
-0.918 
[0.179] 
1.148 
[0.874] 
3.221 
[0.999] 
Note:  μ denotes the mean of the truncated normal distribution (inefficiency term). Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
  98Table A 4  Stochastic Frontier Estimation – Basic specification B 
  Time Period 
Variable 1980-1984  1990-1994  2000-2004 
ln(BERDBYGOV)  1.111*** 1.048*** 1.093  *** 
  (0.067) (0.063) (0.052)   
ln(HERD/BERDBYGOV)  1.114*** 0.675*** 0.381  *** 
  (0.131) (0.134) (0.114)   
ln(GOVERD/BERDBYGOV)  -0.175 -0.029  0.199   
  (0.128) (0.135) (0.145)   
Intercept  0.486 1.007 1.137  * 
  (0.593) (0.640) (0.630)   
2.049 -1.415***  -0.760  ***  ()
2 ln v σ  
(5.918) (0.400) (0.257)   
-20.298 -0.112 -0.082    μ 
(127.752) (14.687) (12.784)   
# of obs.  21 26 42 
Log-Likelihood  -10.887 -18.476 -43.616 
χ
2 Test  506.83*** 380.18*** 519.43*** 
Coelli-Test: No inefficiency 
[p-value] 
-0.918 
[0.179] 
1.148 
[0.874] 
3.221 
[0.999] 
Note:  μ denotes the mean of the truncated normal distribution (inefficiency term). Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
The following tables show the panel regressions for specifications A, B and C for both BERD 
and R&D personnel in the business sector. 
Table A 5  Stochastic Frontier Panel Data Estimation on BERD 
 Specification 
Variable A  B  C 
BERDBYGOV  0.453*** 1.091*** 0.492  *** 
  (0.049) (0.030) (0.049)   
HERD  0.619*** 0.619*** 0.601  *** 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.081)   
GOVERD  0.020 0.020  -0.007   
  (0.069) (0.069) (0.099)   
Intercept  0.753** 0.753** 1.938  *** 
  (0.350) (0.351) (0.736)   
Joint significance of 4 time dummies  2.80 2.80 1.84   
[p-value]  [0.592] [0.592] [0.765]   
-1.027*** -1.027*** -0.968  ***  ()
2 ln v σ  
(0.186) (0.186) (0.192)   
-0.145 -0.145 -0.128    μ 
(15.705) (15.782)  (22.74)   
# of obs.  145 145 145 
Log-Likelihood  -131.214 -131.21  -135.49 
χ
2 Test  1911.53*** 1911.53***  301.24*** 
Coelli-Test: No inefficiency 
[p-value] 
6.143 
[1.000] 
6.143 
[1.000] 
4.223 
[1.000] 
Note:  μ denotes the mean of the truncated normal distribution (inefficiency term). Standard errors in 
parentheses unless indicated otherwise. *** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
  99Table A 6  Stochastic  Frontier  Panel  Data Estimation on R&D Personnel in the 
business sector 
 Specification 
Variable A  B  C 
BERDBYGOV  0.605*** 0.918*** 0.572  *** 
  (0.054) (0.032) (0.053)   
HERD  0.213*** 0.213*** 0.184  ** 
  (0.072) (0.072) (0.087)   
GOVERD  0.101 0.101 0.065   
  (0.077) (0.077) (0.104)   
Intercept  3.688*** 3.687*** 8.940  *** 
  (0.350) (0.392) (0.805)   
Joint significance of 4 time dummies  49.03*** 49.03*** 49.70  *** 
[p-value]  [p<0.001] [p<0.001] [p<0.001]   
-0.890*** -0.890*** -0.860  ***  ()
2 ln v σ  
(0.158) (0.156) (0.175)   
-0.101 -0.101 -0.100    μ 
(10.423) (10.277)  (20.89)   
# of obs.  141 141 145 
Log-Likelihood  -137.301 -137.301  -135.49 
χ
2 Test  1291.27*** 1291.27***  301.24*** 
Coelli-Test: No inefficiency 
[p-value] 
5.672 
[1.000] 
5.672 
[1.000] 
4.223 
[1.000] 
Note:  μ denotes the mean of the truncated normal distribution (inefficiency term). Standard errors in 
parentheses unless indicated otherwise. *** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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Table A 7  DEA output efficiency scores, 3 inputs (HERD, GOVERD, BERDBYGOV), 
1 output (BERD) 
  Variable Returns to Scale  Constant Returns to Scale  Scale Inefficiency 
  80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04
Argentina           1.168  1.272          1.264 1.889          1.082 1.485
Australia  1.248 1.136 1.065 1.023 1.123 1.255 1.149 1.187 1.146 1.579 1.005 1.012 1.115 1.121 1.406
Austria  1.000 1.058 1.118 1.126 1.151 1.107 1.100 1.132 1.150 1.343 1.107 1.040 1.013 1.022 1.167
Belgium  1.000 1.000 1.019 1.027 1.112 1.011 1.000 1.026 1.053 1.335 1.011 1.000 1.007 1.025 1.201
Canada  1.149 1.131 1.138 1.107 1.082 1.164 1.148 1.226 1.186 1.501 1.013 1.015 1.078 1.071 1.387
China              1.033             1.620             1.568
Croatia              1.000             1.176             1.176
Cyprus           1.000  1.000          1.000 1.000          1.000 1.000
Czech Republic           1.000  1.263          1.037 1.555          1.037 1.231
Denmark  1.103 1.082 1.105 1.051 1.071 1.106 1.092 1.136 1.099 1.355 1.003 1.009 1.027 1.046 1.265
Estonia           1.000  1.000          1.184 1.016          1.184 1.016
Finland  1.056 1.006 1.074 1.021 1.085 1.061 1.017 1.118 1.067 1.368 1.005 1.011 1.041 1.044 1.261
France  1.066 1.054 1.061 1.073 1.102 1.087 1.078 1.180 1.193 1.578 1.020 1.023 1.113 1.112 1.432
Germany  1.016 1.008 1.019 1.041 1.049 1.057 1.039 1.130 1.161 1.518 1.040 1.030 1.109 1.116 1.447
Greece 1.086  1.232  1.217 1.173 1.117 1.113 1.262 1.242 1.315 1.587 1.025 1.024 1.021 1.121 1.421
Hungary           1.163  1.283          1.188 1.746          1.022 1.361
Iceland  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.050 1.612 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.143 1.612 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.089
Ireland  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.081 1.013 1.034 1.015 1.000 1.260 1.013 1.034 1.015 1.000 1.165
Israel        1.105  1.069  1.075       1.134 1.099 1.271       1.026 1.029 1.182
Italy  1.070 1.084 1.099 1.151 1.197 1.089 1.108 1.205 1.258 1.641 1.018 1.022 1.096 1.093 1.371
Japan  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.096 1.071 1.106 1.099 1.463 1.096 1.071 1.106 1.099 1.463
 
  Variable Returns to Scale  Constant Returns to Scale  Scale Inefficiency 
 80-84  85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04
Korea           1.000  1.048          1.075 1.450          1.075 1.383
Latvia           1.408  1.476          1.557 1.643          1.105 1.114
Lithuania              1.000             1.056             1.056
Luxembourg              1.000             1.000             1.000
Malta              1.000             1.000             1.000
Mexico        1.000  1.288  1.196       1.033 1.393 1.776       1.033 1.082 1.486
Netherlands  1.114 1.081 1.129 1.110 1.147 1.121 1.088 1.205 1.189 1.527 1.007 1.007 1.068 1.071 1.332
New Zealand     1.000  1.218  1.221  1.339    1.015 1.219 1.292 1.755    1.015  1.001 1.058 1.311
Norway  1.116 1.066 1.156 1.140 1.255 1.119 1.077 1.187 1.177 1.506 1.003 1.010 1.027 1.033 1.200
Poland           1.277  1.492          1.342 1.923          1.050 1.289
Portugal  1.000 1.000 1.299 1.217 1.142 1.000 1.000 1.370 1.333 1.653 1.000 1.000 1.055 1.096 1.448
Romania              1.000             1.412             1.412
Russia              1.294             1.686             1.303
Singapore        1.000  1.100  1.216       1.000 1.104 1.444       1.000 1.004 1.187
Slovak Republic        1.000  1.000  1.448       1.000 1.000 1.543       1.000 1.000 1.065
South Africa              1.241             1.576             1.270
Spain  1.095 1.076 1.133 1.141 1.191 1.099 1.076 1.211 1.211 1.565 1.003 1.000 1.069 1.061 1.314
Sweden  1.025 1.011 1.024 1.004 1.035 1.063 1.014 1.034 1.029 1.207 1.037 1.003 1.009 1.025 1.167
Switzerland  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
United  Kingdom 1.057 1.044 1.049 1.081 1.115 1.078 1.071 1.151 1.190 1.530 1.020 1.026 1.098 1.100 1.372
United  States  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.030 1.041 1.139 1.144 1.524 1.030 1.041 1.139 1.144 1.524Table A 8  DEA output efficiency scores - 3 inputs (HERD, GOVERD, BERDBYGOV), 
1 output (BER vs. BERD), variable returns to scale, 2000-2004, BER vs. 
BERD 
  ln BER  ln BERD 
Country  Efficiency
Score  Rank Efficiency
score  Rank
Argentina 1.299 32 1.272 25
Australia 1.173 18 1.123 15
Austria 1.204 23 1.151 18
Belgium 1.203 22 1.112 12
Canada 1.068 4 1.082 9
China 1.008 3 1.033 2
Croatia 1.119 7 1.000 1
Cyprus 1.003 2 1.000 1
Czech Republic  1.298 31 1.263 24
Denmark 1.147 16 1.071 7
Estonia 1.000 1 1.000 1
Finland 1.131 9 1.085 10
France 1.140 11 1.102 11
Germany 1.097 5 1.049 5
Greece 1.142 13 1.117 14
Hungary 1.184 21 1.283 26
Iceland 1.146 15 1.050 6
Ireland 1.178 20 1.081 8
Italy 1.245 28 1.197 21
Japan 1.000 1 1.000 1
Korea 1.100 6 1.048 4
Latvia 1.141 12 1.476 30
Lithuania 1.000 1 1.000 1
Luxembourg 1.000 1 1.000 1
Malta 1.000 1 1.000 1
Mexico 1.135 10 1.196 20
Netherlands 1.173 17 1.147 17
New Zealand  1.293 30 1.339 28
Norway 1.218 25 1.255 23
Poland 1.252 29 1.492 31
Portugal 1.227 27 1.142 16
Romania 1.000 1 1.000 1
Russia 1.000 1 1.294 27
Singapore 1.222 26 1.216 22
Slovak Republic 1.374 33 1.448 29
Spain 1.204 24 1.191 19
Sweden 1.174 19 1.035 3
Switzerland 1.144 14 1.000 1
United Kingdom 1.126 8 1.115 13
United States  1.000 1 1.000 1
 
  102Table A 9  Output  efficiency  scores,  3 inputs (HERD, GOVERD, BERDBYGOV), 1 
output (BERD), 2000-2004, Variable vs. Constant returns to scale and DEA 
vs. SCI and FDH 
  SCI DEA  FDH 
Country  Output-
Oriented 
Output-
Oriented 
Input-
Oriented 
Output-
Oriented 
  VRS CRS  VRS FDH 
 
 
Efficiency Efficiency 
Scale 
Inefficiency 
Efficiency Efficiency 
Argentina  3.020  1.272 1.889  1.485  0.598 1.104 
Australia    1.006  1.123 1.579  1.406  0.821 1.012 
Austria    0.818  1.151 1.343  1.167  0.764 1.000 
Belgium    0.550  1.112 1.336  1.201  0.819 1.000 
Canada    0.938  1.083 1.501  1.387  0.879 1.000 
China    0.680  1.033 1.620  1.568  0.939 1.000 
Croatia    1.526  1.000 1.176  1.176  1.000 1.000 
Cyprus    4.188  1.000 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Czech Republic   0.928  1.263 1.555  1.231  0.644 1.000 
Denmark    0.546  1.071 1.355  1.265  0.882 1.000 
Estonia    2.394  1.000 1.016  1.016  1.000 1.000 
Finland    0.465  1.085 1.368  1.261  0.867 1.000 
France    0.832  1.102 1.579  1.432  0.853 1.000 
Germany    0.543  1.049 1.518  1.447  0.927 1.000 
Greece   2.553  1.117  1.587 1.421 0.773 1.000 
Hungary  1.954  1.283 1.746  1.361  0.634 1.125 
Iceland  1.024  1.050 1.143  1.089  0.935 1.000 
Ireland  0.556  1.081 1.260  1.165  0.857 1.000 
Israel  0.434  1.075 1.271  1.182  0.872 1.000 
Italy  1.519  1.197 1.641  1.371  0.732 1.104 
Japan  0.339  1.000 1.463  1.463  1.000 1.000 
Korea  0.393  1.048 1.450  1.383  0.924 1.000 
Latvia  3.189  1.476 1.643  1.114  0.609 1.000 
Lithuania  4.499  1.000 1.056  1.056  1.000 1.000 
Luxembourg 0.143  1.000 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Malta    3.754  1.000 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Mexico    2.272  1.196 1.776  1.486  0.677 1.075 
Netherlands   0.961  1.147 1.527  1.332  0.791 1.027 
New Zealand   2.066  1.339  1.755  1.311  0.600  1.043 
Norway    1.032  1.255 1.506  1.200  0.664 1.026 
Poland    3.439  1.492 1.923  1.289  0.523 1.139 
Portugal    2.025  1.142 1.653  1.448  0.741 1.000 
Romania    1.442  1.000 1.412  1.412  1.000 1.000 
Russia    2.323  1.294 1.686  1.303  0.593 1.000 
Singapore    0.814  1.216 1.444  1.187  0.699 1.000 
Slovak Republic   1.135  1.448  1.543  1.065  0.652  1.198 
South  Africa    1.056  1.241 1.576  1.270  0.665 1.000 
Spain    1.135  1.191 1.565  1.314  0.729 1.074 
Sweden    0.425  1.035 1.207  1.167  0.940 1.000 
Switzerland   0.379  1.000 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
United Kingdom   0.911  1.115  1.530  1.372  0.833  1.017 
United States   0.481  1.000  1.524  1.524  1.000  1.000 
 
  103Table A 10  DEA output efficiency scores - 3 inputs (HERD, GOVERD, BERDBYGOV), 
1 output (BERD), variable returns to scale, 2000-2004, Levels of variables 
vs. Natural logarithms and % in terms of GDP 
 level    ln    in %   
Country  Efficiency
Score  Rank Efficiency
score  Rank Efficiency
score  Rank 
Argentina 5.914 30 1.272 27 4.060 25 
Australia 2.994 23 1.123 16 2.903 21 
Austria 2.119 14 1.151 19 2.197 14 
Belgium 1.449 6 1.112 13 1.715 9 
Canada 2.096 13 1.082 10 2.100 12 
China 1.000 1 1.033 2 2.457 17 
Croatia 1.079 3 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Cyprus 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Czech Republic  2.431 18 1.263 26 2.872 20 
Denmark 1.603 7 1.071 7 1.502 8 
Estonia 2.681 19 1.000 1 3.745 23 
Finland 1.354 4 1.085 11 1.065 3 
France 2.093 12 1.102 12 2.055 11 
Germany 1.402 5 1.049 5 1.418 6 
Greece 2.161 15 1.117 15 1.000 1 
Hungary 5.015 29 1.283 28 4.733 28 
Iceland 1.856 11 1.050 6 1.928 10 
Ireland 1.770 8 1.081 9 1.495 7 
Israel 1.021 2 1.075 8 1.000 1 
Italy 4.108 27 1.197 22 4.888 29 
Japan 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Korea 1.000 1 1.048 4 1.061 2 
Latvia 8.318 32 1.476 32 6.563 32 
Lithuania 1.780 10 1.000 1 1.225 5 
Luxembourg 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Malta 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Mexico 3.845 26 1.196 21 2.375 16 
Netherlands 2.761 21 1.147 18 2.737 18 
New Zealand  6.263 31 1.339 30 5.867 31 
Norway 2.923 22 1.255 25 2.933 22 
Poland 9.208 33 1.492 33 13.456 33 
Portugal 2.714 20 1.142 17 2.133 13 
Romania 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Russia 1.780 9 1.294 29 4.549 27 
Singapore 2.336 17 1.216 23 2.217 15 
Slovak Republic  4.221 28 1.448 31 5.491 30 
South Africa  3.089 24 1.241 24 4.530 26 
Spain 3.102 25 1.191 20 4.020 24 
Sweden 1.000 1 1.035 3 1.000 1 
Switzerland 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
United Kingdom  2.166 16 1.115 14 2.760 19 
United States  1.000 1 1.000 1 1.213 4 
 
  104Table A 11  DEA output efficiency scores - 3 inputs (HERD, GOVERD, BERDBYGOV), 
1 output (BERD), variable returns to scale, 2000-2004, B-index 
  B-index incl.  B-index excl. 
Country  Efficiency
Score  Rank Efficiency
score  Rank
Argentina 1.000 1 1.272 22
Australia 1.079 12 1.123 14
Austria 1.097 14 1.151 17
Belgium 1.055 11 1.112 11
Canada 1.050 10 1.082 8
Denmark 1.008 2 1.071 6
Finland 1.013 3 1.085 9
France 1.081 13 1.102 10
Germany 1.036 8 1.049 4
Greece 1.025 6 1.117 13
Hungary 1.140 19 1.283 23
Iceland 1.000 1 1.050 5
Ireland 1.015 4 1.081 7
Italy 1.176 20 1.197 20
Japan 1.000 1 1.000 1
Korea 1.000 1 1.048 3
Mexico 1.112 17 1.196 19
Netherlands 1.101 16 1.147 16
New Zealand  1.215 21 1.339 24
Norway 1.124 18 1.255 21
Portugal 1.029 7 1.142 15
Spain 1.048 9 1.191 18
Sweden 1.021 5 1.035 2
Switzerland 1.000 1 1.000 1
United Kingdom 1.098 15 1.115 12
United States  1.000 1 1.000 1
 
  105Table  A  12  DEA output efficiency scores - 3 inputs (lnHERD, lnGOVERD, 
lnBERDBYGOV), 1 output (lnBERD), variable returns to scale, 2000-2004 
different samples 
 
all 
countries 
all countries 
less former 
eastern 
countries 
EU27+
JP+US EU27 EU15+
JP+US EU15 
Argentina  1.272  1.179      
Australia  1.123  1.110      
Austria 1.151  1.065 1.151 1.101 1.033 1.029 
Belgium 1.112  1.069 1.112 1.108 1.045 1.037 
Canada  1.082  1.019      
China  1.033  1.000      
Croatia  1.000         
Cyprus 1.000   1.000 1.003    
Czech Republic  1.263    1.263 1.216    
Denmark 1.071  1.030 1.067 1.086 1.024 1.007 
Estonia 1.000   1.000 1.000    
Finland 1.085  1.026 1.083 1.060 1.013 1.000 
France 1.102  1.085 1.102 1.034 1.081 1.026 
Germany 1.049  1.060 1.049 1.000 1.056 1.000 
Greece 1.117  1.000 1.078 1.136 1.000 1.000 
Hungary 1.283    1.260 1.158    
Iceland  1.050  1.000      
Ireland 1.081  1.007 1.074 1.139 1.000 1.000 
Israel  1.075         
Italy 1.197  1.167 1.197 1.131 1.156 1.106 
Japan 1.000  1.000 1.000   1.000  
Korea  1.048  1.007      
Latvia 1.476    1.476 1.141    
Lithuania 1.000    1.000 1.000    
Luxembourg 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Malta 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000    
Mexico  1.196  1.026      
Netherlands 1.147  1.096 1.145 1.088 1.089 1.039 
New  Zealand  1.339  1.143      
Norway  1.255  1.084      
Poland 1.492   1.490 1.175    
Portugal 1.142  1.091 1.115 1.200 1.090 1.078 
Romania 1.000    1.000 1.000    
Russia  1.294         
Singapore  1.216  1.092      
Slovak 
Republic 1.448    1.448 1.312    
South  Africa  1.241         
Spain 1.191  1.114 1.191 1.105 1.101 1.064 
Sweden 1.035  1.021 1.035 1.044 1.000 1.000 
Switzerland 1.000  1.000 1.000      
United 
Kingdom  1.115 1.051 1.115 1.012 1.042 1.000 
United States  1.000  1.000 1.000   1.000  
 
 
  106Table  A  13 Correlation matrix between the variables used in the first stage (DEA 
analysis) and the determinants used in the second stage (Tobit regression) 
  lnberd lnberdbygov lngoverd  lnherd   # of obs.
ln BERD  1         1 4 4
ln BERDBYGOV  0.926 1       
ln GOVERD  0.881 0.875 1      
ln HERD  0.932 0.871 0.894 1     
Size of government: Expenditures, taxes and enterprises  -0.055 -0.176 -0.001 0.000  143
Legal structure and security of property rights  0.324 0.222 0.119 0.273     
Access to sound money  0.500 0.346 0.274 0.446     
Freedom to trade internationally  0.258 0.220 0.030 0.181     
Regulation of credit, labour, and business  0.169 0.081 0.062 0.139     
More effective control of public spending growth  -0.236 -0.156 -0.208 -0.344  21
Anchoring the budget process in a medium-term perspective  -0.141 -0.040 -0.003 -0.152    
Reduced budget fragmentation and increased transparency  -0.100 0.005 0.090 -0.196    
Share of enterprises receiving public funding for innovation   0.506 0.409 0.486 0.494  46
Public procurement advertised  
in the Official Journal as a % of GDP  -0.291 -0.307 -0.193 -0.136  43
Public procurement advertised  
in the Official Journal as a % of total public procurements  -0.443 -0.433 -0.262 -0.232  42
Industry university links (business funded R&D 
performed in other sector than the business one)  0.631 0.528 0.436 0.496  113
Basic R&D performed in the private sector  
in % of total business R&D  0.271 0.199 0.041 0.156  46
Share in % of researchers, scientists & engineers 
In the private sector as a % of total active population  0.451 0.313 0.182 0.190  50
Share in % of researchers, scientists & engineers 
In the total business R&D personnel  -0.269 -0.304 -0.403 -0.253  50
Share in % of high-tech sectors 
in total manufacturing value added  0.545 0.395 0.328 0.446  35
Strength of the IPR system  0.655 0.665 0.415 0.544  65
Share of Public Credit Appropriation in the defence sector  0.565 0.705 0.603 0.531  84
 
 
  107Table A 14  Impact of detailed regulatory conditions on DEA efficiency scores: Panel 
data TOBIT regression 
    Dependent Variable: DEA efficiency scores 
Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises      
General government consumption spending as a % of total consumption-0.020 (0.005) *** 
Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP  0.021 (0.007) *** 
Government enterprises and investment   0.012 (0.004) *** 
Top marginal tax rate  -0.001 (0.006)   
# of obs. [left censored]  140 [42]    
log-likelihood  59.9      
LR-test for random effects  63.4    *** 
Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights      
Judicial independence  -0.038 (0.018)  ** 
Impartial courts   -0.024 (0.024)   
Protection of property rights  0.028 (0.023)  
Military interference in rule of law and the political process   0.045 (0.010) *** 
# of obs. [left censored]  72 [18]    
log-likelihood  18.7       
LR-test for random effects  12.2     *** 
Access to Sound Money      
Money growth  -0.014 (0.012)   
Standard deviation of inflation  0.014 (0.013)   
Inflation: most recent year  0.002 (0.014)   
Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts  0.005 (0.004)   
# of obs. [left censored]  142 [43]    
log-likelihood  52.1       
LR-test for random effects  49.8     *** 
Freedom to Trade Internationally      
Taxes on international trade  -0.074 (0.031)  ** 
Regulatory trade barriers  0.002 (0.027)   
Size of the trade sector relative to expected  0.017 (0.012)   
Black-market exchange rates  3.305 (0.022) *** 
International capital market controls  0.027 (0.013)  ** 
# of obs. [left censored]  72 [18]    
log-likelihood  22.5       
LR-test for random effects  13.4     *** 
Regulation of Credit, Labour, and Business      
Credit market regulations  0.020 (0.026)   
Labour market regulations  -0.013 (0.019)   
Business regulations  -0.012 (0.026)   
# of obs. [left censored]  72 [18]    
log-likelihood  16.5       
LR-test for random effects  9.2     *** 
Notes: 
Annual dummies included; standard errors in parentheses; 
*** (**, *) denote a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
  108Figure  A  4 Comparison of efficiency scores (DEA analysis) obtained from R&D 
expenditures (ln BERD) vs. R&D personnel (ln BER) 
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Notes 
80 = 1980-1984 
85 = 1985-1989 
90 = 1990-1994 
95 = 1995-1999 
00 = 2000-2005 
 
 
  109Figure A 5  Scatterplot of DEA predicted and unpredicted scores (ln berd vs. ln ber as 
output) based on the Fraser Institute regulatory conditions 
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Notes 
y = ln business R&D expenditures; z = ln business R&D personnel; unpr = unpredicted;  
 tp = Tobit pooled; tr = Tobit random; fr = 5 Fraser summary regulatory conditions 
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Appendix 7: List of countries groupings 
 
Grouping (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)      (6)     
  geographic areas  GDP per capita IM EURO Size of government  SII    
Country  EU15 EU10 REU HIC RW L  M  H      L  M  H  L  M H
                            
Argentina 0  0  0  0  1 0 1 0 0 0 0  0  1       
Australia 0  0  0  0  1 0 1 0 0 0 0  1  0       
Austria 1  0  0  0  0 0 1 1 1 0 1  0  0  0 1 0
Belgium 1  0  0  0  0 0 1 0 1 0 0  0  0  0 0 1
Bulgaria 0  1  0  0  0 1 0 0 0 0 0  0  1  1 0 0
Canada 0  0  0  1  0 0 1 0 0 0 1  0  0       
China 0  0  0  0  1 1 0 0 0 0 0  0  1       
Croatia 0  0  1  0  0 1 1 0 0 0 1  0  0  1 0 0
Cyprus 0  1  0  0  0 0 1 0 0 0 0  1  0  0 1 0
Czech Republic  0  1  0  0  0 0 1 0 0 0 1  0  0  0 1 0
Denmark 1  0  0  0  0 0 1 1 1 0 1  0  0  0 0 1
Estonia 0  1  0  0  0 1 1 0 0 0 1  0  0  0 1 0
Finland 1  0  0  0  0 0 1 0 1 0 1  0  0  0 0 1
France 1  0  0  0  0 0 1 0 1 0 1  0  0  0 1 0
Germany 1  0  0  0  0 0 1 0 1 0 1  0  0  0 0 1
Greece 1  0  0  0  0 0 1 0 1 0 0  0  1  1 0 0
Hungary 0  1  0  0  0 0 1 0 0 0 0  0  1  1 0 0
Iceland 0  0  1  0  0 0 1 0 0 0 0  1  0  0 0 1
Ireland 1  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 1 0 0  1  0  0 1 0
Israel 0  0  0  0  1 0 1 0 0 0 1  0  0       
Italy 1  0  0  0  0 0 1 0 1 0 0  1  0  0 1 0
Japan 0  0  0  1  0 0 1 0 0 0 0  0  1  0 0 1
Korea 0  0  0  1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  1       
Latvia 0  1  0  0  0 1 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  1 0 0
Lithuania 0  1  0  0  0 1 0 0 0 0 0  1  0  1 0 0
Luxembourg 1  0  0  0  0 0 0 1 1 0 0  0  0  0 0 1
Malta 0  1  0  0  0 0 1 0 0 0 0  1  0  0 1 0
Mexico 0  0  0  0  1 1 0 0 0 0 0  0  1       
Netherlands 1  0  0  0  0 0 1 0 1 0 0  1  0  0 1 0
New Zealand  0  0  0  0  1 0 1 0 0 0 0  1  0       
Norway 0  0  1  0  0 0 0 1 0 0 1  0  0  0 1 0
Poland 0  1  0  0  0 1 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  1 0 0
Portugal 1  0  0  0  0 0 1 0 1 0 0  0  1  1 0 0
Romania 0  1  0  0  0 1 0 0 0 0 0  0  1  1 0 0
Russia 0  0  0  0  1 1 0 0 0 0 1  0  0       
Singapore 0  0  0  0  1 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  1       
Slovak Republic  0  1  0  0  0 0 1 0 0 0 1  0  0  1 0 0
Slovenia 0  1  0  0  0 0 1 0 0 0 1  0  0  0 1 0
South Africa  0  0  0  0  1 1 0 0 0 0 0  1  0       
Spain 1  0  0  0  0 0 1 0 1 0 0  1  0  0 1 0
Sweden 1  0  0  0  0 0 1 0 1 0 1  0  0  0 0 1
Switzerland 0  0  1  0  0 0 0 1 0 0 0  0  1  0 0 1
Turkey 0  0  1  0  0 1 0 0 0 0 0  0  1  1 0 0
United Kingdom  1  0  0  0  0 0 1 0 1 0 0  1  0  0 0 1
United States  0  0  0  1  0 0 0 1 0 0 0  0  1  0 0 1
Notes:   L = Low, M = Medium and H = High. 